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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation’s second and third chapters are about divorce. The fourth is about utilitarian-
ism. Each can be read as a self-contained paper.  
The second chapter is titled “The Evolution of Fault to No-Fault Divorce and The Contempo-
raneous Changes in Divorce Rates.” I find that the statutory enactment of no-fault was not corre-
lated with an increase in divorce rates. Instead, it was correlated with a fall in the growth rates of 
divorce. I review the historical facts and find that in the previous decades, the fault concept had 
already been thoroughly eroded. This may explain why no-fault reforms were not correlated with 
an increase in divorce. 
The third chapter is titled “Omnibus Clauses and Contemporaneous Changes in Divorce Rates, 
1867-1906.” I give a primer on the unusually liberal divorce laws known as omnibus clauses. I 
find that they were significantly correlated with divorce rates.  
The fourth chapter is titled “Revealed Relative Utilitarianism.” It considers the aggregation of 
von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and introduces the concept of revealed marginal rates of 
substitution. The main result is that the only social welfare function that satisfies a certain set of 
axioms that is the relative utilitarian welfare function, that is, where the social planner simply adds 
up all agents’ 0-1 normalized utility functions.  
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CHAPTER I  
Introduction 
 
This dissertation’s second and third chapters are about divorce and, in particular, about the 
relation between divorce laws and divorce rates. The fourth chapter, which is co-authored with 
Tilman Börgers, considers the axiomatic foundations for a utilitarian social welfare function. Each 
of these three chapters can be read as a self-contained paper.  
The second chapter is titled “The Evolution of Fault to No-Fault Divorce and The Contempo-
raneous Changes in Divorce Rates.” I revisit the empirical question of whether the introduction of 
no-fault divorce statutes was correlated with an increase in divorce rates. I do so by reexamining 
the data. I find that no-fault was not correlated with an increase in divorce rates (in the short term 
or the long). Instead, it was correlated with a fall in the growth rates of divorce. To explain why 
no-fault was not correlated with an increase in divorce, I review the historical facts. In the decades 
leading to 1970, the fault concept had already been thoroughly eroded by judiciaries and, to a lesser 
extent, legislatures. In other words, the divorce law had gradually evolved from fault to no-fault. 
The enactment of no-fault thus served merely to codify the law in action into the law of the books. 
This may thus explain why no-fault reforms were not correlated with an increase in divorce. 
The third chapter is titled “Omnibus Clauses and Contemporaneous Changes in Divorce Rates, 
1867-1906.” I give a primer on the unusually liberal divorce laws known as omnibus clauses. I 
then compile annual county-level divorce counts and coding for multiple aspects of divorce laws. 
Using these newly-compiled data, I examine the correlation between divorce laws and divorce 
rates. I find that the omnibus clauses were significantly correlated with divorce rates. This provides 
evidence that divorce laws did matter for divorce rates in the nineteenth century. 
The fourth chapter is titled “Revealed Relative Utilitarianism.” It is co-authored with Tilman 
Börgers. We consider the aggregation of individual agents’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s utility 
functions into a societal von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. We start from Harsanyi’s 
(1955) axiomatization of utilitarianism, and ask under which conditions a social preference order 
2 
 
that satisfies Harsanyi’s axiom uniquely reveals society’s marginal rates of substitution between 
the probabilities of any two agents’ most preferred alternatives. We then introduce three axioms 
for these revealed marginal rates of substitution. Our main result is that the only welfare function 
that satisfies these three axioms is the relative utilitarian welfare function. This welfare function, 
that was introduced in Dhillon (1998) and Dhillon and Mertens (1999), normalizes all agents’ 
utility functions so that the lowest utility value is 0 and the highest utility value is 1, and then adds 
up the utility functions. The three axioms that we introduce are closely related to axioms that Dhil-
lon and Mertens used to provide foundations for relative utilitarianism, but our axioms allow a 
much simpler and more transparent derivation of the main result. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Evolution of Fault to No-Fault Divorce and  
The Contemporaneous Changes in Divorce Rates 
1 Introduction 
What is the relation between legislation and divorce rates? This question has received much 
attention, especially from economists of the family. Addressing this question can, for example, 
help shed light on the broader matter of how the policy-maker can shape the American family.  
This question has been most intensively studied in the context of the US no-fault reforms circa 
1970. Were these reforms linked to the divorce boom of the 1960s and 1970s (Figure II.1)? Many 
have addressed this empirical question but without producing any consensus: Some conclude that 
reforms increased divorce, while others conclude that they did not (see the literature review in 
section 2). I revisit the matter by reexamining the data. Consistent with some earlier empirical 
analyses but not with others, I find that statutory reforms are not correlated with an increase in 
divorce (in the short term or the long). Instead, they are associated with a 0.34 log point drop in 
crude divorce rates (CDR, divorces per thousand persons).  
I contribute to the existing empirical literature in several ways. First, I adjust California’s di-
vorce numbers. Statutory no-fault took effect in 1970. That year, California had 31,396 more di-
vorces than in 1969. This figure was nearly 5% of 1969’s national divorce total. But much of this 
spike had nothing to do with no-fault reforms. A contemporaneous reform reduced the interlocu-
tory period by six months and so compressed roughly one-and-a-half years’ worth of divorces into 
the single year of 1970. I calculate the effects of this reform and strip them out of the data.    
Second, I transform the dependent variable into log form. States about to enact no-fault tended 
to have higher CDRs than states that had not enacted no-fault.1 Moreover, a state’s CDR tended 
to increase more if it was higher to begin with. Together, these imply in turn that reforms would 
                                                 
1 One possible explanation for this is that legislators were more likely to act precisely where CDRs were high. 
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tend to be followed by larger level increases in divorce. To better discern the effects of no-fault 
reforms, the data are examined with the dependent variable in both level and log form.  
Third, I propose a precise definition of statutory no-fault divorce. I give the reasons behind my 
proposal. By this definition, as of 2015, exactly 43 states2 have enacted no-fault divorce. I docu-
ment the approval and effective dates of each of these 43 states’ first no-fault divorce law.  
Fourth, I clean up and extend the divorce and population data to 1922-1990 in order to investi-
gate whether the two earliest no-fault reforms in 1933 and 1935 mattered. It turns out that this 
fourth step does not materially affect the point estimates. 
 
 
FIGURE II.1. US CDR, 1860-2012 
Notes: For sources, see Appendix A. 
 
Any of the first three steps just discussed suffices to reverse an earlier finding that divorce 
increased immediately after reforms. Together, they actually reveal a negative correlation between 
no-fault and growth rates of divorce. Relative to where no-fault was absent, the CDR was on av-
erage 0.34 log point lower where no-fault was in operation, 0.22 log point lower where no-fault 
was in its first or second year of operation, and 0.63 log point lower where no-fault was in its 
fifteenth year of operation or beyond. Most would judge these substantial, given that under this 
specification, the mean of the dependent variable (log CDR) is 1.01.  
Lee & Solon (2011) also observe that the earlier finding was fragile to omitting California. They 
do not however explain why. They suggest in passing (p. 3) the possibility that divorce reforms 
had larger effects in the more populous states. The correct explanation is that California skews the 
results because of the interlocutory period reform, as I explain.  
                                                 
2 In this chapter, a state is any of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, or their predecessors.  
0
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Lee & Solon (pp. 3-4) also transform the dependent variable into log form. They “think this 
sensitivity analysis is [their] most striking of all.” They do not however explain why this should 
be so. They simply argue that the functional specification used in earlier findings was “not the 
most natural” and that the log form is “an obvious alternative.” I explain why it is not surprising 
that this alternative log specification produces such different estimates.  
Besides the above empirical contribution, this chapter also makes a separate contribution that 
is historical in nature. I document that over the course of decades, the overall law of divorce had 
gradually evolved towards no-fault, thanks to heavy erosion of the fault concept by judiciaries and, 
to a lesser extent, legislatures. Thus, when many states introduced statutory no-fault circa 1970, 
this served merely to codify into the law of the books what had already been the law in action. In 
terms of legal practice, the statutory introduction of no-fault was of little substance. It did not mark 
a revolutionary leap from a fault-based to a no-fault divorce law.  
The historical facts thus offer a possible explanation for my empirical finding that statutory no-
fault was not correlated with an increase in divorce. One would not have expected the mere codi-
fication of no-fault divorce to have been correlated with any significant changes in divorce rates.  
It remains a puzzle as to why, as I find, statutory no-fault was correlated with a fall in the growth 
rates of divorce. A possible explanation, which I briefly discuss in the conclusion, is that statutory 
no-fault reforms tended merely to mark the tail end of the 1960s-1970s divorce boom. 
The findings of this chapter tend to support the notion that in divorce law, it is the law in action 
that matters most. If there is a sudden change to the law of the books without a corresponding 
sudden change to the law in action, then one would not expect to see changes in divorce rates.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical studies on the correlation be-
tween no-fault and divorce. Section 3 explains the fault and breakdown theories of divorce. Section 
4 proposes a definition of statutory no-fault. Section 5 discusses some theoretical reasons for why 
statutory no-fault might influence divorce rates. Section 6 describes divorce trends across the US 
and the affluent West. Section 7 discusses the 1970 California timing reform and how the data 
must be adjusted accordingly. Section 8 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 9 
reviews the historical facts and uses California and Vermont as examples to illustrate judicial and 
legislative erosion of the fault concept. Section 10 concludes. 
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2 Review of Empirical Studies 
The link between legislation on divorce has been studied since at least the nineteenth century. 
Here I first list the conclusions made in empirical studies on whether US divorce reforms circa 
1970 were correlated with changes in divorce rates.3 This list makes clear that there is no consen-
sus. I then compare the methodology of this chapter’s empirical analysis to those of three recent, 
influential papers. 
Several early studies looked only at a single state. Goddard (1972, pp. 408-410), Becker (1991, 
pp. 333-334 [1981]), and Gallagher (1973) made cursory examinations of data from a single state. 
The first detailed study Schoen, Greenblatt, & Mielke (1975) found that California’s 1970 intro-
duction of no-fault did not increase divorce. The second detailed study Mazur-Hart & Berman 
(1977) showed that Nebraska’s 1972 law “had no reliable effect on the overall divorce rate.”4 
Subsequent studies examine multiple states. Wright & Stetson (1978) find “that law changes 
have had little effect on increases in the incidence of divorce in most states.” Sepler (1981) con-
cludes, “No-fault divorce laws have been ineffective in altering the divorce rates in 87 percent of 
the thirty-two evaluable states with those laws.” Marvell (1989) concludes, “No-fault laws … had 
a significant impact on divorce rates.” Zelder (1989, 1993) finds that there was “a higher divorce 
rate under no-fault.” Anderson & Shughart (1991) find that “states that do not provide a no-fault 
divorce option … tend to have lower divorce rates.” Nakonezny, Shull, & Rodgers (1995, 1997, 
1999) find that “no-fault divorce law had a significant positive effect on the divorce rate across the 
50 states,” although this would be contested by Glenn (1997, 1999). Sweezy & Tiefenhaler (1996) 
report that their “results reject notions that liberal divorce laws … encourage the breakup of fam-
ilies.” Gray (1996, 1998) finds that “no-fault divorce laws have no effect on divorce rates.” Ellman 
& Lohr (1998) conclude that “there is no evidence that divorce laws affect trends in divorce rates.” 
Brinig & Buckley (1998) find that divorce levels are “lower in states that penalize marital fault.” 
Mechoulan (2006) finds that “for couples who married before the changes in the law, there was a 
significant impact of no fault for property on divorce odds … The law defining divorce grounds, 
in contrast, has a more limited impact on divorce probabilities.” Matouschek & Rasul (2008) find 
that “divorce propensity at each marital duration is higher in adopting states.” Drewianka (2008) 
                                                 
3 I intended this list to be exhaustive, but it is more than likely that I overlooked some studies. 
4 See also Frank, Berman, & Mazur-Hart (1978). 
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finds that reforms “modestly increased divorce.” Gold (2010) finds that “divorce reform affects 
the long-term divorce rate, but find no evidence of an immediate impact”. 
Three American Economic Review articles have been particularly influential. Peters (1986) 
finds that “divorce rates are not significantly different” in reform and non-reform states.5 Friedberg 
(1998) finds that divorce reforms “accounted for 17 percent of the increase in divorce rates be-
tween 1968 and 1988.” Wolfers (2006) finds that following reforms, “the divorce rate rose sharply,” 
but “this rise was reversed within about a decade.” 
I now compare the methodology of this chapter’s empirical analysis to those of Friedberg 
(1998), Wolfers (2006), and Matouschek & Rasul (2008). Friedberg uses a panel of state-level 
divorce rates. Her regressor of interest is a single dummy indicating whether the new law was in 
effect. Besides state and year fixed-effects, she also includes state-specific time trends. Wolfers 
closely follows Friedberg, but makes one key methodological innovation. Instead of one dummy, 
he has eight: The first indicates whether the new law was in year 1 or 2; the second, whether it was 
in year 3 or 4; …; the seventh, whether it was in year 13 or 14; and the eighth, whether it was in 
year 15 or beyond. The empirical analysis below closely follows Wolfers, except that the data are 
reexamined, as will be explained in detail.  
Matouschek & Rasul (2008) do not use state-level divorce rates as their regressand. Instead, the 
regressand is divorces where the marriage lasted d years, per thousand marriages contracted d 
years earlier.6 This variable may be interpreted as marriage-duration-specific divorce propensity. 
One merit of Matouschek & Rasul’s approach is that such duration-specific divorce propensities 
can now be examined. Another merit is that the ‘incentive effect’ and the ‘selection effect’ can 
now be differentiated.7  
Note though that they use a different data set. For example, it contains no divorce data for 
eighteen states. Whether because of this or for other reasons, their estimates differ substantially 
from those of Friedberg. Friedberg (p. 616) estimated that reforms raised the CDR by 0.447, “a 
substantial impact relative to the average divorce rate over the period of 4.6.” One may interpret 
                                                 
5 Peters (1986) is disputed in a comment by Allen (1992): “What evidence there is seems to support the conclusion that no-
fault states have higher divorce rates than fault states.” In Peters’s (1992) reply to Allen, it is “shown that Allen’s empirical results 
are due to a classic problem of omitted-variable bias.” 
6 On p. 81 of their paper, the thousand is incorrectly in the denominator (email communication with Imran Rasul).  
7 Divorce reforms can change the probability that any given married couple divorces (the incentive effect). They can also 
change the composition of those who do decide to get married (the selection effect). 
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this to mean that reforms raised the propensity to divorce by 9.7 percent. In contrast, in their base-
line estimate that they compare directly to Friedberg, Matouschek & Rasul (p. 90) find that the 
effect of reforms was “to increase divorce propensity, averaged across marriages of all durations, 
by 18.5 percent.”8 
Altogether, it is not obvious whose approach is superior. I have not carefully examined the data 
set used by Matouschek & Rasul. Nonetheless I have chosen to follow the approach of Friedberg 
and Wolfers. One possible justification for this is that the latter pair of papers remain the more 
influential. For example, González-Val & Marcén (2014, p. 1) assert that their “findings have been 
widely accepted.” Dean (2014, pp. 46-47) writes, “The research is clear that the onset of ‘unilateral’ 
divorce led to a spike in divorce rates for a period of time in the 1970s and 1980s.” Bronson (2014, 
p. 8) writes, “As has been widely documented, the reforms were followed by a rapid, immediate 
increase in the number of divorces (Friedberg (1998), Wolfers (2003)).”9  
This is despite Dröes & van Lamoen (2010) and Lee & Solon (2011), who show that Friedberg 
and Wolfers are fragile to any one of the following robustness checks: The dropping of California; 
the usage of ordinary rather than weighted least squares; the transformation of the dependent var-
iable into log form; the usage of Stata’s cluster option to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. Perhaps Friedberg’s and Wolfers’s findings continue to be “widely accepted” because, 
as Lee & Solon (pp. 4-5) take great pains to emphasize, “The fragility of the previously published 
estimates does not prove those estimates are wrong.” These conclusions are not “necessarily 
wrong.” The true impact of reforms “remains unclear.”  
The analysis below will not merely repeat the conclusion that the effects of no-fault are unclear. 
I reexamine the data and take into account Lee & Solon’s critiques. I find that no-fault was corre-
lated not with a rise in divorce rates, but with a fall in their growth rates. I further explain why 
Friedberg and Wolfers were fragile to the specific robustness checks tried by Lee & Solon.  
                                                 
8 When comparing this 18.5 percent figure to Friedberg’s estimates, Matouschek & Rasul (p. 90) state, mistakenly, that Fried-
berg found that reforms “increase the aggregate divorce rate, measured as the number of divorces per 1,000 population, by 17 
percent.” In fact, what Friedberg (p. 608) found was this: “The move towards unilateral divorce accounted for 17 percent of the 
increase in divorce rates between 1968 and 1988.” 
9 This footnote lists every other 2014 paper on Google Scholar that cites Friedberg and/or Wolfers with specific reference to 
the issue of whether no-fault reforms had an effect on divorce rates. (I exclude, for example, those papers that cite them only with 
reference to matters of pure methodology.) Of these papers, only the last two even suggest that the evidence is mixed. Horner (2014, 
p. 229), Wong (2014, p. 2), Hillier & Barrow (2014, p. 355), Reichman, Corman, & Noonan (2014), Viitanen (2014, p. 26), Rossin-
Slater & Wüst (2014, p. 5), Galichon, Kominers, & Weber (2014, p. 4), Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli (2014, p. 199), Bellido & 
Marcén (2014, p. 57), Hassani-Nezhad & Sjögren (2014, p. 117), Lopoo & Raissian (2014, p. 217). 
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Here I shall mention in passing that most papers, including the present chapter, tend to focus 
on the CDR, even though it is for good reason called ‘crude’. Ideally, for a more convincing anal-
ysis, one would look at more refined measures. For example, one would look at the refined divorce 
rate—divorces per thousand married females. Or, even better, one would control for other charac-
teristics—for example, education levels, age at which the couple married, whether this is a first or 
higher order marriage, race, etc. The reason why these more-refined measures are not used here 
(and probably also elsewhere) is that the pertinent state-level data are not available. 
Here I merely and briefly suggest three reasons why the CDR may exaggerate the rise in the 
propensity to divorce. First, the CDR is mechanically boosted if there are more extant marriages 
per capita. This was precisely the case during the mid-1960s, as baby-boomers came of age and 
the baby boom itself was tapering off.  Second, the risk of divorce is greatest early on in a marriage. 
When annual marriages increase, recent marriages will make up an increasing share of extant mar-
riages. This would tend to boost even the refined divorce rate. Third, remarriages and teen mar-
riages are at higher risk of divorce.10 So if these make up an increasing share of all marriages, then 
the CDR will mechanically rise. 
I give these three reasons merely to emphasize that the use of the CDR in our analyses is not 
ideal. Ideally, one would use more refined measures of divorce. Unfortunately, it seems that the 
pertinent state-level data for such an analysis is not available. 
3 The Fault and Breakdown Theories of Divorce 
From the eleventh through the fifteenth centuries, marriage was indissoluble.11 Thereafter, ab-
solute divorce (i.e. the dissolution of one’s matrimonial bond) became possible in almost all Re-
formed states.12  
Absolute divorce was traditionally based on what may be called the fault theory. A divorce 
could be awarded only if one spouse had committed a fault against the other. It must be emphasized 
                                                 
10 Plateris (1978, p. 11) finds that “the divorce rate for the remarried men and women was more than twice that for the first 
married.” McCarthy (1978, p. 352) suggests that teen marriages are thrice as likely to end in divorce as non-teen marriages. Hetzel 
& Cappetta (1973, pp. 1-2) reports that in 46% of all 1969 divorces, the bride had been teenaged at the time of marriage. 
11 In Western Christendom. The most definitive histories of divorce in Western Christendom are Howard (1904) and Phillips 
(1988). Excellent supplements are given by Rheinstein (1972) and Blake (1962). 
12 Except notably in England and Wales, which had to wait until 1857. This was curious, given that the English Reformation 
was catalyzed by Henry VIII’s desire to be unmarried. 
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that a divorce was awarded not to the couple. Instead, it was awarded to the injured spouse as a 
form of relief and against the guilty spouse as a form of punishment. 
The classic Protestant divorce grounds were adultery, desertion, and cruelty. When, for example, 
one spouse committed adultery, he injured his spouse; a divorce could therefore be awarded to his 
spouse as relief and against him as punishment. The nineteenth century American legislator would 
add many more grounds: e.g. intemperance and neglect. The five examples of grounds just given 
comport with the fault theory. They may thus be called ‘fault-based’ divorce grounds.  
The fault theory contains three key elements: guilt, innocence, and malice. The first element, 
guilt, is sine qua non: Unless one spouse has acted wrongfully, there simply cannot be any divorce. 
The second element, innocence, is that the recipient of a divorce cannot himself have acted wrong-
fully. This is usually justified by the broader legal principle known as the ‘clean hands doctrine’—
he who seeks judicial relief cannot himself have acted wrongfully. The third element, malice, is 
that there must have been deliberate intent on the part of the wrongdoer. That this could have 
perverse implications was oft-noted; for example: 
The law is thus in the position of saying to a wife whose husband is beating her regularly, 
“We are sorry, but since your husband is insane and therefore not able to form a specific 
intent to hurt you, you must continue living with him as his wife.” (Clark, 1968, p. 383.) 
 
The fault theory was buttressed in two important ways. First, divorce proceedings were simply 
grafted onto the standard adversarial legal system, under which litigants engage in a vigorous battle, 
whereupon truth and justice are supposed to emerge. Husband and wife were thus pitted against 
each other as antagonists. This encouraged mutual fault-finding and thus reinforced the fault theory. 
Second, there were the special defenses or doctrines. The four most frequently discussed were 
condonation, collusion, connivance, and recrimination.13 Given their preoccupation with inno-
cence and guilt, these doctrines tended to reinforce the fault theory. Here is the pith of each: Con-
donation says that a fault forgiven cannot serve as the basis of a divorce. Collusion says that no 
divorce shall be granted if a couple cooperates to get it. Connivance says that no divorce shall be 
granted to a party that actively procured (or even merely acquiesced in) the fault complained of.  
Recrimination was an especially important cornerstone of the fault theory of divorce. It explic-
itly highlights the second element, innocence, by forbidding divorce if both spouses are guilty. As 
said by Halberstadter (1954), “one may wonder whether a husband and wife can live together for 
                                                 
13 Three other special defenses were estoppel, provocation, and laches.  
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any length of time without supplying each other with grounds for divorce.” If this be true, then a 
strict application of this doctrine would have barred most divorces. Moreover, as will be shown in 
section 9.1, one important step taken in the evolutionary path taken from fault to no-fault was the 
repeal of recrimination. It is thus worth quoting from several venerable rulings, to better illuminate 
the nature of recrimination: 
the parties may live together, and find sources of mutual forgiveness in the humiliation of 
mutual guilt (Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Eccl. 789, 1799) 
If both parties are guilty, neither has any claim to relief; and they are in that case suitable 
and proper companions for each other (Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige 108, 1830, New York).  
If both parties have a right to divorce, neither party has (Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 Mo. 547, 
1869). 
Our conclusion is, that both husband and wife are two miserable wretches, and the case is 
too disgusting to be longer entertained by the Court (Horne v. Horne, 72 N.C. 530, 1875). 
 
This completes the synopsis of the fault theory of divorce. Another theory of divorce is called 
the breakdown theory. This theory may be considered the modern one because it would be seri-
ously considered by legislators around the world only from the 1960s.14 It posits that divorce is 
the mere legal recognition of a failed marriage; moreover, marriages do not fail for the simplistic 
reason that one guilty spouse has wronged the other innocent spouse. The contrast between the 
fault and breakdown theories of divorce was well-expressed by one particular group of writers:  
A divorce law founded on the doctrine of breakdown … would have the merit for showing 
up divorce for what in essence it is—not a reward for marital virtue on the one side and a 
penalty for marital delinquency on the other; not a victory for one spouse and a reverse for 
the other; but a defeat for both, a failure of the marital ‘two-in-oneship’ in which both its 
members, however unequal their responsibility, are inevitably involved together (Arch-
bishop of Canterbury’s Group, 1966, p. 18).  
 
In California, the breakdown theory was put into practice through the 1969 Family Law Act. 
This Act deleted all of the old fault-based grounds—divorce would no longer be granted on the 
basis that one spouse had wronged the other. Instead, divorce (now renamed ‘dissolution of mar-
riage’) would be granted on the sole15 ground of: “Irreconcilable differences, which have caused 
the irremediable breakdown of the marriage.” This new divorce ground may be referred to as a 
‘no-fault’ divorce ground.  
                                                 
14 Note though as Hahlo (1975, p. 50) points out, the breakdown theory is much older than that.  
15 If one ignores the retained divorce ground of incurable insanity. 
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Some states followed California’s approach by abolishing all old fault-based divorce grounds 
and replacing them with a single, similar no-fault divorce ground. Others simply appended a no-
fault divorce ground to the pre-existing old fault-based divorce grounds. 
4 My Definition of a Statutory No-Fault Divorce Law 
The empirical analysis below addresses this question: Was the statutory introduction of no-fault 
correlated with changes in divorce rates? To address this question, another question must first be 
answered: When can a state be said to introduce statutory no-fault divorce?  
It turns out that this latter question cannot be easily addressed. This is illustrated by the diversity 
of opinion regarding when Vermont introduced statutory no-fault divorce (see n. 56 below and 
accompanying text). Vermont is not unrepresentative. Such diversity of opinion is due in large part 
to the fact that each researcher has a different definition of statutory no-fault. It is thus important, 
in any study of no-fault, to give a clear and precise definition of what it means for a state to have 
introduced statutory no-fault.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I shall adopt the following definition: A state’s statutory di-
vorce law allows no-fault divorce if it contains any one or more of the following exact words or 
phrases: incompatibility (or incompatible), insupportability, irretrievably broken (or irretrievable 
breakdown or irremediable breakdown or broken down irretrievably or breakdown of the mar-
riage), or irreconcilable differences. In making this definition of no-fault, I have excluded four 
important considerations. The reasons for doing so are now explained.  
First, I exclude divorce on the ground of insanity, even though, as many noted, this marked a 
departure from fault. The reason is that such divorces were rare. And so it would not make sense 
to classify a state as having a no-fault divorce law, simply because it permitted divorce on the 
ground of insanity. 
Second, I exclude the ‘living separate and apart’ grounds. These ‘living apart’ clauses varied 
widely. A few explicitly repudiated any consideration of fault. A few others explicitly required 
that the separation be voluntary or the petitioner blameless. These clauses might be classified as 
fault and no-fault, respectively. Unfortunately, the other ‘living apart’ clauses were ambiguous; 
that is, they were not explicit about whether fault was relevant.16 In practice, it would often be left 
                                                 
16 For more, see e.g. A.D.C. (1949, pp. 706-709). 
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to the individual judge to decide whether fault was relevant. Altogether then, it is possible for 
reasonable people to disagree over whether or not each given ‘living apart’ clause endows a state 
with a no-fault divorce law. To sidestep such debates, I simply exclude these grounds altogether 
from my definition of no-fault. 
Third, I completely ignore the special defenses discussed above. As said above, these special 
defenses served to buttress the fault theory, with recrimination being a particularly important cor-
nerstone. One might thus be inclined to adopt the rule that a state with any such defense should 
not be counted as no-fault. But such a rule would mean that Tennessee in 2015 is not a no-fault 
state, because its divorce law still lists recrimination, condonation, and connivance as defenses to 
divorce on the ground of adultery. Yet reason would dictate that Tennessee is in 2015 a no-fault 
state, because it permits divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.17 Altogether, I am 
unable to produce a precise and non-arbitrary definition of no-fault that specifically takes into 
account these defenses and yet still labels Tennessee in 2015 as no-fault, as reason might dictate. 
There is a further complication. These special defenses were often applied, even where they 
were absent from the statutes; conversely, they were sometimes ignored, even where they were 
present.18 Their presence or absence from the statutes thus served as no reliable guide as to whether 
they were, in practice, applied. Altogether, I shall simply ignore all four of these special defenses. 
Once again, this is to avoid debates over the matter.19  
Fourth, I completely ignore the incidents of divorce (e.g. property division, alimony, child cus-
tody). For example, a few states explicitly bar fault from being a consideration when it comes to 
property division; others do not. One might argue that a state which fails to completely banish fault 
from divorce cases is not a no-fault state. On the other hand, this might be too harsh a view. Yet it 
is unclear where or how the line should be drawn, when trying to define no-fault. Here again, to 
sidestep such debates, I will simply exclude this altogether from my definition of no-fault. 
Under my definition, Table II.1 lists the approval date and the effective date of each state’s first 
no-fault divorce law. With digitization and the internet, it was feasible to rely solely on primary 
legislative material and thereby ensure the veracity of these dates.  
Here are a few summary observations. Most states (33) introduced no-fault between 1967 and 
1978; of these, 22 did so in the five year period 1970-1974 alone. Another five did so in the 1980s. 
                                                 
17 Tennessee Code Annotated 2015, §36-4-112 for bars to adultery and §36-4-101-a-14 for irreconcilable differences. 
18 Beamer (1942, p. 244), Dunahoo (1969, p. 149), Clark (1968, p. 375). 
19 Note that in previous studies of the same empirical issues, these special defenses are not even mentioned. 
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Three early reformers were New Mexico (1933), Alaska (1935), and Oklahoma (1953). Two late 
reformers were New Jersey (2007) and New York (2010). At the time of writing, eight states still 
do not have no-fault divorce. 
 
TABLE II.1—APPROVAL AND EFFECTIVE DATES OF EACH STATE’S FIRST NO-FAULT DIVORCE LAW  
 Approval Effective State Approval Effective 
State Date Date Missouri 1973-08-06 1974-01-01 
Alabama 1971-08-12 1971-08-12 Montana 1973-03-03 1973-07-01 
Alaska 1935-03-13 1935-06-11 Nebraska 1972-04-08 1972-07-05 
Arizona 1973-05-14 1973-08-08 Nevada 1967-04-05 1967-07-01 
Arkansas None, even in 2015 New Hampshire 1971-06-30 1971-08-29 
California 1969-09-04 1970-01-01 New Jersey 2007-01-20 2007-01-20 
Colorado 1971-06-02 1972-01-01 New Mexico 1933-03-03 1933-03-09 
Connecticut 1973-05-29 1973-10-01 New York 2010-08-13 2010-10-12 
Delaware 1968-06-11 1968-06-11 North Carolina None, even in 2015 
District of Columbia None, even in 2015 North Dakota 1971-03-18 1971-07-01 
Florida 1971-06-22 1971-07-01 Ohio 1989-05-26 1989-08-25 
Georgia 1973-04-13 1973-07-01 Oklahoma 1953-05-23 1953-09-04 
Hawaii 1972-04-11 1972-07-01 Oregon 1971-06-04 1971-10-01 
Idaho 1971-02-13 1971-05-19 Pennsylvania 1980-04-02 1980-07-01 
Illinois 1983-12-02 1984-07-01 Rhode Island 1975-05-22 1975-05-22 
Indiana 1973-04-12 1973-09-01 South Carolina None, even in 2015 
Iowa 1970-03-20 1970-07-01 South Dakota 1985-03-12 1985-07-01 
Kansas 1969-04-18 1969-07-01 Tennessee 1977-04-28 1977-04-28 
Kentucky 1972-03-25 1972-06-16 Texas 1969-05-14 1970-01-01 
Louisiana None, even in 2015 Utah 1987-03-16 1987-04-27 
Maine 1973-06-19 1973-10-03 Vermont None, even in 2015 
Maryland None, even in 2015 Virginia None, even in 2015 
Massachusetts 1975-11-19 1976-01-01 Washington 1973-04-24 1973-07-14 
Michigan 1971-07-29 1972-01-01 West Virginia 1977-04-09 1977-07-08 
Minnesota 1974-03-14 1974-03-15 Wisconsin 1977-10-21 1978-02-01 
Mississippi 1976-05-20 1976-07-01 Wyoming 1977-03-04 1977-05-27 
Notes: See text for definition of no-fault. See Appendix H for sources.  
 
A final note concerns coding. In the analysis below, each state-year observation is coded as 
either as having no-fault or not. Given the variety of approval and effective dates, there is no ob-
vious way of doing this. This chapter codes a state as not having no-fault divorce in a given year, 
if and only if that year precedes the year of the effective date of that state’s first no-fault law. Thus, 
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California and Oregon are coded as having had no-fault from 1970 and 1971. This is in contrast to 
some who code California as having had no-fault from 1969 (perhaps because its law was approved 
in 1969) and to others who code Oregon as having had no-fault only from 1972 (perhaps because 
its law only came into effect late in 1971). The conclusions of the analysis below are not sensitive 
to alternative coding schemes on this front. 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, the next section briefly examines trends in divorce 
rates across the US and the affluent West. One purpose of this is to give the reader a better sense 
of what divorce trends looked like around this era. Another is to build a prima facie case that 
statutory no-fault was not responsible for the 1960s-1970s boom in divorce. 
5 Theoretical Reasons Why Statutory No-Fault Might Influence Divorce Rates 
The effects of an easier divorce law on divorce rates are considered in Choo (2015b). The his-
torical facts (section 9) suggest that the introduction of statutory no-fault did not make divorce 
substantially easier. But it may nonetheless have had effects on divorce rates. Some such effects 
are now considered in purely qualitative terms.  
First, the stigma associated with divorce may be reduced. For example, a man’s elderly and 
illiterate mother might have had trouble understanding that her son has not actually performed any 
act of cruelty, even if he obtains a divorce on the ground of cruelty. With the new law, it becomes 
easier for him to explain to his mother that he can get a divorce simply because he and his wife are 
no longer happy together.  
Second, the need to commit perjury, however mild, was now eliminated. Consider the script of 
a typical pre-1970 California divorce case:  
Q: And during your marriage with Mr. X, has he on many occasions been cold and indif-
ferent to you? ¶ A: Yes. ¶ Q: And as a result of this conduct on the part of your husband, 
have you become seriously ill, nervous and upset? ¶ A: Yes. ¶ Q: And was this conduct on 
the part of your husband in any manner caused by anything you have done? ¶ A: No. …  
Q: And have you done everything in your power to preserve the marriage, but without 
success? ¶ A: Yes. … Q: And during the marriage, you at all times did your best to be a 
good wife to Mr. X? ¶ A: Yes. (Governor’s Commission on the Family, 1966, pp. 119-
120.) 
 
For most couples seeking divorce, the above answers (especially the last three) would likely have 
been at least mildly disingenuous, if not outright lies. Those unaccustomed to telling nothing but 
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the truth might have opted to stay in an unhappy marriage rather than to tell even these small lies. 
With the new no-fault law, such lies were no longer necessary. 
Third, the new law may have signaled a symbolic break with the past and the zeitgeist. It made 
clear—not just to the married but also to those at risk of marriage—that society and the state now 
had a different view of marriage, divorce, and the family. This symbolic change could have af-
fected divorce rates in a myriad of complex ways. Here is one small example: The new law may 
signal to a couple that marriage caters to more than merely physiological or economic needs. On 
the one hand this may decrease the couple’s marital satisfaction and so raise the probability of 
divorce. On the other, they may now work harder to promote conjugal bliss and so actually de-
crease the probability of divorce. Altogether, it is unclear whether this symbolism would have 
increased or decreased divorce rates.  
Fourth, the codification of no-fault helped to pass the fact of no-fault divorce into the domain 
of common knowledge. This could in turn magnify other effects. Consider again stigma. Before 
the reform, even if everyone knew with absolute certainty that Mr. X had never been cruel to his 
wife, Mr. X might nonetheless legitimately fear that some did not know. The new law would help 
diminish such fears.   
5.1 The ‘Coase’ Theorem 
The economics literature characterizes the no-fault divorce reforms of the 1970s as a dramatic 
shift from mutual consent to unilateral divorce.20 To wit, pre-reforms, to get a divorce, it was nec-
essary to get the consent of both spouses. Post-reforms, this was no longer necessary. According 
to the economics literature, these no-fault reforms thus “furnish an excellent illustration of the 
‘Coase Theorem’” (Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977). 
I briefly explain the argument. There are three possible cases of couples. The first is where both 
husband and wife do not want a divorce. In this case, it obviously makes no difference whether we 
have a mutual consent or a unilateral divorce law. Under either law, they will stay married. The 
second case is where both husband and wife want a divorce. Here again, the law obviously makes 
no difference—they will get divorced under either law.  
                                                 
20 This characterization began implicitly in Becker, Landes, & Michael (1977, p. 1144). It was made more explicit in Becker 
(1981). These days it is made unabashedly: Dee (2003, p. 163), Gruber (2004, pp. 800, 802), Manzini & Mariotti (2004, p. 944), 
Rasul (2006, p. 41), Stevenson & Wolfers (2006, p. 267), Wolfers (2006, p. 1802), Stevenson & Wolfers (2007, p. 46), Matouschek 
& Rasul (2008, p. 1802), Drewianka (2008, p. 486), Hanlon (2012, p. 162), and Reinhold, Kneip, & Bauer (2013, p. 1037).  
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The third case is the interesting one, where one party (say the wife) wants to stay married, but 
the other party (the husband) wants to get divorced. According to the layperson untrained econom-
ics, pre-reforms, there would have been no divorce (because the wife vetoed it), but post-reforms, 
there would be a divorce (because the wife couldn’t stop it). But according to the economics liter-
ature, the layman’s intuition is correct only if transaction costs are prohibitively high. If transaction 
costs are sufficiently low, then the couple will divorce if and only if the husband wants a divorce 
more than the wife wants to stay married. For, if the husband wanted the divorce more than the W 
wanted to stay married, then pre-reforms he could bribe her to get divorced; while post-reforms, 
he would just have gotten a divorce; under either law, they would have divorced. Conversely, if 
the wife wanted to stay married more than the husband wanted a divorce, then pre-reforms they 
would just have stay married; while post-reforms, she would have bribed him to stay married; 
under either law, they would have stayed married.  
Thus, assuming the economics literature’s characterization of reforms is correct, then reforms 
would have been followed by an increase in divorce if transaction costs were high and would not 
have been followed by any increase if transaction costs were low. Thus, if one finds empirically 
that reforms had no effect, then this is evidence in favor of low transaction costs and widespread 
‘Coasean’ bargaining. On the other hand, if one finds empirically that reforms were followed by 
an increase in divorce, then this is evidence in favor of high transaction costs and less ‘Coasean’ 
bargaining.21  
My empirical analysis below will indicate that reforms were not followed by an increase in 
divorce. However, my explanation is not the same as the one given in the economics literature; it 
has nothing to do with transaction costs. Instead, my explanation is much more mundane—namely 
that the statutory no-fault reforms lacked substance and merely codified into the law of the books 
what had already been the law in action. They could thus not have had any effect. 
                                                 
21 It was further noted by one member of this dissertation committee that “the ‘Coase’ Theorem is largely not confirmed by the 
literature on bargaining, i.e. it is not the case that the equilibria of models of frictionless bargaining are necessarily efficient, nor is 
it the case that these equilibria are the same regardless of the initial definition of property rights.”  
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6 Trends in Divorce 
Here is a summary of postwar trends in US CDR (see Figure II.1). The CDR spiked postwar, 
then went into a lull in the late 1940s and 1950s. It rose steadily from the early 1960s and especially 
during 1967-1976. It plateaued in the late 1970s and thereafter entered a decades-long decline.22 
The no-fault ‘revolution’ is usually dated to 1970, when California’s Family Law Act came into 
effect. It could therefore not have caused any of the 1960s rise in divorce. Indeed, since divorce 
had already begun rising in the early 1960s, it is possible that the continued steep ascent of divorce 
during the 1970s was a mere continuation of a pre-existing trend, rather than a consequence of 
statutory no-fault reforms. 
The majority (22) of no-fault reforms occurred during the five-year span 1970-1974. Figure II.2 
shows the 1940-1990 CDR of each of these five groups of reform states. It also shows the US CDR 
and the CDR of the group of eight states that do not have no-fault even today. The trends are 
similar: Postwar spike, lull, rise in the 1960s and 1970s, and then plateau. Moreover, for each 
group of states, the CDR had already begun its sharp ascent well before 1970. These trends suggest 
that across the US, certain common underlying forces had been working in concert to increase 
divorce, well before no-fault reforms. 
Moreover, from Figure II.2 alone, it is not obvious that reforms led to any increase in divorce. 
Indeed, between 1960 and 1980, the CDR of the group of non-reform states increased by about 
200 percent, a percentage increase that was larger than that of any group of reform states. 
Consider also the CDR of seven other affluent Western countries (Figure II.3). The trends are 
again broadly similar: In each country, the CDR spiked postwar, lulled, rose in the 1960s and 
1970s, then plateaued. This suggests that the forces behind the increase in US divorce rates were 
also at work across the affluent West.23  
 
                                                 
22 But see Kennedy and Ruggles (2014), who point out that data collection deteriorated after 1990 and argue that the post-1990 
decline in divorce is much exaggerated. 
23 This is not a novel observation. See e.g. Michael (1978, p. 177; 1988, p. 369). 
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FIGURE II.2. 1940-1990 CDRS OF SEVEN GROUPS OF STATES  
Notes: Author’s calculations. ‘1970’ for example refers to states that, by my reckoning, introduced statutory no-fault in 1970. 
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FIGURE II.3. CDR OF SEVEN OTHER AFFLUENT WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1946-1989 
Notes: See Appendix C for sources. 
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7 The 1970 California Spike 
The California 1969 Family Law Act came into effect on January 1st, 1970. This Act contained 
a variety of reforms, including the introduction of no-fault divorce. In 1970, California had 31,396 
more divorces than in 1969. This number was equal to nearly 5% of the 1969 national divorce 
total. But this colossal spike was due not to no-fault, but to a contemporaneous ‘timing reform’ 
that reduced the interlocutory period from one year to six months. To explain briefly, if a divorce 
petition had merit, the court would first grant the couple an interlocutory divorce decree. Only 
upon expiration of the interlocutory period could the couple then motion for entry of a final decree. 
The interlocutory period may thus be considered a waiting period. 
 
 
FIGURE II.4. CALIFORNIA TOTAL DIVORCES AND FILINGS (10,000S), 1926-90 
Notes: See Appendix B for sources. Total divorces are for the calendar year, while total filings are for the fiscal year, where the 
1926 fiscal year, for example, is 1925-07-01 through 1926-06-30. Total divorces include annulments. Total filings are for divorce, 
annulment, and separate maintenance. These were in 1970 renamed dissolution of marriage, judgment of nullity, and legal separa-
tion. The vertical lines mark the years 1946, 1965, 1970, and 1984. As noted in the sources, for total divorces, 1984-86 include 
legal separations (and are hence biased upwards); 1988 is based on incomplete data (hence biased downwards); and 1989 is based 
on incomplete data and moreover includes approximately 1,000 legal separations. 
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Schoen, Greenblatt, & Mielke (1975) estimate that compared to their benchmark, the two-year 
period 1970-1971 had “41-45 thousand ‘excess’ divorces.” They estimate that of these excess di-
vorces, the minimum that can be attributed to the shortened waiting period is 40,051. After taking 
into account several other factors, they conclude that none of the excess divorces can be attributed 
to the statutory introduction of no-fault. In Mielke & Smith (1977, p. 21), it is stated in passing 
that on the basis of later information, Schoen, Greenblatt, & Mielke’s estimates were too conserva-
tive and should be revised upwards by 3,100. 
Schoen, Greenblatt, & Mielke estimated how many of the excess divorces during the two-year 
period 1970-1971 could be attributed to the timing reform. I extend their work by calculating how 
California’s divorce numbers in each individual year from 1970 onwards should be adjusted, had 
there been no timing reform. This enables us to strip out the effects of this contemporaneous timing 
reform, before trying to estimate the effects of no-fault on divorce rates. To make these calculations, 
I use, inter alia, information given in Schoen, Greenblatt, & Mielke. (And so the adjustments for 
the years 1970 and 1971 sum up to their estimate of 40,051.) Footnote 24 contains more details of 
the adjustment procedure, but here follows a brief description. 
Due to the reform, 1970 and every year after ‘gained’ roughly six months’ worth of divorces 
from the following year.24 The timing reform thus compressed roughly one-and-a-half years’ 
worth of divorces into the single year of 1970.  In contrast, 1971 and every year after ‘gained’ 
divorces from the following year but also ‘lost’ divorces to the preceding year. The timing reform 
                                                 
24 Since the reform reduced the interlocutory period by half a year, it is reasonable to assume that a final divorce decree that 
was actually entered in year y would, absent the timing reform, have been entered either in year y or in year y + 1, and not any later. 
Let a(x, y) denote the number of year y final divorces that were first filed in year x, but which would have—absent the timing 
reform—instead been entered as final divorces in year y + 1.  
I assume that a(x, y) = 0 for x ≤ 1969. That is, filings in 1969 or before were not affected by the timing reform. This assumption 
is certainly false, because for one, the 1970 Family Law Act was retroactive with regards to the interlocutory period (see California 
Legislature, 1969, p. 8063). In making this assumption, I am merely following Schoen, Greenblatt, and Mielke and erring on the 
conservative side of understating the effects of the timing reform.  
Assuming also that a(x, y) = 0 if y – x ≥ 2, 1970 ‘gained’ a(1970, 1970) divorces from 1971; 1971 ‘gained’ a(1970, 1971) + 
a(1971, 1971) from 1972; 1972 ‘gained’ a(1971, 1972) + a(1972, 1972) from 1973; etc. Schoen, Greenblatt, & Mielke (1975) 
estimate that a(1970, 1970) = 23,218; a(1970, 1971) = 15,544; and a(1971, 1971) = 24,507.  
It would be ideal to use their procedure to estimate the other a(x, y). Unfortunately, their procedure required the use of divorce 
records obtained from the California State Department of Health. Even if these records still exist, it would not be feasible for me 
to access them. Instead, I use the following crude but not unreasonable estimation procedure. Assume that for t ≥ 1969, the ratio of 
a(t, t) to year t filings is constant. Assume also that the ratio of a(t, t + 1) to year t filings is constant. It turns out that this crude 
estimation procedure does very well for the pair of SGM estimates to which it may be applied. This gives us some reassurance that 
the proposed calculation procedure is not wildly misguided. 
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would thus have had a small net effect on 1971 and every year after. This point seems to have been 
overlooked by Becker (1981, 1991) and Zelder (1989) in their critiques of Schoen et al.25  
The solid line in Figure II.4 shows annual California divorces before these adjustments are 
made. The dotted line shows annual California divorces, after these adjustments are made. These 
two graphs coincide through 1969, because 1970 is the first year for which adjustments must be 
made for the timing reform.  
 
TABLE II.2—YEAR-ON-YEAR INCREASES IN CA DIVORCES AND FILINGS, 1963-72 AND 1981-86 
Year 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
 Divorces  +2,262 +2,821 +10,832 -781 +898 +5,369 +6,132 +31,398 
 Filings  +3,839 +4,813 +1,963 +4,724 +5,038 +6,792 +4,359 +10,831 
Year 1971 1972 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
 Divorces  -4,633 +2,409 +37 -211 -5,835 +15,440 -5,448 -391 
 Filings  +7,448 +6,129 +976 -9,353 -6,511 +3,174 +1,048 -1,651 
Notes: Notes for Figure II.4  apply here. 
 
 
To underscore the point that such timing reforms can have large effects, I now examine also 
1965 and 1984. After 1970, these two years had the largest year-on-year percentage and absolute 
increases in divorce. These two spikes were wildly anomalous (see Table II.2). It turns out that 
once again, these spikes were caused by timing reforms, whose effects I now crudely quantify.26 
(Note that in the empirical analysis below, no effort is made to adjust for the 1965 and 1984 re-
forms. The reason is that I have only very crude estimates of the effects of these reforms.) 
Before 1965, the start date of the interlocutory period was, naturally enough, the date of the 
interlocutory decree. The 1965 reform moved this start date to the date of service.27 A crude cal-
culation suggests that this boosted 1965 divorces by perhaps a sixth,28 which would explain most 
of the 1965 spike.  
                                                 
25 Becker (1981, p. 229; 1991, p. 334): “Schoen and his associates (1975) claim that the jump in divorce rates in 1970 and 1971 
can be almost entirely explained by these changes in timing … If, however, timing is the main explanation, the predicted rates in 
1972-1974 should have been much above the actual rates; in fact this was not the case.” Zelder (1989, p. 13): “Their calculation 
that 40,000 1971 divorces were an artifact of timing implies that there must have been 40,000 fewer 1972 divorces as a result of 
the change in waiting period.” 
26 I have encountered remarks that the 1965 reform likely boosted divorces that year. However, I have not come across similar 
remarks regarding the 1984 reform or any attempts, however crude, to quantify the effects of either of these reforms.  
27 This is when “a copy of the summons and complaint had been served on the defendant” (Mielke & Smith, 1977, p. 3). 
28 First, note that although this amendment became effective only on 1965-09-17, it was retroactive (46 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 24 
– Attorney General of California, 1965). In 1966, the median interval between an initial complaint and the entry of an interlocutory 
decree was 4.8 months (Greenblatt & Cohen, 1967, p. 11). Since the interval between an initial complaint and service did not 
usually take more than a few weeks, a rough estimate is that the 1965 reform enabled the median couple to get their final decree 
about four months sooner. The six month ‘forward-shift’ in 1970 boosted divorces by about a quarter. A rough estimate might thus 
be that the four-month ‘forward shift’ in 1965 boosted divorces by about a sixth.  
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Before 1984, upon expiry of the interlocutory period, couples had to motion to enter the final 
decree. The 1984 reform eliminated this hassle—henceforth, the final decree was automatically 
entered. Section 11 calculates that this reform added at least 34,460 divorces to 1984.  
Now consider one final piece of evidence: divorce filings. The annual divorce data usually ex-
amined are the final decrees issued each year. But due to reforms and other peculiarities of the law, 
this may not be the best indicator of the demand for divorce. Some years it may be that a simplifi-
cation of the divorce process rapidly converts a backlog of cases into final decrees, creating the 
illusion that demand for divorce has risen. Conversely, in other years, it may be that demand for 
divorce has risen, but courts are unable to cope with overwhelming demand, so that the rise in final 
decrees issued understates the rise in demand for divorce.29 Filings for divorce are perhaps a better 
indicator of the demand for divorce.30  
Figure II.4 also shows annual filings in California. In 1970, divorces increased by 38.5%, while 
filings increased by merely 9.0%. Similarly, divorces in each of 1965 and 1984 spiked anoma-
lously, but not filings. A mere examination of divorce numbers might tempt one to conclude that 
the demand for divorce spiked in each of 1965, 1970, and 1984. An examination of divorce filings 
reveals that this is a mistake. 
8 Results of the Empirical Analysis 
I run the same regression as Wolfers (2006). The eight no-fault indicators indicate whether the 
no-fault divorce law is in year 1 or 2, year 3 or 4, …, year 13 or 14, and year 15 or beyond.  
 
CDRs,t = β0 + ∑k β1,k No-Fault Indicatork + ∑s β2,s States + ∑t β3,t Yeart + us,t 
 
Table II.3 reports the results. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Following Lee & 
Solon’s (2011) critique of Wolfers, robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are reported 
in brackets. P-values based on these robust standard errors below 0.1 are reported in superscript 
as 1000 × p.  
The first column ‘Wolfers’ simply reprints the results of Wolfers’s preferred specification (p. 
1808). Wolfers had used these results to conclude that reforms increased divorce in the short term. 
                                                 
29 This phenomenon was perhaps on display in 1946. California divorces increased by 13.9% in 1946 and by another 5.0% in 
1947. In contrast, filings spiked up by 28.8% in the 1946 fiscal year, but fell by 15.2% in the 1947 fiscal year.  
30 This is not a novel observation. See e.g. Chester (1977, p. 76). 
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But as Lee & Solon (2011, p. 2) already showed, once one uses Stata’s cluster option to correct 
for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, thereby producing larger standard errors, “the 
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates for lags up to eight years becomes less compel-
ling.” Indeed, Wolfers’s estimates now suggest that reforms only had statistically significant ef-
fects in the long term; moreover, these effects were negative. 
TABLE II.3—THE CORRELATION BETWEEN NO-FAULT REFORMS AND DIVORCE 
(For all specifications except (6) and (7), the dependent variable is the CDR. For (6) and (7), it is log CDR.) 
 Wolfers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) (9) 
 Reprinted Wolfers replicated 
Same as 
(1), but 
data ex-
tended to 
1922-90 
Same as 
(2), but re-
form years 
corrected 
Same as 
(3), but 
California 
data cor-
rected 
Same as 
(4), but 
OLS 
Same as 
(4), but 
CDR in 
log form 
Same as 
(6), but 
OLS 
Same as 
Wolfers, 
but Re-
form Year 
– 5  
Same as 
Wolfers, 
but Re-
form Year 
+ 5 
           First 2 years 
(of no-fault)  
 
0.267 0.277 0.282 0.051 -0.071 -0.503 -0.221 -0.108 0.060 0.115 
(0.085) (0.083) (0.152) (0.123) (0.123) (0.481) (0.025) (0.031) (0.093) (0.080) 
[0.188] [0.189] [0.205] [0.158] [0.097] [0.527] [0.105] [0.053] [0.121] [0.120] 
           Years 3–4 
 
 
0.210 0.249 0.245 0.069 0.044 -0.575 -0.236 -0.123 0.000 -0.037 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.153) (0.129) (0.129) (0.50) (0.026) (0.033) (0.093) (0.081) 
[0.159] [0.162] [0.187] [0.140] [0.127] [0.655] [0.129] [0.065] [0.126] [0.118] 
           Years 5–6 
 
0.164 0.204 0.152 0.034 0.010 -0.845 -0.282 -0.163 0.103 -0.263 
(0.085) (0.084) (0.152) (0.130) (0.130) (0.502) (0.026) (0.033) (0.092) (0.081) 
[0.171] [0.174] [0.194] [0.134] [0.123] [0.858] [0.140] [0.079] [0.195] [0.146] 
           Years 7–8 
 
 
 
0.158 0.187 0.153 0.008 -0.017 -1.143 -0.315 -0.208 0.273 -0.481 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.153) (0.135) (0.134) (0.521) (0.027) (0.034) (0.090) (0.081) 
[0.174] [0.176] [0.193] [0.146] [0.137] [1.117] [0.152] [0.097] [0.195] [0.168] 
           Years 9–10 
 
 
-0.121 -0.100 -0.117 -0.078 -0.097 -1.405 -0.368 -0.258 0.150 -0.507 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.152) (0.140) (0.140) (0.547) (0.028) (0.036) (0.089) (0.083) 
[0.163] [0.162] [0.198] [0.160] [0.157] [1.333] [0.166] [0.114] [0.197] [0.185] 
           
Years 11–12 
 
-0.324 -0.297 -0.347 -0.235 -0.250 -1.626 -0.443 -0.291 0.191 -0.573 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.152) (0.143) (0.143) (0.553) (0.029) (0.036) (0.089) (0.099) 
[0.180] [0.177] [0.208] [0.193] [0.193] [1.513] [0.177] [0.122] [0.205] [0.235] 
           Years 13–14 -0.461 -0.445 -0.515 -0.357 -0.354 -1.716 -0.519 -0.311 0.015 -0.894 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.149) (0.147) (0.147) (0.561) (0.030) (0.037) (0.088) (0.129) 
[0.199] [0.198] [0.224] [0.224] [0.222] [1.659] [0.187] [0.133] [0.183] [0.304] 
           Year 15  
onwards 
 
-0.507 -0.469 -0.451 -0.611 -0.620 -2.239 -0.634 -0.359 -0.389 -0.413 
(0.080) (0.079) (0.116) (0.124) (0.124) (0.463) (0.025) (0.030) (0.066) (0.219) 
[0.233] [0.240] [0.259] [0.345] [0.345] [2.402] [0.201] [0.186] [0.209] [0.231] 
Observations 1,631 1,631 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 1,631 1,631 
Mean DV 3.909 3.891 3.357 3.357 3.352 3.790 1.009 1.005 3.909 3.909 
R2 0.9348 0.9342 0.7945 0.7943 0.7947 0.6336 0.9109 0.8948 0.9343 0.9347 
No-fault law 
in operation 
-0.055 -0.029 -0.103 -0.080 -0.122 -1.102 -0.335 -0.203 -0.044 -0.259 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.290) (0.016) (0.019) (0.055) (0.050) 
[0.151] [0.150] [0.182] [0.155] [0.145] [1.103] [0.159] [0.092] [0.149] [0.148] 
R2 0.9305 0.9298 0.7921 0.7920 0.7926 0.6320 0.9028 0.8926 0.9305 0.9316 
Notes: See text for a fuller description of each specification. Standard errors are in parentheses and robust standard errors (clustered 
at the state level) are in brackets.  
 
I conduct simple placebo tests. I take Wolfers’s original data and coding, but replace each state’s 
reform year with reform year + x. I then rerun Wolfers’s regressions. The results of two such 
placebo tests, where x = -5 and x = 5, are reported as specifications 8 and 9. Under the first placebo 
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test, only one estimate turns out to be statistically significant at the 10% level. Hence, this first 
placebo test tends not to injure Wolfers’s claim that reforms had a causal effect on CDR. However, 
under the second placebo test, seven of the nine coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 
the 10% level. And of these seven, three are significant at the 1% level. We have thus estimated a 
significant effect of a hypothetical policy change, even though there was actually no policy change. 
Hence, this second placebo test tends to cast doubt on Wolfers’s claim that reforms had a causal 
effect on CDR. 
Specification 1 replicates Wolfers, using his reform dates. Moreover, the observations are re-
stricted to 1956-1988, as done in Wolfers. However, I use cleaned-up divorce and population data. 
It is seen that this clean-up produces estimates that are very similar to Wolfers’s. 
Specification 2 is exactly the same as 1, except that the data are extended to 1922-1990. It is 
conceivable that the extension of the data back to 1922 could change our estimates, because the 
earliest no-fault laws were in 1933 and 1935. It turns out though that this extension has little effect 
on our estimates. 
Specification 3 is exactly the same as 2, except that the no-fault reform years in section 4 are 
used instead. With this adjustment, the estimated short term effects of reforms are close to zero. It 
is striking that a move from Wolfers’s reform year coding (specification 2) to mine (specification 
3) results in such different coefficient estimates. It is thus worth investigating which states’ coding 
accounts for the bulk of this move.  
There are fifteen states in which my coding disagreed with Wolfers’s by at least 2 years.31 By 
playing around with these, I find that it is Illinois and Pennsylvania which account for the bulk of 
the change: When I use Wolfers’s coding for all states except those two, the resulting coefficient 
estimates are quite similar to those produced in specification 3. Wolfers codes both of these states 
as not having reformed the divorce law by 1998. In contrast, I code Illinois and Pennsylvania as 
having done so in 1984 and 1980. 
Note that Wolfers’s coding of the reform years were taken from Friedberg (1998), who in turn 
took her coding from other secondary sources. In contrast, my coding is derived entirely from 
primary sources and is fully documented in Appendix H.  
                                                 
31 Delaware (coded by Wolfers as ‘None by 1998’; and by me as ‘1968’); Illinois (None by 1998; 1984); Mississippi (None by 
1998; 1976); Missouri (None by 1998; 1974); Montana (1975; 1973); Nevada (1973; 1967); New Mexico (1973; 1933); Ohio 
(None by 1998; 1989); Oregon (1973; 1971); Pennsylvania (None by 1998; 1980); Tennessee (None by 1998; 1977); Texas (1974; 
1970); Utah (None by 1998; 1987); West Virginia (None by 1998; 1977); Wisconsin (None by 1998; 1978). 
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Specification 4 is exactly the same as 3, except that the section 6 adjustments to California 
divorce numbers are made. With this adjustment, the estimated short term effects of reforms are 
even closer to zero.  
Specification 6 is exactly the same as 4, except that the dependent variable is transformed to 
log form. Lee & Solon (2011, pp. 3-4) also did the same. They justified this by simply arguing that 
Wolfers’s functional specification was “not the most natural” and that the log form was “an obvi-
ous alternative.” I now explain why it is especially sensible to log-transform the dependent variable, 
specifically in the present context. 
First, states about to introduce no-fault had higher CDR than those that had not done so. This 
is suggested by Table II.4, which says, for example, that the 1969 CDR of the three 1970 reform 
states was 4.0, while that of the states that had not reformed by 1970 was 3.1.  
 
TABLE II.4—CDR OF REFORM STATES VS. NON-REFORM STATES IN THE YEAR BEFORE REFORM  
 
 CDR in Year x – 1 of 
x Reform States Reform States Non-Reform 
 1970 CA, IA, TX 4.0 3.1 
1971 AL, FL, ID, NH, ND, OR 4.8 2.9 
1972 CO, HI, KY, MI 3.8 3.0 
1973 AZ, CT, GA, IN, MT, WA 4.7 3.2 
1974 ME, MN, MO 3.9 3.4 
Notes: Author’s calculations. ‘Reform States’ are those states that introduced statutory no-fault in year x. ‘Non-Reform States’ 
are those that had not done so by year x. The CDRs computed are population-weighted. 
 
 
Second, a state’s CDR tended to experience larger increases if it was higher to begin with. This 
assertion is supported by a casual inspection of Figures II.1 and II.2 and also by earlier findings 
that the historical growth trend of divorce rates was exponential.32 This assertion can moreover be 
tested formally, by running the regression below. It turns out that the CDR and changes in the CDR 
are positively correlated (as given by the positive estimate of β1 in the regression below)33 and that 
this correlation is highly statistically significant. This provides evidence that a state’s CDR tended 
to experience larger increases if it was higher to begin with. 
 
CDRs,t - CDRs,t-1 = β0 + β1 CDRs,t-1 + ∑s β2,s States + ∑t β3,t Yeart + us,t 
                                                 
32 Cahen (1932, p. 21), Hart & Bowne (1943, p. 191), and Preston & McDonald (1979, p. 13). 
33 This regression is run with (1) the full sample, (2) Nevada dropped, (3) only state-year observations in which no-fault was 
not yet in place, (4) the sample restricted to years between 1950 and 1970. The estimates of β1 obtained are between 0.06 and 0.25. 
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Altogether, reform states tended to have higher CDR; moreover, CDR tended to experience 
larger increases if it was higher to begin with. Thus, reforms would tend mechanically to be fol-
lowed by larger increases in the CDR. This would be so even if reforms had no substance whatso-
ever. Thus, a failure to appropriately transform the dependent variable may bias upwards the esti-
mated effects of reforms. One possible remedy is to transform the dependent variable into log form. 
This has the additional benefit of allowing the estimated effects of reforms to be interpreted as 
effects on the growth rates of divorce. 
Under Specification 6, it is seen that where a no-fault divorce law was in its first two years of 
operation, the CDR was 0.22 log point lower than where no-fault had not been introduced. This is 
diametrically opposed to Wolfers’s finding that reforms increased divorce in the short term. It is 
also found that where no-fault had been in operation for more than 14 years, the CDR was 0.63 
log point lower than where it had not been introduced.  
For each specification, I run in addition the regression below. It differs only in that instead of 
having eight no-fault indicators, there is now only one indicator for whether there was a statutory 
no-fault divorce law at all. This facilitates a simple comparison of CDR between states that had 
no-fault and states that did not. The results of these regressions are reported at the bottom of Table 
II.3. Specification 6 shows that the CDR of states where there was no-fault was 0.34 log point was 
lower than states where there was not no-fault.  
 
Dependent Variables,t = β0 + β1 No-Fault Indicator + ∑s β2, s States + ∑t β3, t Yeart + us,t 
 
If interpreted causally, then these point estimates would imply that in the absence of no-fault 
divorce reforms, the CDR would have been about 1.0 point higher. This is diametrically opposed 
to conventional wisdom. Considering that the 2.3-point rise in divorce between 1967 and 1976 has 
often been considered remarkable, these estimates—if interpreted causally—would suggest that in 
the absence of no-fault reforms, said rise would have been even more extraordinary. However, as 
will be suggested by my historical study and in the conclusion below, these estimates should not 
be interpreted causally. 
Next, as per the critique of Wolfers by Lee & Solon (2011), I rerun specifications 4 and 6 using 
OLS. The results are reported in Table II.3 as specifications 5 and 7. These OLS estimates do not 
alter the substantive conclusions made above. But it must be admitted that the discrepancies, es-
pecially between specifications 4 and 5, are large.  
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It turns out that these discrepancies are driven mostly by the Nevada outlier. In 1946 for exam-
ple, Nevada had a remarkable 136 divorces per thousand persons. Table II.5 replicates Table II.3 
but with all Nevada observations dropped (and with the placebo tests corresponding to specifica-
tions 8 and 9 also dropped). The discrepancies, especially between specifications 4 and 5, are now 
smaller. This gives some assurance that the model is not badly misspecified.  
 
TABLE II.5—REPLICA OF TABLE II.3, BUT WITH ALL NEVADA OBSERVATIONS DROPPED 
(For all specifications except (6) and (7), the dependent variable is the CDR. For (6) and (7), it is log CDR.) 
 Wolfers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
  Wolfers Replicated 
Same as 
(1), but 
data ex-
tended to 
1922-90 
Same as 
(2), but re-
form years 
corrected 
Same as 
(3), but 
California 
data cor-
rected 
Same as 
(4), but 
OLS 
Same as 
(4), but 
CDR in 
log form 
Same as 
(6), but 
OLS 
         First 2 years 
(of no-fault)  
 
0.302 0.308 0.358 0.076 -0.046 0.009 -0.222 -0.097 
(0.059) (0.054) (0.068) (0.056) (0.055) (0.072) (0.025) (0.028) 
[0.182] [0.186] [0.185] [0.152] [0.091] [0.115] [0.106] [0.053] 
         Years 3–4 
 
 
0.265 0.290 0.335 0.101 0.076 0.065 -0.23575 -0.103 
(0.059) (0.055) (0.069) (0.059) (0.058) (0.075) (0.026) (0.029) 
[0.147] [0.153] [0.161] [0.133] [0.121] [0.139] [0.129] [0.064] 
         Years 5–6 
 
0.228 0.207 0.255 0.078 0.053 -0.004 -0.281 -0.129 
(0.059) (0.055) (0.068) (0.059) (0.059) (0.075) (0.026) (0.029) 
[0.154] [0.154] [0.158] [0.124] [0.115] [0.166] [0.141] [0.074] 
         Years 7–8 
 
 
 
0.219 0.212 0.261 0.076 0.051 -0.050 -0.312 -0.158 
(0.059) (0.055) (0.069) (0.061) (0.061) (0.078) (0.027) (0.030) 
[0.159] [0.148] [0.155] [0.128] [0.119] [0.202] [0.152] [0.084] 
         Years 9–10 
 
 
-0.059 -0.051 -0.005 0.007 -0.011 -0.103 -0.364 -0.196 
(0.058) (0.055) (0.068) (0.064) (0.063) (0.082) (0.028) (0.032) 
[0.147] [0.153] [0.161] [0.137] [0.135] [0.240] [0.166] [0.096] 
         
Years 11–12 
 
-0.255 -0.278 -0.225 -0.126 -0.142 -0.140 -0.437 -0.218 
(0.058) (0.055) (0.068) (0.065) (0.064) (0.083) (0.029) (0.032) 
[0.169] [0.168] [0.173] [0.165] [0.167] [0.231] [0.177] [0.099] 
         Years 13–14 -0.388 -0.045 -0.389 -0.231 -0.229 -0.063 -0.513 -0.229 
(0.058) (0.055) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.084) (0.030) (0.032) 
[0.189] [0.185] [0.192] [0.197] [0.194] [0.221] [0.187] [0.105] 
         Year 15  
onwards 
 
-0.446 -0.433 -0.332 -0.355 -0.363 0.155 -0.620 -0.228 
(0.056) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.056) (0.070) (0.025) (0.027) 
[0.234] [0.227] [0.242] [0.241] [0.242] [0.237] [0.202] [0.131] 
Observations 1,598 1,503 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 
Mean DV 3.865 3.823 3.306 3.306 3.301 3.126 1.004 0.954 
R2 0.9614 0.9680 0.9372 0.9355 0.9368 0.9107 0.9117 0.8989 
No-fault law 
in operation 
0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.046 -0.002 -0.332 -0.154 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.043) (0.016) (0.017) 
[0.135] [0.136] [0.145] [0.129] [0.120] [0.154] [0.159] [0.079] 
R2 0.9563 0.9625 0.9338 0.9338 0.9354 0.9102 0.9040 0.8980 
  Notes: Notes for Table II.3 apply here.  
 
In sum, no-fault reforms were not correlated with an increase in the CDR (in the short term or 
the long). Instead, they were associated with a large and statistically significant fall in the growth 
rates of the CDR. As an additional robustness check, Table II.6 replicates Table II.3 with census-
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region-by-year fixed effects included (and with the placebo tests corresponding to specifications 8 
and 9). It is seen that the same broad conclusions apply.  
TABLE II.6—REPLICA OF TABLE II.3, BUT WITH REGION-BY-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS 
(For all specifications except (6) and (7), the dependent variable is the CDR. For (6) and (7), it is log CDR.) 
 Wolfers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
  Wolfers Replicated 
Same as 
(1), but 
data ex-
tended to 
1922-90 
Same as 
(2), but re-
form years 
corrected 
Same as 
(3), but 
California 
data cor-
rected 
Same as 
(4), but 
OLS 
Same as 
(4), but 
CDR in 
log form 
Same as 
(6), but 
OLS 
         First 2 years 
(of no-fault)  
 
0.127 0.116 0.103 -0.013 -0.080 -0.414 -0.161 -0.091 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.167) (0.134) (0.134) (0.499) (0.023) (0.030) 
[0.122] [0.117] [0.128] [0.119] [0.112] [0.470] [0.060] [0.047] 
         Years 3–4 
 
 
0.133 0.143 0.109 -0.022 -0.036 -0.507 -0.163 -0.100 
(0.091) (0.090) (0.169) (0.139) (0.139) (0.517) (0.023) (0.031) 
[0.144] [0.151] [0.163] [0.134] [0.132] [0.591] [0.070] [0.058] 
         Years 5–6 
 
0.093 0.031 -0.011 -0.083 -0.098 -0.844 -0.195 -0.147 
(0.091) (0.090) (0.166) (0.141) (0.140) (0.519) (0.024) (0.031) 
[0.162] [0.152] [0.167] [0.136] [0.134] [0.843] [0.076] [0.068] 
         Years 7–8 
 
 
 
0.090 0.053 0.008 -0.116 -0.134 -1.188 -0.221 -0.185 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.168) (0.146) (0.146) (0.539) (0.025) (0.032) 
[0.162] [0.135] [0.160] [0.150] [0.149] [1.172] [0.084] [0.086] 
         Years 9–10 
 
 
-0.106 -0.119 -0.173 -0.139 -0.154 -1.483 -0.240 -0.214 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.167) (0.151) (0.151) (0.565) (0.025) (0.034) 
[0.148] [0.143] [0.175] [0.161] [0.160] [1.445] [0.091] [0.105] 
         
Years 11–12 
 
-0.235 -0.288 -0.333 -0.256 -0.272 -1.701 -0.276 -0.233 
(0.089) (0.091) (0.167) (0.155) (0.155) (0.572) (0.026) (0.034) 
[0.133] [0.129] [0.169] [0.172] [0.171] [1.630] [0.095] [0.108] 
         Years 13–14 -0.294 -0.375 -0.408 -0.311 -0.315 -1.816 -0.310 -0.241 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.165) (0.161) (0.160) (0.580) (0.027) (0.035) 
[0.161] [0.150] [0.193] [0.200] [0.199] [1.743] [0.103] [0.114] 
         Year 15  
onwards 
 
-0.199 -0.225 -0.247 -0.527 -0.537 -1.832 -0.382 -0.255 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.134) (0.142) (0.141) (0.484) (0.024) (0.029) 
[0.172] [0.168] [0.221] [0.286] [0.286] [1.914] [0.114] [0.156] 
Observations 1,631 1,536 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 
Mean DV 3.909 3.869 3.357 3.357 3.352 3.790 1.009 1.005 
R2 0.9412 0.9451 0.8084 0.8087 0.8085 0.6597 0.9429 0.9188 
No-fault law 
in operation 
-0.028 -0.055 -0.116 -0.133 -0.159 -1.044 -0.219 -0.163 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.301) (0.014) (0.018) 
[0.131] [0.123] [0.155] [0.139] [0.137] [1.031] [0.080] [0.077] 
R2 0.9401 0.9438 0.8078 0.8078 0.8076 0.6586 0.9412 0.9179 
  Notes: Notes for Table II.3 apply here.  
 
9 Judicial and Legislative Erosion of the Fault Concept 
The above empirical finding that statutory no-fault reforms were not correlated with increased 
divorce is perhaps surprising. It is however congruent with the historical facts: The fault concept 
had already been heavily eroded in the decades leading to 1970, so that statutory no-fault reforms 
merely made de jure what had already been de facto. 
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Previous writers have described the decades-long erosion of the fault concept, but only in broad 
strokes.34 To my knowledge, none has documented in systematic detail the erosive process for any 
single state, as I do here. In this section, I document the cases of California and Vermont, as ex-
amples of judicial and legislative erosion of the fault concept.  
Before proceeding, it should be noted that each state’s experience was distinct. The judicial and 
legislative erosion of the fault concept in each state were not always as smooth, steady, and pro-
nounced as in California and Vermont. Unfortunately it is not feasible here to describe the decades-
long erosive process in every state. I simply assert here that, based on my study of the history of 
divorce, California and Vermont were not wildly exceptional. In general, across the US, the fault 
concept had been steadily eroded in the many decades before the statutory introduction of no-fault.  
9.1 California: Judicial Erosion of the Fault Concept 
Note: This section is accompanied by a list of notes in section 12. 
 
Long before 1970, many had already observed that there was a great divergence between the 
law in action and the law of the books. Below is listed a series of cases that trace the evolution of 
California’s divorce law in action from fault to no-fault. Of these, De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952) 
was probably the most important.35 (Unless otherwise noted, all cases mentioned in this subsection 
are from California.) But as the following will show, even De Burgh was merely the largest in a 
series of steps taken towards no-fault. 
California judges eroded the fault doctrine chiefly by stretching the definition of cruelty. Cali-
fornia lawyers would eventually circulate the apocryphal tale that even “crackers in bed” consti-
tuted cruelty (Rheinstein, 1972). It is thus helpful to begin with the leading, traditional, and con-
servative interpretations of cruelty given by the English jurist Lord Stowell (Sir William Scott). It 
can then be seen how these traditional interpretations were steadily eroded by California judges.  
Judges often refused to give a positive definition of cruelty. But one was given by Lord Stowell 
in the English case of Waring v. Waring (1813):36 “The definition of legal cruelty, is that which 
                                                 
34 E.g. Marshall & May (1932, pp. 12, 17); Pound (1943); Sirjamaki (1953, pp. 179-185) O’Gorman (1963, pp. 20-30); Clark 
(1968, pp. 341, 344); Rosenblatt (1969); Rheinstein (1952; 1972, pp. 51-105); Frank, Berman, & Mazur-Hart (1978, pp. 40-45); 
Marvell (1989, p. 544); Fineman (1989, pp. 945-946); Blumberg (1991, pp. 117-118, 124); Friedman (2000, pp. 1511-1527). 
35 De Burgh v. De Burgh (39 Cal.2d 858, 1952). 
36 Waring v. Waring (2 Phil. Eccl. 132, 1813) . 
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may endanger the life or health of the party.” His negative definition in Evans v. Evans (1790) 
would however prove to be the more influential.37 As said by Griswold (1986), “The importance 
of the Evans decision to American interpretations of matrimonial cruelty cannot be overestimated.” 
In both Waring and Evans, Lord Stowell made clear that bodily harm was necessary for a finding 
of cruelty.   
Carpenter v. Carpenter (1883) took place not in California, but in Kansas.38 Nonetheless, it 
was seminal. Carpenter explicitly repudiated Lord Stowell and would be oft-cited by California 
courts. Carpenter defined legal cruelty to include any “unjustifiable conduct … such as utterly 
destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony.” Carpenter also declared that “the tendency 
of modern thought is to elevate the marriage relation and place it upon a higher plane, and to 
consider it a mental and spiritual relation as well as a physical relation” (emphasis added).  
The views expressed in Carpenter were not immediately endorsed by California: In Waldron v. 
Waldron (1890),39 Evans continued to be cited approvingly. But just two years later, Waldron was 
reversed and Carpenter was cited with approval in Barnes v. Barnes (1892).40 Barnes thus marked 
an early and significant departure from the fault doctrine in California.  
MacDonald v. MacDonald (1909) reaffirmed Carpenter and Barnes.41 Mrs. MacDonald had 
filed with her husband’s fraternal order—Hesperian Parlor of the Native Sons of the Golden 
West—a single affidavit listing charges against his character. A lower court found these charges 
to be “false, unfounded, and malicious” and granted Mr. MacDonald a divorce for cruelty. Mrs. 
MacDonald then appealed, arguing that this single act of cruelty did not suffice for the granting of 
a divorce. Her appeal was defeated, with the court citing Carpenter and Barnes.  
Brewthauer v. Brewthauer (1920) cited Barnes.42 But more importantly, it made the assertion 
that “the ends and object of matrimony between them [Mr. and Mrs. Brewthauer] having been 
                                                 
37 In Evans v. Evans (1 Hag. Eccl. 35, 1790), Lord Stowell wrote, “Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness 
of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, 
do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offences in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of 
life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties (for it may 
exist on the one side as well as on the other) the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious 
connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation, and if they cannot, they must suffer in silence.” 
38 Carpenter v. Carpenter (30 Kans. 712, 1883). 
39 Waldron v. Waldron (85 Cal. 251, 1890). 
40 Barnes v. Barnes (95 Cal. 175, 1892). 
41 MacDonald v. MacDonald (155 Cal. 665, 1909). 
42 Brewthauer v. Brewthauer (188 P. 296, Cal.App. 1920). 
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utterly destroyed, it were better for them and for society that the union be legally dissolved” (em-
phasis added). This was a clear departure from the law of the books, which permitted divorce only 
if certain fault-based grounds were established. 
‘Incompatibility of temperament’, which many writers consider to be a no-fault divorce ground, 
has never been a divorce ground in California. Yet it was explicitly considered in Blanchard v. 
Blanchard (1909).43 Blanchard would later be cited in McGann v. McGann (1947) to defeat the 
wife’s protest that her acts did not constitute cruelty—the husband had testified that, amongst other 
things, she “was cold toward him, nagged him, wrote him whining letters.”44  
One important element of the fault theory is malice. Barngrover v. Barngrover (1922) sug-
gested that this element was not essential.45 Mrs. Barngrover’s “nagging for over ten years” was 
held sufficient for the finding of cruelty, even if such nagging had sprung from good motives. This 
ruling that the element of malice was not essential would be cited approvingly in Keener v. Kenner 
(1941) and Hill v. Hill (1947).46. 
A distinct Hill v. Hill (1943) case asserted that “public policy does not discourage divorce where 
the relations between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have 
been utterly destroyed.”47 This assertion is significant in that it invokes ‘public policy’. In law and 
perhaps especially family law, ‘public policy’ is sometimes used to override other considerations. 
Hill thus set a precedent for invoking ‘public policy’ as a rationale for departing from the divorce 
law of the books. Hill would be frequently cited,48 including in De Burgh itself.  
Three cases on the eve of De Burgh lent further affirmation to the breakdown theory. Weil v. 
Weil (1951) reiterated the assertion made in Hill (1943): “No prospects of reconciliation remain … 
We cannot ignore the important ‘social considerations which make it contrary to public policy to 
insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly broken down.’”  
In Slavich v. Slavich (1951),49 the trial judge had apparently granted a divorce on the basis of 
remarks far removed from the statutory divorce law: e.g. “both these parties are acting very, very 
                                                 
43 Blanchard v. Blanchard (10 Cal.App. 203, 1909). 
44 McGann v. McGann (82 Cal. App. 2d 382, 1947). 
45 Barngrover v. Barngrover (56 Cal.App. 687, 1922). 
46 Keener v. Keener (18 Cal.2d 445, 1941), Hill v. Hill (82 Cal.App.2d 682, 1947). 
47 Hill v. Hill (23 Cal.2d 82, 1943). 
48 E.g. Barham v. Barham (33 Cal. 2d 416, 1949), Spellens v. Spellens (49 Cal. 2d 210, 1957), Braden v. Braden (178 Cal. App. 
2d 481, 1960). 
49 Slavich v. Slavich (108 Cal.App.2d 451, 1951). 
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silly indeed, very silly” and “I couldn’t keep these people together.” Citing these remarks, Mrs. 
Slavich appealed on the basis that she had been denied “a fair trial by certain acts and conduct of 
the trial judge.” Her appeal failed and the trial judge’s decision was upheld. 
The law of the books made no mention of the concept of love. Yet Ganann v. Ganann (1952) 
suggested that this concept deserved consideration in divorce cases.50 
In the seminal case of De Burgh (1952), a lower court had denied the De Burghs a divorce upon 
a showing of recrimination—both husband and wife had been guilty of cruelty towards each other. 
Mrs. De Burgh then appealed to the Supreme Court.  
De Burgh made three distinct but not unrelated advances towards no-fault. First, Chief Justice 
Roger Traynor repealed recrimination. California’s recrimination clause, enacted in 1872, had 
never been amended. Yet Traynor was able to re-interpret it in an entirely new light and thereby 
repeal it altogether.  
Second, the breakdown theory was enshrined. Henceforth, divorce cases would be governed by 
several major considerations, the first being: “The prospect of reconciliation. The court should 
determine whether the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed or whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be saved.” This, once again, completely departed from 
the law of the books, which made no reference, however obliquely, to “the prospect of reconcilia-
tion” or whether “the marriage can be saved.” Similar language would appear in later no-fault laws.  
Third, it was declared that divorce to both parties would henceforth be possible. Such a possi-
bility had hitherto never been entertained in a Californian court. This was yet another rebuke to 
the fault theory, in which divorce was to be awarded to the victorious, innocent party and against 
the defeated, guilty party. 
The De Burgh ruling prevailed on a 4-3 majority. In his dissent, Justice Edmonds criticized “the 
fallacy of such circuitous reasoning,” noted that the “Civil Code contemplates that a divorce can 
be awarded to only one party,” and concluded, “If public policy no longer approves the doctrine 
of recrimination, then it is for the Legislature, and not for the court, to repeal the statute.”  
Phillips v. Phillips (1953) and Mueller v. Mueller (1955) cemented De Burgh.51 In each case, a 
lower court had, as in De Burgh, denied a divorce upon a showing of recrimination. In each, the 
                                                 
50 Ganann v. Ganann (109 Cal.App.2d 346, 1952). 
51 Phillips v. Phillips (41 Cal.2d 869, 1953), Mueller v. Mueller (44 Cal.2d 527, 1955). 
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Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision and affirmed the De Burgh ruling. In each, 
the majority were the same four justices and the dissenters the same three. In the following years, 
lower courts would expound upon, expand upon, and reaffirm the ideas expressed in De Burgh.52 
A further advance towards no-fault was made in Nunes v. Nunes (1964).53 Mrs. Nunes argued 
that her cruel conduct was “basically attributable to her emotional difficulties and that she was 
unable to discipline herself.” Citing De Burgh, the Supreme Court stated, “it does not follow that 
[Mr. Nunes] must be denied a divorce.” Sanner’s (1965) commentary on Nunes is worth quoting 
at length: 
Although the courts had tended to become less preoccupied with the fault doctrine and the 
degree of fault required in a particular case had been held to be minimal, no court had held 
that a complete lack of fault would not constitute a bar to divorce, except where the strict 
requirements of Section 108 of the California Civil Code were met. Nunes, however, seems 
to stand for that very proposition and coupled with the court’s decision in DeBurgh v. De-
Burgh, which held that the “innocence” of a complaining spouse is not a condition prece-
dent to the award of a divorce, marks California as a jurisdiction in which the issue of fault 
may be of very minor relevance in future divorce actions.  
… If Nunes stands for the proposition that intention and the ability to control one’s acts are 
no longer relevant factors in cruelty cases, the ground of extreme cruelty could seemingly 
be used as a basis for terminating any marriage that a court might find had ceased to serve 
the legitimate ends of matrimony.  
… In conclusion, it is suggested that a new look at California statutory divorce provisions 
is needed. There seems little doubt that the present scheme, based on fault and misconduct, 
is obsolete and misleading. If marriage failure has become the first principle of divorce law, 
the statutes should express and qualify that fact. 
 
In 1969, the Family Law Act (FLA) was passed. But in so doing, the legislature merely adopted 
the recommendation of Sanner and many others to codify the law in action (see California Legis-
lature, 1969, p. 8054). Not surprisingly, many contemporaries would comment that the FLA did 
not make divorce any easier; instead, it merely made de jure what had already been de facto. 
One final and crucial observation must be made: Even on paper, the FLA was not a liberal 
revolution. Divorce would henceforth be granted if and only if54 there were “Irreconcilable differ-
ences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage.” As Wheeler (1974, p. 21) 
notes, “If taken at face value, these phrases present a standard so strict that no marriage could ever 
                                                 
52 Kirsch v. Kirsch (119 Cal.App.2d 271, 1953), Hendricks v. Hendricks (125 Cal.App.2d 239, 1954), Ohligschlager v. Ohlig-
schlager (125 Cal.App.2d 458, 1954), Friedenberg v. Friedenberg (178 Cal.App.2d 106, 1960), Baker v. Baker (233 Cal.App.2d 
569, 1965). 
53 Nunes v. Nunes (62 Cal.2d 33, 1964). 
54 Again ignoring divorce on the ground of incurable insanity, which the FLA retained. 
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be dissolved.” Similar remarks can be found in Sharff (1969), Rheinstein (1972, p. 373), Lee (1972, 
p. 419), and DiFonzo (1994, p. 546).  
In sum, California’s divorce law evolved from fault to no-fault, over the course of many decades. 
The FLA, when it was finally passed, served largely to codify into the law of the books what had 
already been the law in action. It did not represent a revolutionary leap from fault to no-fault. 
The foregoing discussion prompts a related empirical question: Did any of these judicial cases 
affect divorce rates? As I have tried to show above, the erosion of the fault doctrine was incremen-
tal and relentless. No single one of these cases marked a momentous shift in the law. In California 
between 1941 and 1965, there were, in the foregoing discussion alone, twenty cases55 that under-
mined the fault doctrine to some small degree. Collectively, the tide of judicial cases over the many 
decades mattered. But it is unlikely that any single one of them engendered changes in the divorce 
rates that can be detected in an empirical analysis. Moreover, it is unclear how each of these cases 
should be coded in an empirical test. It would seem necessary to employ an empirical strategy 
more sophisticated than the mere assignment of indicator variables. This I leave to future research.  
9.2 Vermont: Legislative Erosion of the Fault Concept 
Vermont was a state where, unlike California, the legislature played an important role in erod-
ing the fault concept. Researchers disagree over which year, if any, Vermont introduced no-fault.56 
The key reason is that its statutory divorce law progressed from fault to no-fault in a series of small 
steps. I now list these to illustrate how one state’s legislature aided the erosive process.  
In 1931, the General Assembly of Vermont added incurable insanity as a divorce ground.57 As 
discussed above, the fault theory contains three key elements: innocence, guilt, and malice. All 
three can reasonably be said to be absent from divorce for insanity. This 1931 enactment of insanity 
as a divorce ground may thus be considered Vermont’s first breach of the fault doctrine.  
Ten years later, the General Assembly added this divorce ground: “VII. Desertion. When a 
married person has lived apart from his or her spouse for three consecutive years without fault on 
                                                 
55 Keener (1941), Hill (1943), McGann (1947), Hill (1947), Barham (1949), Weil (1951), Slavich (1951), Ganann (1952), De 
Burgh (1952), Phillips (1953), Kirsch (1953), Hendricks (1954), Ohligschlager (1954), Mueller (1955), Spellens (1957), Frieden-
berg (1960), Braden (1960), Nunes (1964), Baker (1965). 
56 Ellman & Lohr (1998) and Gold (2010) say 1941; Drewianka (2008) says between 1967 and 1969; Nakonezny, Shull, & 
Rodgers (1995, 1997, 1999) and Vlosky & Monroe (2002) say 1972; and Wright & Stetson (1978), Zelder (1993), Brinig & Crafton 
(1994), Brinig & Buckley (1998), Allen, Pendakur, & Suen (2006), and Mechoulan (2006) say never. 
57 31st Biennial Session, No. 44. Approved on and effective from 1931-03-25. 
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the part of the libellant and the court finds that the resumption of marital relations is not reasonably 
probable.”58 The sentence quoted explicitly preserved the fault theory’s first element with its in-
sistence that the “libellant” be “without fault.” However, it made no mention of the other two 
elements, namely guilt and malice on the part of the libellee. This ground thus marked a further 
breach of the fault doctrine.  
Note though that this new ground was explicitly headed with the word Desertion.59 This word 
could have been taken by judges to connote the necessity of guilt and malice. However, this word 
would be omitted from the 1947 Vermont Statutes and subsequent editions thereof. I have found 
no primary legislative commentary or secondary legal commentary regarding this omission.   
An act of 1970 amended this 1941 ground by deleting the words without fault on the part of the 
libellant,60 thereby jettisoning a third element of the fault theory, viz. the innocence of the libellant. 
The same act also repealed recrimination, thereby further eroding the fault theory. 
The act of March 1971 repealed condonation, thereby further eroding the fault doctrine. This 
same act also reworded the 1970 repeal of recrimination, which had read “The defense of bar in 
recrimination in matrimonial actions is hereby abolished.” This sentence was now rewritten as: 
“Recrimination shall not constitute a defense or a bar to a libel for divorce.”61 I have found no 
primary legislative commentary or secondary legal commentary regarding this rewording. But this 
1971 rewording suggests that legislature was firm in its intent to repeal recrimination. 
A month later, the act of April 1971 reduced the separation requirement of the above ground 
from three years to two.62 The act of 1972 then further reduced this to six months.63 Also, the 
wording of Section 3 of the same 1972 act closely resembled other newly-minted no-fault grounds. 
The foregoing shows that in no single year did Vermont’s statutory divorce law leap dramati-
cally from fault to no-fault. Instead, it progressed from fault to no-fault in a series of small steps. 
10 Conclusion 
I reexamined the data. I found that the statutory introduction of no-fault was not correlated with 
an increase in divorce (in the short term or the long). Instead, it was associated with lower growth 
                                                 
58 36th Biennial Session, No. 43. Approved on 1941-03-20. 
59 Even though there was already another divorce ground that read “IV. For wilful desertion for three consecutive years.” 
60 50th Biennial Session, Adjourned Session, No. 264. Approved on 1970-04-08 
61 51st Biennial Session, No. 4. 
62 51st Biennial Session, No. 39. Effective from 1971-05-01.   
63 51st Biennial Session, Adjourned Session, No. 238. Approved on and effective from 1972-04-06. 
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rates of divorce. It must be emphasized that my findings do not and cannot prove that no-fault 
reforms did not increase divorce. Nonetheless, my findings appear to be consistent with the his-
torical facts reviewed. Statutory no-fault reforms merely coded into the law of the books what had 
already been the law in action. This would provide one possible explanation for why they would 
have been correlated with an increase in divorce. This would also lend support to the hypothesis 
that what matters most for divorce rates is the law in action, rather than the law of the books. If 
there is a sudden change to the latter without a sudden change to the former, then one should not 
expect to see changes in the divorce rate. 
So, what did cause the divorce boom of the 1960s-1970s? This broader question is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. This chapter sought merely to answer a simple question (“Was statutory no-
fault correlated with an increase in divorce?”) and did so in the negative.  
There remains a puzzle: How could it be that reforms were correlated with lower growth rates 
of divorce? As this chapter has tried to show, reforms had little substance in practice. It is thus 
unlikely that reforms caused a decrease in the growth rates of divorce. This correlation must be 
dismissed as spurious.  
Nonetheless, this correlation is not entirely inexplicable. Here is one possibility that future re-
searchers may explore. Rising divorce prompted legislative reforms.64 No-fault, when it finally 
came into effect, tended to mark the tail end of the 1960s-1970s divorce boom. And as is now 
known, this boom was followed by a decades-long decline in divorce that continues even today. It 
is thus not surprising that no-fault and the growth rates of divorce were negatively correlated. 
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11 Appendix: Calculating the Effects of the 1984 California Timing Reform 
Absent the 1984 reform, how many of the 1984 final decrees would instead have been entered 
only in 1985? Assume that absent the 1984 reform, the 1984 couples would have exhibited pre-
cisely the same pattern of tardiness as in 1973, for which we have some information: Mielke & 
Smith (1977, p. 24) report that of final decrees in 1973, 16.6% were entered within a month of the 
eligible date; 21.5%, one month later; 11.5%, two months; 7.9%, three months; 6.0%, four months; 
4.7%, five months; 9.4%, six to eight months; 5.8%, nine to eleven months; 9.9% twelve to 23 
months; and 6.7%, 24 or more months. So, let us assume that, (at least) 83.4% of December 1984 
final decrees would instead have been entered in 1985. Likewise for (at least) 61.9% of November 
decrees, 50.4% of October decrees, 42.5% of September decrees, 36.5% of August decrees, 31.8% 
of July decrees, 22.4% of April to June decrees, and 16.6% of January to March decrees. 
There were 142,972 divorces, annulments, and legal separations 1984. Err on the side of under-
stating the effect of the 1984 reform and say that 10,000 final decrees were entered in each month 
of 1984. Hence, absent the reform, 8,340 of the 10,000 December decrees would instead have been 
entered in 1985; 6,190 of the 10,000 November decrees would instead have been granted in 1985; 
etc. Altogether, (at least) 42,350 of the 1984 decrees would instead have been entered in 1985.  
If I assume instead that the pattern of tardiness in 1984 would, absent the 1984 reform, have 
been the same as that in 1969 (for which Mielke & Smith also provide data), then the correspond-
ing number would be 34,460. Either of these numbers vastly exceeds the 1984 spike of 15,440. 
These calculations are extremely crude. Nonetheless, it is probably safe to conclude that divorces 
would have fallen in 1984, were it not for this reform. 
The future researcher wishing to undertake a more refined analysis may wish to take note of 
three things. First, when comparing the patterns of tardiness in 1969 and 1973, Mielke & Smith 
(1977, p. 23) state, “it appears that the heavier case load confronting the courts in 1973 was the 
probable cause of the slow-down in processing of decrees.” 
Second, unlike 1983 and before, the figures for 1984-6 include legal separations (hence biasing 
upwards the divorce totals for these years). I have not been able to uncover the exact number of 
legal separations in 1984, but based on the following clues, it is likely to have been relatively small. 
First, there were 496, 553, and 570 separations in 1979, 1980, and 1981 (California Department 
of Public Health, Vital Statistics of California, 1979-1980 and 1981). Second, it is stated in the 
source for the 1989 divorce total that there were about 1,000 legal separations that year. 
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Third, I have completely ignored the nunc pro tunc (‘now for then’) decrees. Although these 
could conceivably skew my calculations, it does not seem, based on my study of the history of 
California divorce, that these ever had an appreciable effect on the divorce statistics. 
12 Appendix: Notes to Accompany Section 9.1 
Commentators on the dual law of divorce before 1970:  
To all who make such proposals [for change to the law of divorce], the Institute of Law 
issues the same challenge: “First find out what the law of divorce really is.” ¶ That chal-
lenge came as a shock to the group of Maryland lawyers to whom the manuscript of this 
book was submitted. They thought they knew the law; and they were a little annoyed to 
have put in their hands a book of 350 pages to tell them what is found in three pages of the 
Annotated Code and a dozen leading cases. But they were forced to admit that the law of 
the law-books and the law as it is, the living body of the law, are not always identical. It is 
the latter, the living body of the law of divorce, the law of divorce as it really functions, 
the law of divorce as a working tool of society, that is delineated in this book (Joseph N. 
Ulman, foreword to Marshall & May, 1932, p. 12). 
Butler’s satire of the two distinct commercial systems in the metropolis of Erewhon bears 
a too-apt analogy to the subject of divorce in the American states. Like Erewhon our states 
have a system ancient in heritage, minutely defined, and officially accepted. Like Erewhon, 
too, they have a practice that varies widely from the official theory, a practice which is not 
heralded in law books but which is thoroughly a part of common thought and common 
discussion (Marshall & May, 1932, p. 17). 
Perhaps in no other area has the discrepancy between law in dogmatic theory and law in 
action, evading dogma by fiction and subterfuge, become so marked as in divorce law. The 
withered dogma that divorce can be granted only for marital fault, variously and eccentri-
cally defined from state to state, is rendered still more irrational by the widespread rule that 
recrimination is an absolute defense. The result has been a triumph, not for dogma, but for 
hypocrisy. Rules insensitive to reality have been cynically circumvented by litigants and 
attorneys with the tacit sanction of the courts (Traynor, 1956). 
We have our fine strict divorce law on the book; our official morals sound wonderful, and 
the people who want their liquor or the people who want to gamble or the people who want 
to get an easy divorce can have it for the asking (Rheinstein, 1952, p. 45). 
It is apparent that courts are frequently dealing in fictions when they determine “innocence” 
or “guilt” of married couples (A.D.C., 1949, p. 709). 
the exclusion of fault has the virtue of being in closer rapport with actual practice in divorce 
litigation. ... it is submitted that present popular concepts of the marital institution approach 
an actual practice between individuals which has diverged so far from the “legal norm” 
that statutes predicated on traditional thinking have become archaic (Students of North-
western University, Illinois Law Review, 1950). 
There has been a gradual relaxation in the grounds of divorce and a judicial winking at 
collusion so as to allow the dissolution of marriages for purely personal reasons quite apart 
from the “fault” of either party (Leathers, 1937). 
46 
 
If you talk to the man on the street, he generally takes it for granted that whenever he wants 
a divorce he can have it. He knows that there is some legal rigmarole connected with it, 
even though he does not quite see why and what. He knows he has to have a lawyer to 
whom he has to pay a fee, which he, of course, always regards as exorbitant. But he is 
perfectly convinced that if he wants a divorce he can have it. ¶ Very few people who harbor 
that belief have ever looked up the divorce statute of their state, and, if they did, they might 
experience a severe shock. According to the official law of the majority of states, it is not 
so easy to obtain a divorce (Rheinstein, 1952, p. 45). 
 
Evans v. Evans (1790): 
What is cruelty? … it is the duty of courts … to keep the rule extremely strict. The causes 
must be grave and weighty, and such as shew an absolute impossibility that the duties of 
the married life can be discharged. … What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few 
cases to be admitted, where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or 
menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of 
civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not 
threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offences in the 
marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not 
that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the par-
ties (for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other) the suffering party must bear 
in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent 
resistance or by prudent conciliation, and if they cannot, they must suffer in silence. And 
if it be complained that by this inactivity of the courts much injustice may be suffered and 
much misery produced, the answer is, that courts of justice do not pretend to furnish cures 
for all the miseries of human life. They redress or punish gross violations of duty; but they 
go no farther; they cannot make men virtuous; and, as the happiness of the world depends 
upon its virtue, there may be much unhappiness in it which human laws cannot undertake 
to remove.  
Still less is it cruelty, where it wounds not the natural feelings, but the acquired feelings 
arising from particular rank and situation; for the court has no scale of sensibilities by 
which it can gauge the quantum of injury done and felt; and therefore, though the court will 
not absolutely exclude considerations of that sort, where they are stated merely as matter 
of aggravation; yet they cannot constitute cruelty where it would not otherwise have existed: 
of course, the denial of little indulgences and particular accommodations, which the deli-
cacy of the world is apt to number amongst its necessaries, is not cruelty. …  
These are negative descriptions of cruelty; they shew only what is not cruelty …; but if it 
were at all necessary to lay down an affirmative rule … the danger of life, limb, or health, 
is usually inserted as the ground upon which the court has proceeded to a separation. … I 
have heard no one case cited in which the court has granted a divorce without proof given 
of a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt.  
 
Carpenter v. Carpenter (1883):  
It was formerly thought that to constitute extreme cruelty, such as would authorize the 
granting of a divorce, physical violence is necessary; but the modern and better-considered 
cases have repudiated this doctrine as taking too low and sensual a view of the marriage 
relation, and it is now very generally held that any unjustifiable conduct on the part of 
either the husband or the wife, which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, 
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or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to seriously impair the bodily health 
or endanger the life of the other, or such as in any other manner endangers the life of the 
other, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes 
“extreme cruelty” under the statutes, although no physical or personal violence may be 
inflicted, or even threatened. [Citations.]  
None of the foregoing cases are precisely like the present case, but many of them sustain 
the principle above enunciated; and taken together, they clearly show the tendency of mod-
ern thought upon this subject. The tendency of modern thought is to elevate the marriage 
relation and place it upon a higher plane, and to consider it a mental and spiritual relation 
as well as a physical relation.  
 
Waldron v. Waldron (1890): 
the final test of its sufficiency, as a cause of divorce, must be its actual or reasonably ap-
prehended injurious effect upon the body or health of the com plaining party. … the prac-
tical view of the law is, that a degree of cruelty which cannot be perceived to injure the 
body or the health of the body, “can be practically endured,” and must be endured, if there 
is no other remedy than by divorce 
 
Barnes v. Barnes (1892):  
[Waldron] was decided by a bare majority of the court as it was then constituted, and while 
the conclusion there reached finds support in many earlier cases cited in the opinion, we 
do not think it can be sustained without a wide departure from the letter and spirit of section 
94 of the Civil Code of this state, which declares: “Extreme cruelty is the infliction of 
grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other by one party to the mar-
riage.” …  
The tendency of modern decisions, reflecting the advanced civilization of the present age, 
is to view marriage from a different standpoint than as a mere physical relation. It is now 
more wisely regarded as a union affecting the mental and spiritual life of the parties to it,—
a relation designed to bring to them the comfort and felicities of home life,—and between 
whom, in order to fulfill such design, there should exist mutual sentiments of love and 
respect. 
 
Blanchard v. Blanchard (1909):  
Incompatibility of temperament is disclosed by the record also, and that mutual confidence 
and affection essential to conjugal happiness and the proper maintenance of the marriage 
state seems to have been entirely wanting.  
 
McGann v. McGann (1947):  
[Wife] was cold toward [husband], nagged him, wrote him whining letters while overseas, 
turned her back on him while in bed, attempted to regulate his life and refused to permit 
him to go bowling with his father, invited him to leave home, made it difficult for him to 
practice dentistry, and attempted to have him arrested. 
 
Barngrover v. Barngrover (1922):  
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The nagging grew out of the ultrapuristic character of [wife]. [Wife] says that “she is an 
earnest Christian woman.” It may be added that the whole record sustains that claim. It 
may be added that apparently [husband] is an earnest Christian man. Nevertheless it is a 
sound legal proposition that nagging by a spouse of such character may have, and probably 
would have, the same effect on the other spouse as any other kind of nagging. [Wife] also 
argues that “her motives have always been good.” Conceding such to be the fact, it still 
remains that nagging from good motives may be just as hurtful as nagging from any other 
kind of motives.  
 
Weil v. Weil (1951):  
It is apparent from the proposal made by the trial judge, and from his other comments, that 
he believed a divorce was the only satisfactory solution to the problems presented in the 
marital tragedy that confronted him. His statement that “it was clear to him from all the 
evidence that he had heard and read in the case, that the legitimate objects of matrimony 
had been destroyed” is conclusively supported by the record. The evidence shows that the 
marriage of the parties began with mutual affection and happiness, but that arguments and 
misunderstandings, largely over financial matters, became increasingly frequent and acri-
monious. The physical health of both parties has become seriously impaired. Family, social, 
and even business relationships have been disrupted. No prospects of reconciliation re-
main—the final separation followed earnest efforts to overcome differences and live peace-
fully together. Since the filing of the complaint the activities of the parties have degenerated 
into a legal battle, characterized by extravagant and embittering charges, and in which the 
only remaining consideration of importance is money. We cannot ignore the important 
“social considerations which make it contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance 
of a union which has utterly broken down.” 
 
Slavich v. Slavich (1951), quoting the trial judge’s remarks:  
never in my experience have I tried a case of this character, a divorce case or plea for 
separate maintenance, where there were so many intangibles that have been enlarged into 
apparently important features … I received the impression at the hearing yesterday that this 
case is made up almost exclusively of trivial incidents. … the facts developed in the course 
of this trial are very fragmentary ... It seems an immense amount of discussion here over 
very little. … I think both these parties are acting very, very silly indeed, very silly. ... 
[F]rom an economic standpoint, these people are way superior to the average American 
family. The only thing they lack, they don’t lack any income, but they lacked happiness 
and the ability to get along with one another—but I think it has got beyond that point. They 
both exhibit, I think, extreme dislike for one another, both of them.  
… I had to. I couldn’t keep these people together. Mrs. Slavich wouldn’t take a divorce, so 
I gave the divorce to him. 
 
Ganann v. Ganann (1952):  
The court was fully justified in drawing the inference that if the appellant loved the re-
spondent at the time of the marriage she lost that love shortly afterwards and that that fact 
became evident to respondent. 
 
De Burgh v. De Burgh (1952):  
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The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble 
and enrich human life. It channels biological drives that might otherwise become socially 
destructive; it ensures the care and education of children in a stable environment; it estab-
lishes continuity from one generation to another; it nurtures and develops the individual 
initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since the family is the core of our society, the 
law seeks to foster and preserve marriage. But when a marriage has failed and the family 
has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce will be 
permitted.  
… Important developments of the past several decades have made it increasingly clear that 
the courts can no longer decline to exercise the discretion inherent in the clean hands doc-
trine. 
The rising divorce rate in the United States has compelled a growing recognition of mar-
riage failure as a social problem and correspondingly less preoccupation with technical 
marital fault. This trend is strikingly exemplified by the recent amendment of section 92 of 
the Civil Code designating incurable insanity as a ground for divorce. Formerly, no matter 
how vicious the conduct of an insane spouse, he could not be divorced, for the law refused 
to find in him the guilt essential to a marital offense. [Citations.] The Legislature has come 
to realize, however, that when a union is dominated by insanity, fulfilment of the normal 
purposes of marriage is hopeless. What was once a bar to divorce is now recognized as a 
justification for divorce. Still more striking in recognition of this trend has been the enact-
ment of legislation in many states authorizing divorce when the spouses have lived apart 
for a required number of years. Marriage failure, rather than the fault of the parties, is the 
basis upon which such divorces are granted. [Citations.]  
It would be froward indeed for the court, when it is called upon to evaluate an alleged 
recriminatory defense, to ignore the growing awareness that a marriage in name only is not 
a marriage in any real sense. In other fields, equity does not deny relief on the ground of 
plaintiff’s unclean hands when to do so would be harmful to the public interest. 
… In keeping with the traditional view of the law toward both marriage and divorce, the 
Lord Chancellor states that the consideration of “primary importance” is the interest of the 
community at large. This interest is “to be judged by maintaining a true balance between 
respect for the binding sanctity of marriage and the social considerations which make it 
contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly broken 
down.”  
… the doctrine of recrimination, like the doctrine of unclean hands of which it is a part, is 
neither puristic nor mechanical, but an equitable principle to be applied according to the 
circumstances of each case and with a proper respect for the paramount interests of the 
community at large. 
… Reconciliation appears impossible. The trial judge himself observed that “the marriage 
here was a failure from the start” and that “there is nothing really to keep them together.” ... 
it is apparent that there has been a total and irremedial breakdown of the marriage. Tech-
nical marital fault can play but little part in the face of the unhappy spectacle indicated by 
this evidence, with its inevitable effect upon the family, friends, neighbors, and business 
interests of the parties. 
 
Also from De Burgh, Chief Justice Traynor re-interprets and thereby repeals the recrimination 
clause:  
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the language of section 122 of the Civil Code indicates that the trial court may have abused 
its discretion in disregarding the requirement therein that the cause of divorce of which one 
party is found guilty must be “in bar” of that party’s ground of divorce against the other 
party. To resolve this conflict, we have studied the history of the doctrine of recrimination, 
its objectives, and the wording and legislative background of the applicable statutes.  
It has sometimes been assumed that any cause of divorce constitutes a recriminatory de-
fense. The legislative language, however, is ill-adapted to such a broad purpose. Read to-
gether, sections 111 and 122 of the Civil Code provide: “Divorces must be denied upon ... 
a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the plain-
tiff’s cause of divorce.” Had the Legislature meant to make every cause of divorce an ab-
solute defense, it could easily have provided that: “Divorces must be denied upon ... a 
showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff.” We are bound to 
consider the additional requirement that such a cause of divorce must be “in bar” of the 
plaintiff’s cause of divorce. 
… It is clear that the Legislature, in relying upon judicial principles of general application, 
intended that in divorce litigation the fault of the plaintiff should have no more significance 
than elsewhere in the law. Apparently with this purpose in mind it worded the statute to 
require that a cause of divorce shown by defendant must be “in bar” of the plaintiff’s cause 
of divorce. It would have defeated its own purpose had it closed the avenues to divorce 
when the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed. The perpetuation of an 
unwholesome relationship would be a mockery of marriage.  
…We have concluded that section 122 of the Civil Code imposes upon the trial judge the 
duty to determine whether or not the fault of the plaintiff in a divorce action is to be re-
garded as “in bar” of the plaintiff’s cause of divorce based upon the fault of the defendant. 
Tested by the considerations discussed above, the evidence in the present case would have 
been ample to support a finding that the parties’ misconduct should not bar a divorce. Rec-
onciliation appears impossible. The trial judge himself observed that “the marriage here 
was a failure from the start” and that “there is nothing really to keep them together.” 
 
Also from De Burgh, California divorce cases would henceforth be governed by this consider-
ation: 
The prospect of reconciliation. The court should determine whether the legitimate objects 
of matrimony have been destroyed or whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the mar-
riage can be saved. It should consider the ages and temperaments of the parties, the length 
of their marriage, the seriousness and frequency of their marital misconduct proved at the 
trial and the likelihood of its recurrence, the duration and apparent finality of the separation, 
and the sincerity of their efforts to overcome differences and live together harmoniously. 
 
Also from De Burgh, Justice Edmonds’s dissent: 
Ignoring the mandatory “must” of section 111, the majority hold that the trial court may 
exercise its “discretion” in determining whether to grant a divorce where each party has 
shown a cause of divorce against the other. 
… The fallacy of such circuitous reasoning lies in the misinterpretation of the plain lan-
guage of the statute.  
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… That the doctrine of recrimination has been repealed is made crystal clear by the sug-
gestion “that a divorce will be granted to both parties.” The code makes no provision for 
such a decree and the result is contrary to the requirement that a divorce “must be denied” 
when recrimination is proved. … The Civil Code contemplates that a divorce can be 
awarded to only one party. Section 131 provides in part: “If it determines that the divorce 
ought to be granted, an interlocutory judgment must be entered, declaring that the party in 
whose favor the court decides is entitled to a divorce; ...”  
… this court should not usurp the legislative prerogative by the device of interpreting a 
statute which needs no interpretation, and which has been accepted without question for 80 
years. If public policy no longer approves the doctrine of recrimination, then it is for the 
Legislature, and not for the court, to repeal the statute. 
 
Kirsch v. Kirsch (1953):  
From the narrative of the unfortunate relationship that developed between the parties it is 
apparent that the family effected by the union of these parties is at an end. … When a 
marriage fails, the family thereupon ceases to exist; it is no longer a unit, “the purposes of 
family life are no longer served” and a dissolution should be decreed if statutory require-
ments therefor are met. [De Burgh citation.] Marriage should not be degraded and its pur-
poses frustrated by such decrees as will merely punish the parties and rob their progeny of 
love and contentment yet at the same time bring no benefit to the state.  
 
Hendricks v. Hendricks (1954):  
It is fundamental that a marriage contract differs from other contractual relations in that 
there exists a definite and vital public interest in reference to the marriage relation. The 
“paramount interests of the community at large,” quoting from the Phillips case, supra, is 
a matter of primary concern. The instant case presents a picture of long continued strife not 
merely between husband and wife but as well involving the two children in the marital 
quarrels. The parties have been married almost 23 years, and as appellant says, it appears 
that “their constant litigation has produced nothing so far but additional trouble for the 
entire family (Clk. Tr., pp. 40, 41).” Public policy cannot well be served by denying a 
divorce to both parties. Since both parties are, under the evidence, entitled to a divorce on 
the ground of cruelty, they should be granted that relief without further litigation.  
 
Ohligschlager v. Ohligschlager (1954): 
The law provides a method of escape from marital relationships that have become intoler-
able to one or both of the parties. This was such a marriage. There were mutual desires to 
solve the marital problems and avoid a divorce, but the sincere efforts of [wife] had failed 
and it appeared clearly from the evidence that further efforts would have been futile. It is 
not the policy of the law that a man and his wife should be required to live together, or be 
held in a marital relationship, when they have come to regard each other as mere strangers, 
even though one of them objects to its termination. And when it appears that honest and 
repeated efforts have been made by the complaining party to overcome the causes of the 
failure of the marriage, and that they cannot be overcome, it would be an act of injustice to 
withhold the relief which the law provides. 
 
Friedenberg v. Friedenberg (1960):  
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Two conclusions were drawn from the facts found. The first one was that the deed was 
void because given for a promise that was promotive of a divorce and so contrary to public 
policy. No doubt for many years the premise of this conclusion was sound; such promises 
were held to be contrary to public policy. (See cases cited, 9 Cal.Jur. 636.) A change has 
taken place in the law. 
 
Baker v. Baker (1965):  
The court further found the marriage had failed; that there was no likelihood of reconcili-
ation or that the marriage could be saved, and that its continuance would involve serious 
hazard to the health of both parties and be a deleterious influence upon their minor child. … 
The evidence in the record fully supports the findings and clearly demonstrates that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting each party a divorce. 
 
California Legislature (1969, pp. 8054-8055): 
California’s outmoded divorce laws, dating for the most part from 1872, lately have gen-
erated considerable dissatisfaction. In recent years there have been exhortations for reform 
by professional groups, the electorate and those who have experienced divorce. In response, 
Governor Edmund G. Brown in May, 1966, established the Governor’s Commission on 
the Family to examine what he termed “the high incidence of divorce in our society and its 
often tragic consequences.” 
… Dissolution was to be based upon the sole finding by the court that ‘the legitimate ob-
jects of matrimony have been destroyed and that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
marriage can be saved.’ That language was based upon the opinion of Chief Justice Roger 
Traynor in De Burgh 
 
Commentary on the 1969 Family Law Act: 
They [those in the legal profession] don’t, generally, think it’s an “easier” bill. “How could 
divorce be easier than it already is in California?” one attorney asks (McGuinness, Los 
Angeles Times, 1969-09-04, p. G1). 
dramatic and sweeping as the new law is in its language, much of it simply represents a 
legislative recognition of evolving public attitudes and judicial practices. For most Califor-
nia judges, the changes involve not much more than the use of new terms and different 
code sections; in few courtrooms will considerable restructuring of the judicial process be 
necessary (Avakian [Alameda County Superior Court judge], 1970). 
According to Herma Kay, that divorce is now available on demand is not very different 
from the old practice. “It’s just under a new rubric. The mental cruelty divorces were di-
vorce on demand as far as I can tell. I don’t remember many contested cases being denied, 
once the courts determined ways to grant a wife support.” (Wheeler, 1974, p. 24). 
As one judge has said, the new law “represents a legislative recognition of evolving public 
attitudes and judicial practices.” Another judge has said that “what was de facto before the 
Act is now de jure; the new law has cut out hypocrisy.” In this respect, the new law has not 
created “divorce for the asking,” as has been suggested. Judges interviewed agreed that 
divorce is easy to get, but the ease of divorce has not been aided by the new law. A simple 
divorce has been possible for some time (Goddard, 1972, p. 419). 
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Would not suggest that divorce be made easier to obtain in California, since I don’t think 
that is possible. There is no person in this state who can’t get a divorce simply by supplying 
the given attorneys with the right amount of money. It is simply a matter of patience and 
waiting until the routine goes through and getting her sister or brother or Aunt Nellie to tell 
a couple of white lies for you. It couldn’t be made any easier (California Assembly Interim 
Committee on Judiciary, 1964, pp. S-42).  
the defendant’s opposition did not markedly reduce the plaintiff‘s chances of success. The 
only result of an attempt to prevent divorce was to make reconciliation less possible (Berg, 
1974, p. 455). 
It was impossible to make divorce easier in California than it already was (Herma Hill Kay, 
as quoted in Jacob, 1988, p. 46). 
 
Remarks regarding how the 1969 California Family Law Act could, if judges had so chosen, 
have been interpreted conservatively: 
Lawyers are in doubt as to whether … the Legislature intended to make it more difficult to 
obtain a divorce in California, or to make it easier. For example, suppose a husband struck 
his wife, knocking her down, but only did this once during a 10-year marriage. Under the 
current law this one incident would be extreme cruelty and would entitle the wife to a 
divorce. However, could a judge find that one such incident was an irreconcilable differ-
ence causing the irremediable breakdown of the marriage? … It is to be kept in mind that 
the new divorce law is the product of a commission appointed by Governor Brown for the 
purpose of saving the family as a unit (Sharff, 1969). 
True enough, this term is susceptible of a great variety of interpretations, especially when, 
as the statute says, the breakdown must be caused by irreconcilable differences. A con-
servative judge may use this formula to deny the dissolution of a marriage in situations in 
which under the former law a divorce might have been had for the asking, upon true or 
faked evidence. But are California trial judges likely to be conservative? Few have been so 
in the past. They have handled the old statute so that a divorce was hardly ever denied and 
thus the California divorce rate has been one of the highest in the nation (Rheinstein, 1972, 
p. 373).  
one can imagine a judge, whose commitment to the institution of marriage is deeper than 
that of the immediate parties, denying a divorce for a single act of adultery, cruelty or 
desertion, even though he would have been bound under the old law to grant a divorce 
upon a showing that such a marital offense had been committed. Instances may well arise 
where the judge denies a divorce when both parties want it, simply because he feels a 
breakdown has not occurred. (Lee, 1972, p. 419)  
The conservative aura of the reforms created the impression that the Family Law Act of 
1969 would truly escalate the hurdles facing dissolution-minded couples. Both law review 
commentary and appellate court interpretation reinforced the notion that California No-
Fault had closed the gates on divorce on demand. (DiFonzo, 1994, p. 546) 
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CHAPTER III 
Omnibus Clauses and Contemporaneous Changes in Divorce Rates, 1867-1906 
1 Introduction 
To what degree are legislation and divorce rates linked? This question is of interest to policy-
makers, for example those seeking to shape the American family. It has been intensively studied 
by economists of the family, but mostly in the context of the twentieth century. This chapter instead 
studies data from 1867-1906—these were last analyzed a century ago and are here subject to the 
first modern empirical analysis.  
This chapter also focuses on the unusually liberal divorce laws known as omnibus clauses. 
These catch-all clauses gave judges wide discretion to grant divorces. For example, Washington’s 
permitted divorce “for any other cause deemed by the court sufficient.” As remarked by Crayton 
(1904, p. 28), “What case could not be covered by this statute!” The omnibus clauses were argua-
bly the most liberal divorce statutes ever known to the United States. A study thereof might there-
fore be expected to shed light on the degree to which legislation and divorce rates are linked. 
This chapter’s first contribution is to give a primer on these omnibus clauses. This is of value 
because most discussions of omnibus clauses were isolated, made in passing, and contained errors. 
I give a single, complete, and correct list of these omnibus clauses. This list includes the reasons 
behind their enactment and abolition. I also give an exhaustive examination of the reported rulings 
from five states’ Supreme Courts. I find that these Supreme Courts interpreted the omnibus clauses 
conservatively. 
This chapter’s second contribution is to conduct an empirical analysis of these omnibus clauses. 
The analysis involves a multiple regression. The dependent variable is the crude divorce rate 
(CDR), defined here as absolute divorces per million population. An absolute divorce is the com-
plete, final, and legal dissolution of a valid marriage; it must be distinguished from such other legal 
devices as limited divorce, annulment, decree of nullity, and decree nisi. The dependent variable 
is constructed by compiling annual county-level divorce counts for 1867-1906.  
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The independent variables include legal coding for 44 aspects of divorce statutes. These 44 
aspects of divorce statutes are constructed by examining the statutes and session laws of 50 divorce 
jurisdictions, over 1867-1906. Two of these 44 legal aspects pertain to the omnibus clauses. The 
remaining 42 are not the focus of this chapter. Nonetheless, I do consider the estimates of their 
correlation with the CDR.  
The empirical analysis here suggests that the omnibus clauses were correlated with higher CDR. 
The magnitude of this correlation amounted to over a fifth and over a third of the mean and the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable—most would judge this non-trivial, if not substantial.   
Data from this bygone era is worth studying for at least three reasons. First, this era contains 
surprisingly complete and extensive divorce data. Concerned about the problem of divorce, the 
National Divorce Reform League and other reformers petitioned Congress to undertake massive 
investigations of marriage and divorce statistics. The results were the Wright Report (1889) (1891), 
covering 1867-1886 and numbering 1,074 pages; and the North Report (1909) (1908), covering 
1887-1906 and numbering, in two parts, 535 and 840 pages. As said by Willcox (1891, p. 9) of the 
first report,  
the bulky volume is a mine of information on the subject of divorce in this and foreign 
countries. Like other mines, however, it does not carry its ore on the surface; it needs to be 
worked.  
 
The last analyses of these troves of data were made about a century ago. These analyses are 
reviewed in greater detail in section 3.2. They were less sophisticated than the empirical analysis 
in this chapter. They examined the trends in divorce rates and laws of each state and then proceeded 
to adjudge, on a case-by-case basis, whether legislation had had any influence over the divorce 
rate in that state. One broad conclusion common to these dated studies was that the influence of 
legislation on divorce was not large. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of this chapter.  
A second reason for examining this era is that the omnibus clauses were in effect during this 
time. The no-fault reforms circa 1970 have attracted much attention. It is less well-known that the 
nineteenth century had divorce statutes that were more liberal than even today’s no-fault divorce 
laws. This chapter gives these unusually liberal divorce laws some of the attention they deserve.  
A third reason for examining this era is that it had considerable variation in legislation across 
space and time, and thus provides a helpful setting for identifying the effects of legislation. In this 
early era, there were few precedents to serve as constraints: The mother country (England and 
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Wales) had not known absolute divorce, except as Acts of Parliament; moreover, ecclesiastical 
courts had handled matrimonial affairs, but these were never replicated in America. Also, this early 
era bore witness to what Howard (1904, p. 4) called the “immense volume of laws, the constant 
stream of legislative enactments, the ceaseless tinkering of the statute-maker, the wearisome rep-
etitions.” Altogether, it would have been during this early era that Vernier’s (1932) remark rang 
especially true:65 
Divorce statutes are not a product of logic alone. They are a resultant of many mixed ele-
ments. Religion, sentiment, logic, historical accident, commercialism, and other matters—
all have combined to form an inharmonious and incongruous whole. Anyone making a 
comparative reading of our American divorce statutes for the first time is astounded by the 
unnecessary variation and vagueness of this legislative output. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a primer on the omnibus clauses. Section 
3 describes this chapter’s empirical analysis and is divided into a further four subsections. The first 
considers how legislation may influence divorce; the second reviews older studies on the influence 
of legislation on divorce; the third discusses the divorce data; and the fourth discusses the legal 
coding. Section 4 reports and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2 A Primer on Omnibus Clauses   
The phrase omnibus clause was coined by contemporary observers and cannot be found in any 
statute. There is thus the question of what an omnibus clause is. Definitions varied across sources. 
To motivate this chapter’s definition of an omnibus clause, consider first these two descriptions of 
Connecticut’s omnibus clause:  
Previous to this time the law ... had contented itself with alleging certain distinct and defi-
nite crimes, capable in each case of definite legal proof … Now, however, in language so 
general and vague, and wholly unknown to any jurisprudence, whether civil or criminal, as 
to be utterly incapable of any definite legal construction, marriage was declared dissoluble 
by “any such misconduct as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner, or defeats 
the purposes of the marriage relation.” No rules of evidence are provided for determining 
whether these conditions are fulfilled, nor are the purposes of the marriage relation more 
particularly defined. It is evident that the widest door possible was opened, both in the 
character of the evidence which might be admitted, and in the latitude of discretion allowed 
the judge in his ultimate decision (Loomis, 1866, pp. 441-442).  
If the law containing this provision had been entitled “An Act for the Promotion of Divorce 
in the State of Connecticut,” the description would have been exact (Gladden, 1882, p. 
412). 
                                                 
65 See also Clark (1968, p. 379). 
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TABLE III.1—STATES THAT HAD OMNIBUS CLAUSES, YEARS OF ENACTMENT AND REPEAL 
State Enactment Repeal State Enactment Repeal 
Iowa 1846 1855 Louisiana 1870 1877 
Minnesota 1855 1866 Connecticut 1849 1878 
North Carolina 1827 1872 Utah 1852 1878 
Indiana 1824 1873 Maine 1847 1883 
Illinois 1832 1874 Washington 1854 1921 
 Notes: See Appendix D for sources of these dates. See Section 6 for the wording of each omnibus clause. 
 
As a second example, consider North Carolina’s omnibus clause. It was referred to, in Scrog-
gins v. Scroggins (661832), as “the unlimited powers which we are commanded to exercise.” Com-
menting on Scroggins, Kent (1854, p. 77) wrote, “This vast power and discretion were found by 
the Supreme Court to be exceedingly embarrassing and painful in the exercise.”  
As a third example, Governor Baker (1871, p. 66) described Indiana’s omnibus clause thus:  
This clause, which pretends to lay down a rule for the government of human affairs in the 
most important relation of life, is at war with the fundamental idea and elementary defini-
tion of law. … Under this clause the question, what is or is not a sufficient cause for a 
divorce, instead of being determined by a general rule is measured by no rule at all, and 
the standard of judgment, instead of being prescribed so that it may be known and read of 
all men, remains locked up in the mind of the judge until he pronounces judgment between 
the parties in the case before him.  
 
Therefore, this chapter defines an omnibus clause to be a clause in the statutory divorce law 
that gives the court wide discretionary power to grant an absolute divorce. It may be that the court 
is allowed to grant a divorce if this be deemed ‘just’ or ‘reasonable’. It may also be that the court 
is allowed to take into consideration the questions of whether the parties can live together in peace, 
happiness, or union; and whether the happiness of the petitioner has been destroyed. However, an 
omnibus clause may not require acts of cruelty or neglect. 
Table III.1 lists the ten states that ever enacted omnibus clauses.67 (Section 2.4 lists another 
three states which enacted what I call weak omnibus clauses.) Here are some summary observa-
tions. These ten states spanned all four Census regions (see Figure III.1).  
                                                 
66 Scroggins v. Scroggins (14 N.C. 535, 1832). 
67 Several writers claim that Missouri, Kentucky, Florida, and Wisconsin also had omnibus clauses. They are either mistaken 
or have a different definition of an omnibus clause. Kent (1854, p. 77) is mistaken about what is printed on p. 225 of the Revised 
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Nine of the ten omnibus clauses were enacted before 1867. Louisiana’s was enacted in 1870.  
Two of the ten were abolished before 1867 (Iowa in 1855, Minnesota in 1866). One was abolished 
after 1906 (Washington in 1921). The remaining seven were all abolished between 1872 and 1883. 
The shortest-lived omnibus clause was Louisiana’s, at seven years (1870-1877). The longest-lived 
was Washington’s, at 67 years (1854-1921).  
 
 
FIGURE III.1. STATES THAT HAD OMNIBUS CLAUSES (SHADED IN GRAY), YEARS OF ENACTMENT AND REPEAL 
                                                 
Statutes of Missouri, 1835. Snyder (1889, p. 159) says that Kentucky “permitted divorce ‘for any cause in the discretion of the 
court’.” Wording aside, he is correct, but this was only for limited divorce. He also says that “the law now allows a dissolution of 
the marriage ‘where the husband habitually behaves toward his wife, for not less than six months, in such cruel and inhuman 
manner as to indicate a settled aversion to her, or to destroy permanently her peace or happiness.’” But most would consider this 
clause to be a cruelty clause, especially given the phrase “cruel and inhuman.” Stimson (1886, p. 688) claims that Florida and 
Wisconsin had omnibus clauses. But most would simply consider Florida’s a cruelty clause, while a careful reading of Wisconsin’s 
§2357 and §2358—which Stimson fails to quote correctly—suggests that these are simply neglect and cruelty clauses. Crayton 
(1904, p. 28) writes, “At present this ‘Omnibus Clause’ has generally disappeared from our statute law, but not wholly, for a near 
equivalent still disfigures the statutes of a few States. In Florida, ‘the habitual indulgence of a violent and ungovernable temper’ is 
ample ground for divorce. Kentucky, Missouri, Oregon, Wyoming, and Washington, will grant divorce for ‘indignities sufficient 
to render life burdensome’.” The present chapter classifies these two laws cited by Crayton as cruelty clauses. 
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Both Utah and Washington were territories when they enacted their omnibus clauses. Both did 
so at their very first legislative session. Both gained statehood in 1896. Utah abolished its omnibus 
clause in 1878, before statehood, while Washington did so only in 1921, after statehood. 
With one exception, every omnibus clause was accompanied by at least one other divorce 
ground. The exception was Maine between 1850 and 1863, when its omnibus clause was its only 
divorce ground.68  
Figure III.2 depicts the CDR of the ten states that ever had omnibus clauses, that of the other 
states, and that of the USA as a whole. It is seen that the ten states that ever had omnibus clauses 
had consistently higher CDR. 
Figure III.3 depicts the CDR of the eight states whose omnibus clauses were in effect during at 
least some portion of 1867-1906. Note that Utah, whose CDR exploded during 1875-1877, is de-
picted on the secondary axis (right axis). The figure suggests that only in the cases of Utah and 
Maine was the enactment or repeal of an omnibus clause followed by any abrupt changes in CDR. 
  
 
FIGURE III.2. 1867-1906 CDR OF THE TEN OMNIBUS CLAUSE STATES, USA, AND ALL OTHER STATES  
Notes: Author’s calculations. The ten omnibus clause states are Iowa, Minnesota, North Carolina, Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Connecticut, Utah, Maine, and Washington. 
                                                 
68 The section containing all other grounds for divorce was repealed in 1850 (Acts and Resolves, 1850, Ch. 171, Sect. 4, p. 151, 
approved 1850-08-16). Subsequently, it would only be in 1863 that desertion was reinstated (Acts and Resolves, 1863, Ch. 211, pp. 
157-158, approved March 25, 1863). 
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FIGURE III.3. 1867-1906 CDR OF USA, CONN., INDIANA, ILL., LOUISIANA, MAINE, N. CAROLINA, UTAH, & WASH.  
Notes: Author’s calculations. This figure depicts the eight states whose omnibus clauses were in effect during some portion of 
1867-1906. The secondary (right) vertical axis is for Utah only. During 1867-1906, only Louisiana enacted an omnibus clause 
(1870)—this is marked by a gray vertical line; seven repealed their omnibus clauses—these are marked by black vertical lines 
(1872: North Carolina; 1873: Indiana; 1874: Illinois; 1878: Connecticut, Louisiana, & Utah, and 1883: Maine); and, of the eight 
states depicted, two gained statehood (Washington, 1889 and Utah, 1896).  
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2.1 Reasons for Enactment 
Bishop69 suggests that there were two main reasons for enacting omnibus clauses. First, to pro-
vide relief for those “cases falling completely within the equity of the divorce laws, yet not suffi-
ciently within the letter to enable the tribunals to interfere.” Second, to “prevent the legislature 
from being burdened with applications for special divorces.” This second reason requires some 
explanation: 
Many states had had the practice of legislative divorce (LD). That is, their legislatures had had 
the power to grant divorces. As the demand for divorce rose, this power proved to be less a privi-
lege than a burden. Most states would eventually ban such practice through their constitution. What 
Bishop suggests is that in some states, omnibus clauses were enacted to curb such practice.  
North Carolina’s act of 1827 introduced the omnibus clause. The preamble candidly revealed 
that this was to disencumber legislature.70 The same act also provided that “no defendant or party 
offending” divorced through an act of legislature “shall ever be permitted to marry again.” Both 
the omnibus clause and this latter provision would have had the effect of making LD less attractive. 
Nonetheless, the practice of LD would not cease71 until it was altogether banned by the 1835 Con-
stitution (Art. 1, Sec. 4, §3). 
Connecticut’s omnibus clause was enacted in 1849. Loomis (1866, p. 441) claims that it like-
wise sprang “mainly from the strong desire on the part of Legislature to rid itself of troublesome 
applications.” I have no direct evidence for this claim. But it seems plausible. Even though Con-
necticut had permitted judicial divorce since at least 1702,72 its legislature remained burdened by 
divorce applications.73 In 1843, cruelty and intemperance were added as grounds for judicial di-
vorce. But even so, legislature continued to receive divorce applications.74 The 1849 law enacted 
the omnibus clause and also stipulated that the superior court was to have sole jurisdiction over 
divorce cases. Thereafter, LD became very rare.75 
                                                 
69 Bishop (1859, pp. 519-520), (1873, pp. 694-695), (1864, pp. 685-686), (1881, pp. 640-641). 
70 Laws of North Carolina, 1827-28, pp. 19-20, Ch. XIX: “the numerous applications for divorce and alimony … consume a 
considerable portion of time … and consequently retard the investigation of more serious subjects.”  It should also be noted that 
the Act of 1814 had imposed the requirement that all absolute divorces be ratified by the General Assembly (Laws, 1814, pp. 4-6, 
Ch. V, Sec. IV). But this onerous requirement was repealed in 1818 (Laws, 1818, p. 21, Ch. X). 
71 There were 1 in 1832, 2 in 1833, 6 in 1834, and a record 15 in 1835 (Ferrell, 1963, p. 619). 
72 Acts and Laws, Of His Majesties Colony of Connecticut in New-England, 1702, p. 28. 
73 Between 1837 and 1843 are found, in each year, 16, 9, 19, 9, 7, 10, and 13 LDs granted. 
74 Between 1844 and 1849 are found, in each year, 2, 5, 6, 7, 15, and 18 LDs granted. 
75 Though not extinct, as some writers have erroneously claimed. One can be found in each of 1850, 1856, 1859, and 1871. 
One can also be found as late as 1915, granted to one Merrill C. Jenkins, for incurable insanity on the part of his wife (Special Acts, 
January Session, 1915, No. 347, p. 387, approved May 20, 1915).  
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Utah’s omnibus clause was enacted in 1852. It was dubbed by Ertman (2010, pp. 341-342) “the 
most permissive divorce statute in the entire country.” An account of early Utah divorce law is 
given by Aaron (1982). In “the absence of direct legislative history,” Aaron marshals a variety of 
other evidence and arrives at the tentative conclusion “that the new divorce statute may have been 
formulated as a convenient method to allow the faithful to rescind old marriage bonds in order to 
remarry within the sect” (p. 22). 
In 1824, Indiana was the first American jurisdiction to enact an omnibus clause. It might be 
thought that Robert Dale Owen was involved in the 1824 enactment, given the oft-quoted exchange 
between him and Horace Greeley. The latter charged that Owen’s “lax principles” had brought 
about “a state of law which enables men or women to get unmarried nearly at pleasure” in this 
“paradise of free-lovers.”76 But despite these charges, it is unlikely that Owen had been involved 
in the 1824 enactment, given that he first arrived in the New World in 1825 (Owen, 1874, p. 232). 
It might also be thought that Owen’s father Robert Owen was involved, because the elder Owen 
had in 1825 founded the Utopian community of New Harmony, Indiana. But this is also unlikely, 
given that the elder Owen sailed to America only in December 1824 (Podmore, 1907, p. 288), 
while Indiana’s 1824 act had been approved in January. Altogether I am inclined to rule out the 
involvement of either Owen in the original 1824 enactment. But otherwise I have found little ma-
terial to explain this 1824 enactment.  
Minnesota’s omnibus clause, it was alleged in True v. True (1861),77 had in 1855 been “im-
providently added” “to meet a particular case.” I have found no other commentary on Minnesota’s 
omnibus clause. But the Minnesota Supreme Court’s allegation does seem plausible, given the 
covert circumstances under which the omnibus clause seems to have been enacted.78  
                                                 
76 New York Daily Tribune editorial, March 1, 1860. The full debate is reproduced in Greeley & Owen (1860, p. 10). 
77 True v. True (6 Minn. 458, 1861). 
78 There are several reasons for deeming this 1855 enactment ‘covert’. First, the 200-odd pages of the Session Laws of 1855 do 
not seem to contain a single instance of the word ‘divorce’. Second, the act under which the omnibus clause was passed was entitled 
“An Act allowing for a change of Venue in certain cases.“ This gave no hint that the act was in any way connected to divorce. 
Third, the omnibus clause was buried as the penultimate section in said act. Moreover, it did not make explicit that the divorce law 
was being amended. It said simply: “Section seven (7) of chapter sixty-six, (66) page two hundred and seventy-four of the Revised 
Statutes, is hereby amended by adding at the end of said section seven …” 
It is reported in the 1855 House Journal (p. 416) that Minnesota’s omnibus clause was offered as an amendment to a bill, by 
one Mr. Sibley, by the unanimous consent of the House. But no other details are furnished.  
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Louisiana enacted its omnibus clause in 1870. I have found no direct evidence to explain this. 
But some inferences may be made. One, the 1845 Constitution had already banned LD,79 so it 
cannot be that the 1870 law was passed in order to relieve legislature of burdensome divorce ap-
plications. Two, after Louisiana repealed its omnibus clause in 1877, there was much confusion 
over what precisely the Louisiana divorce law said.80 Such confusion suggests that the 1870 en-
actment and 1877 repeal of Louisiana’s omnibus clause were not the products of careful delibera-
tion. This lends weight to Carver’s (1909) assertion that the 1877 repeal was a “mere retracting of 
a step taken too hastily and too far.”  
Washington enacted its omnibus clause in 1854. The only possible clue I have found to explain 
this is an allegation that Governor Fayette McMullin (1857-1859) had come to the Territory of 
Washington to obtain a legislative divorce (Meany, 1909, p. 326). This allegation, if true, would 
suggest a possible link between McMullin and the 1854 enactment. But I have found no evidence 
of any such link.  
If pertinent material regarding why omnibus clauses were enacted in Illinois, Maine, or Iowa 
exists, such material has unfortunately eluded me. I must therefore remain silent on them.  
2.2 Reasons for Repeal 
“A migratory divorce is a divorce granted to a person who has left his home in one state and 
resorted temporarily to another state for the express purpose of obtaining a divorce from its courts” 
(Cavers, 1937). Jurisdictions that granted too many migratory divorces risked being branded ‘di-
vorce mills’.  
Indiana was “the first divorce mill in our history” (Nolan, 1951, p. 515). Its omnibus clause was 
enacted in 1824 and repealed in 1873. The following account of the 1873 reform is from Wires 
(1967). Reform efforts failed in the late 1850s, but resumed after the war. In 1867, a proposed 
reform failed because it was too harsh. In 1869, reform efforts were sidelined by the controversy 
surrounding the 15th Amendment. “By 1871 the reputation of Indiana as a jurisdiction of easy 
                                                 
79 Title VI, Art. 117. In fact the Act of 1827-03-19 had already decreed that the district courts “shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction in cases of divorce” (Acts Passed at the First Session of the Eighth Legislature of the State of Louisiana, p. 130). 
80 Following the 1877 repeal, there was much uncertainty over Louisiana’s divorce law. As remarked in Daspit v. Ehringer (32 
La. Ann. 1174, 1880), “at first glance it may seem that article 138, R. C. C. [Revised Civil Code] was apparently repealed by Act 
76 of 1870.” However, the Court would go on to clarify, “such is not the fact, for the double reason …” Despite the clarification 
made in Daspit, lower courts continued to fall into the error of believing that article 138 of the Revised Civil Code was defunct. In 
the following years, the Court would have to repeat the clarification made in Daspit: Bates v. Behen (35 La. Ann. 872, 1883) and 
Blanchard v. Baillieux (37 La. Ann. 127, 1885). 
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divorce had become so objectionable … Popular demand for divorce reform was also growing.”  
By November 1872, “divorce reform was regarded as virtually inevitable.” Such reform was fi-
nally achieved in 1873. The 1873 law amended the “most criticized provisions of the Indiana di-
vorce law,” namely “those pertaining to residence requirements and service of summons.”81 Pack-
aged alongside was the abolition of the omnibus clause.  
One might fear that the issue of migratory divorce severely injures the empirical analysis below. 
Perhaps it was that whenever a state enacted or repealed its omnibus clause, its divorce rate did 
not change because couples there had already been getting divorced through Washington’s omni-
bus clause. (Note that our sample period is a subset of the lifespan of Washington’s omnibus 
clause.) It is thus possible that omnibus clauses—in particular Washington’s—had a tremendous 
positive effect on divorce rates, but our data and methodology fail to detect it. While this possibility 
cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely, given that migratory divorces never constituted more than a 
small fraction of divorces nationwide.82 There were certainly instances where a state’s divorce rate 
was boosted by migratory divorce (e.g. Utah between 1875 and 1877, as shall be seen next). But 
as suggested by Hankins (1931, pp. 182-183), twentieth-century Nevada was the only state where 
migratory divorce was a chronic and severe phenomenon.  
Utah’s divorce law had been enacted in 1852 and was not amended before 1878. Yet in 1875-
1877, its CDR surged (Figure III.3). This remarkable surge was epitomized by Beaver county. It 
had recorded just 2,007 persons in the 1870 Census. Yet in 1875-1877, it had 639 divorces. Ap-
parently some, if not most, were to individuals who had never set foot in Utah.83 Elsewhere in the 
town of Corinne, a vending machine allegedly dispensed divorce decrees for $2.50 apiece.84 
What explains Utah’s 1875-1877 surge? According to Wright (1891, pp. 203-206) and Aaron 
(1982, p. 23), this was when “eastern lawyers discovered the Utah divorce statute.” Aaron gives 
some credit for this ‘discovery’ to “the meeting of the transcontinental railroad at Promontory 
Point in Utah in 1869.” It is also possible that this ‘discovery’ was spurred by Indiana’s 1873 
                                                 
81 E.g. Wharton (1879) mentions these two provisions in his critique of Indiana’s divorce law, but not the omnibus clause. 
82 See e.g. Wright Report itself (pp. 193-194), Willcox (1893, pp. 90-92), the North Report (pp. 33-35), Lichtenberger (1931, 
pp. 180, 206-207), Hankins (1931, pp. 182-183), Cahen (1932, p. 78), Marshall and May (1932, pp. 54-56, 89; 1933, pp. 60-65, 
126-127), Groves (1935), Cavers (1937), Jacobson (1959, p. 109). Several of these scholars estimated that migratory divorces 
constituted at most three percent of all divorces. Despite these efforts, there was the recurrent popular belief that migratory divorces 
were a serious problem (see e.g. Lichtenberger, 1931, p. 188). Indeed, this popular belief was instrumental in producing the Wright 
Report, the North Report, and the decades-long movement for a uniform nationwide divorce law. For more on this latter movement, 
a good starting point in The Congressional Digest, Vol. VI, Number 6-7, June-July 1927. 
83 See e.g. Hood v. State (56 Ind. 263, 1877). 
84 I can find only secondary sources for this claim—e.g. Anderson (1941, p. 151). 
65 
 
divorce reforms—with the closure of the Indiana divorce mill, eastern lawyers were encouraged 
to look elsewhere. Aaron (p. 44) concludes: 
The Utah divorce statute of 1851 demonstrated that a divorce process tantamount to con-
sent divorce was no threat to the group whose values about marriage were set by religious 
beliefs that were peculiar and strong. While isolated and administered by non-lawyers, the 
territorial probate courts showed no remarkable divorce consequences. Only when the ter-
ritory was accessible, and lawyers within and without Utah conspired to manipulate the 
statute, did a sham divorce haven develop.   
 
In 1878, Utah legislators “struck at the root of the former abuses” by introducing an explicit 
one year residency requirement and making it mandatory that courts grant decrees only upon 
proper legal testimony and file its finding of facts and law (Wright, 1891, p. 206). The omnibus 
clause was also abolished. 
The remaining eight states never achieved the same level of disrepute. Perhaps for precisely 
this reason, I can find little material regarding each of their repeals. What follows are a few findings.  
Connecticut repealed its omnibus clause repeal in 1878, but agitation for divorce reform had 
begun at least a decade before.85 In 1870, a bill to abolish the omnibus clause was proposed, but 
failed.86 It was alleged in the Hartford Post that such failure occurred because the “judiciary com-
mittee [was] composed of lawyers who [had] a lucrative practice in procuring divorces.”87 In 1878, 
the omnibus clause was repealed. But strangely enough, this was done through a bill that had 
initially proposed instead to make the omnibus clause the sole divorce ground!88 Following 1878, 
there were at least four separate attempts to restore the omnibus clause.89 All failed. It was alleged 
that these attempts were made by a legal profession that was “resolutely interested in the facilita-
tion of divorce.”90  
                                                 
85 For example, during the 1867 session, 25 out of the 200-odd petitions to the House of Representatives were for divorce law 
reform.(Journal of the House of Representatives, of the State of Connecticut, May Session, 1867). Also, in each year’s annual 
address, the Governor would urge for divorce reform (House Journal, 1869, p. 37; 1870, p. 37; 1871, p. 63). 
86 House Journal, 1870, pp. 65, 314, 338. 
87 Hartford Post, date unknown, quoted in Albany Law Journal, 1870, Vol. 1, p. 421. See also Chicago Tribune, 1870-07-19, 
‘Rights of Married Women’ and Albany Law Journal, Vol. 2, p. 47. 
88 House Journal, 1878, pp. 203, 408, 517. 
89 1879 House Journal, H.B. 5, pp. 66, 449, 556; 1880 House Journal, H.B. 246, pp. 212, 345, 366; 1882 House Journal, H.B. 
215, pp. 225, 348, 660, 683; 1883 House Journal, H.B. 159, pp. 217, 584. 
90 Minutes of the General Association of Connecticut, 1881, p. 13 and 1882, p. 15.  
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Connecticut’s organized divorce reform efforts should be mentioned. Although Connecticut 
had had several prominent anti-divorce crusaders,91 it appears that the first serious organized ef-
forts were made only circa 1880. In 1879, the General Association of Connecticut resolved to 
establish a committee to produce divorce reform. This led to the formation of the Divorce Reform 
Association of Connecticut in 1880 and a similar sister association in Massachusetts. In 1881 the 
New England Divorce Reform League was founded. This would be renamed the National Divorce 
Reform League in 1885—this organization would prove influential in securing the Wright Re-
port.92 It would seem plausible that Connecticut’s 1878 reform was linked to these organized ef-
forts. But I can find no evidence of any such link. 
The above historical review suggests that Connecticut’s omnibus clause would have been re-
pealed, sooner or later. It also suggests that the precise timing of the repeal was fortuitous—it 
could just as easily have been a decade earlier or a decade later.  
It is natural to link Maine’s 1883 divorce reforms to the New England Divorce Reform League, 
the latter having been founded in 1881. But I can find no evidence of any such link. Here is what 
I was able to find. In 1875, divorce reform was urged in the Governor’s address. In 1882, the 
Episcopal Church established a committee on divorce.93 This committee submitted a petition to 
the House of Representatives in 1883. This, “in conjunction with strong and influential petitions 
from other sources,” resulted in “a very important modification of the divorce law of the state, 
clearing it of those features most grossly objectionable from a social point of view, and adding 
provisions which will probably go far to check a great and growing evil” (Journal of Episcopal 
Church of Maine, 1883, p. 26).94 And so according to the Episcopal Church, it was influential in 
securing the repeal of Maine’s omnibus clause. 
Maine’s 1883 omnibus clause repeal was packaged alongside many other reforms. Adultery, 
cruelty, intemperance, neglect, and impotency were added as divorce grounds. The interlocutory 
decree with a six-month interlocutory period was also introduced. This latter reform would have 
delayed by six months all final divorce decrees and so probably explains most of Maine’s 1883-
1884 CDR drop (see Figure III.2).  
                                                 
91 E.g. Trumbull (1785), Dwight (1819), Loomis (1866). 
92 In 1897, it was further renamed the National League for the Protection of the Family. 
93 J. of the Sixty-Third Annual Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Maine, 1882, pp. 10, 14, 27. 
94 The petition is recorded on p. 99 of the 1883 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Maine. Similar appeals 
by other parties are recorded on pp. 67, 78, 79, 84, 97.   
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 I have found no material to explain the repeal of the omnibus clause in Iowa, North Carolina, 
Illinois, Louisiana, or Washington. And so nothing will be said of them, except for one observation: 
North Carolina repealed its omnibus clause in the same year (1872) that South Carolina’s divorce 
law began its short life (1872-1878). I do not know if these two events were linked.  
2.3 How the Omnibus Clauses Were Interpreted by the Supreme Courts 
A literal reading of the law of the books lends some weight to the claims by various observers, 
that the omnibus clauses opened “the widest door possible,” were “for the Promotion of Divorce,” 
and bestowed courts with “unlimited powers.” However, in practice, how were such “unlimited 
powers” actually exercised? To try to answer this question, the relevant, reported Supreme Court 
cases in five states are examined. It is found that these Courts interpreted the omnibus clauses very 
conservatively. The presence of an omnibus clause made these Courts little, if any, more inclined 
to grant divorces.  
Note though that these are merely reported cases from each state’s Supreme Court. It is possible 
that the average trial court judge interpreted his state’s omnibus clause more liberally than did his 
state’s highest court. If so, then notwithstanding the conservatism of the Supreme Courts, the om-
nibus clauses may still have had the effect of boosting divorces. Unfortunately, I have found no 
records of trial court rulings. Nonetheless, if it were indeed the case that trial courts were more 
liberal, some indirect evidence of this might be furnished by the empirical analysis below. 
Here follows a summary of pertinent Supreme Court cases from five arbitrarily-chosen states, 
viz. North Carolina, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, and Louisiana. Section 7 contains fuller excerpts of 
some of the cases discussed here and also some others. 
North Carolina. Scroggins v. Scroggins (1832) was the first reported case in the US to concern 
an omnibus clause.95 The ruling itself said the case had a “peculiar character,” “produced by the 
odious circumstance of color.” Mr. Scroggins had wed Mrs. Scroggins while she was several 
months pregnant. After birth, the child was found to be mulatto, whereupon Mr. Scroggins sought 
a divorce.  
The state’s Supreme Court made a lengthy explanation of its “private convictions”: Divorce 
“ought in no ease to be allowed, but in [impotency], and near consanguinity.” It then inferred that 
                                                 
95 Scroggins v. Scroggins (14 N.C. 535, 1832). 
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the legislative intent behind the 1827 omnibus clause enactment was to make divorce harder to 
obtain.96 The Court reasoned that Mr. Scroggins must have known his wife had been impregnated 
by another man. He was therefore “criminally accessory to his own dishonor, in marrying a woman 
whom he knew to be lewd” and so undeserving of relief.  
North Carolina’s omnibus clause permitted divorce whenever the court “may be satisfied, upon 
due evidence presented, of the justice of such application; any law, usage or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding” (emphasis added). The sub-clause just emphasized suggested that courts need 
not place great weight on “any law, usage or custom to the contrary.” But this sub-clause was given 
no mention in Scroggins. Instead, tradition was paid obeisance:   
After the law upon this subject has been settled for ages, and when the Legislature has been 
unable to devise any alteration, founded on a general principle worthy of their adoption, it 
would be too much to expect a court to pretend to more wisdom than the Legislature and 
our forefathers united, and strike out new theories. 
 
A very similar case took place the same month (December 1832), but produced a different result. 
In Barden v. Barden (1832), the Bardens had wed after the birth of the child.97 Only later was it 
discovered that the child was mulatto. The Court granted Mr. Barden a divorce, on the reasoning 
that he had, unlike Mr. Scroggins, been deceived into believing that the child was his. One reason 
was “the artful representations” of Mrs. Barden. Another was that “in so young an infant, whose 
mother was white, it might not be in the power of an ordinary man, from inspection of the face and 
other uncovered parts of the body, to discover the tinge, although it were so deep as to lead to the 
belief now, that it is the issue of a father of full African blood.”  
Johnson v. Kincade (1843) affirmed the conservative interpretation in Scroggins:98  
as we have before said, those large terms of the act of 1827 do not confer the arbitrary 
power of divorce, but must be restricted to the causes enumerated in the act of 1814, or 
others of a like nature, or to such enumerated causes as were grounds for holding a marriage 
void at common law and still in reason should annul it. 
                                                 
96 “the great purpose of the Legislature was to free itself from applications which ought not to be granted, but which, from the 
hardship to the parties, and feeling in the members, were sometimes obtained, and to turn them over to tribunals which would do 
more impartial or exact justice. … We cannot intend that the meaning was that the courts should grant divorces where, under like 
circumstances, the Legislature had or might be expected to grant them by statute; for the contrary is implied by commanding the 
action of courts, usually regulated by fixed rules.” 
97 Barden v. Barden (14 N.C. 548, 1832). 
98 Johnson v. Kincade (37 N.C. 470, 1843). 
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In Joyner v. Joyner (1862), Mrs. Joyner sought a divorce after her husband had, amongst vari-
ous misdeeds, struck her with a horse-whip and a switch.99 The Court was unsympathetic. It in-
voked the biblical injunction “Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee” 
(Genesis 3:16). It also noted that  
there may be circumstances which will mitigate, excuse, and so far justify the husband in 
striking the wife “with a horse-whip on one occasion and with a switch on another, leaving 
several bruises on the person,” so as not to give her a right to abandon him and claim to be 
divorced. 
 
It elaborated by giving several concrete examples of circumstances that would “justify the conduct 
of the husband” and permit the Court to “dismiss her petition with the admonition, ‘if you will 
amend your manners, you may expect better treatment’” (emphasis added). 
In Hansley v. Hansley (1849),100 the Court stated that the law entitled Mrs. Hansley to a limited 
divorce but not to an absolute divorce. The allegations are worth quoting at length, because they 
illustrate how difficult it was to get an absolute divorce, even with an omnibus clause. Mr. Hansley 
had  
became, at some time, intemperate, and then was harsh, insulting and cruel to the wife—at 
times beating her: that occasionally, for a while, and, afterwards, for weeks, he absented 
himself from his wife’s bed at night, and, as she suspected for some time, and afterwards 
ascertained, he spent those nights in bed with a negro woman he had on the same plantation: 
that he did himself, and allowed that woman to treat his wife with contempt, depriving her 
of all authority as mistress of the house, and conferring it on the negro: that, afterwards, 
instead of going to the house of the black woman, he brought her to his own house, and 
frequently made her and the wife sleep in the same bed with him, and in that situation he 
had carnal knowledge of the negro: that at other times the husband would not allow the 
wife to sleep in the house, but turned her out and locked the door against her and kept her 
out all night: that he at some times went away, carrying the keys and leaving her without 
food for several days together. 
 
Unfortunately for Mrs. Hansley, the law “does not authorize such a divorce for cruelty, nor for 
every act of adultery, nor even for habitual adultery.” In Whittington v. Whittington (1836) and 
Foy v. Foy (1851), the Court was similarly reluctant to grant a divorce.101 
Iowa. Iowa’s omnibus clause read “when it shall be made fully apparent to the satisfaction of 
the Court, that the parties cannot live in peace or happiness together, and that their welfare requires 
a separation between them.” Pinkney v. Pinkney (1854) specifically emphasized that no divorce 
                                                 
99 Joyner v. Joyner (59 N.C. 322, 1862). 
100 Hansley v. Hansley (32 N.C. 506, 1849). 
101 Whittington v. Whittington (19 N.C. 64 1836), Foy v. Foy (35 N.C. 90, 1851). 
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was to be granted unless it was fully apparent that the parties cannot live in peace or happiness 
together.102 The Court also stated, “A law so unusual, so relaxing in its influence upon the sacred 
obligations of marital contracts, should not be loosely administered.” 
In Lyster v. Lyster (1855),103 Mr. and Mrs. Lyster had apparently come to the conclusion that 
they could not live in peace and happiness together and that they should be separated. The Court 
rebuked them thus: “The law requires that the court shall be satisfied … and not that the parties 
shall be satisfied.” The Court also cited several English cases with approval: “Parties cannot law-
fully rid themselves of the duties of the marriage contract at the pleasure of either or both of them”; 
“it is the policy of the law not to proceed upon the ground of the consent of parties to a dissolution 
of the marriage contract.”  
In Inskeep v. Inskeep (1857),104 the Court observed that even if “the parties could not live in 
peace and happiness together,” “it might not be apparent that their welfare required their separa-
tion.” It also repeated points made in Lyster: “these things must be made fully apparent to the 
court”; “the chancellor is not to dissolve the relation, upon the mere clamor of the parties.” It 
further stated that “if it shall appear that the parties could live together in peace and happiness, but 
for the unwarrantable conduct of the complainant—if it is shown that but for his, or her, improper 
conduct, there might be peace, quiet and happiness, the relief prayed for should be denied.” 
The omnibus clause was not at issue in either Hunt v. Hunt (1854) or Smith v. Smith (1854).105 
But in Hunt, the Court revealed, in an off-hand remark, its disapproval of the “apparent facility 
with which divorces are to be obtained under the Code.” In Smith, after elaborating at some length 
about the sanctity of the family relation, the Court announced that it was “not ambitious to establish 
for Iowa, by judicial construction, the humbling distinction of being ‘the state in which a divorce 
can be most easily obtained.’” 
Maine. Maine’s omnibus clause was enacted in 1847, modified in 1849, and reenacted in 1850. 
In 1868, the Supreme Court of Maine would remark that the “Legislature has seen fit to give to 
                                                 
102 Pinkney v. Pinkney (4 G. Greene 324, 1854). 
103 Lyster v. Lyster (1 Iowa 130, 1855). 
104 Inskeep v. Inskeep (5 Iowa 204, 1857). 
105 Hunt v. Hunt (4 G. Greene 216, 1854), Smith v. Smith (4 G. Greene 226, 1854). 
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this Court an almost unlimited power to grant divorces.”106 How was this “almost unlimited power 
to grant divorces” actually exercised? Four cases involved the omnibus clause.107  
Ricker v. Ricker (1849) suggested that at least initially, the Supreme Court did not regard the 
1847 enactment as being a radical change to the divorce law. The ruling spanned two paragraphs, 
one of which read: 
The enactment of 1847 was not intended to repeal any part of ch. 89, of the R. S. It only 
introduced some classes of causes which should justify a divorce, which were not embraced 
in the former law. That law was not altered as to causes of divorce, which had already been 
prescribed. 
 
The 1847 enactment had contained the clause “in all cases not now provided for by law.” In 
1849, this clause was dropped.108 Even though I have no evidence, it is plausible to suppose that 
this enactment was in response to the Court’s pronouncements in Ricker.   
In 1850, the Court would similarly assert in three cases (Motley, Small, and Elwell) that the 
1849 enactment did not repeal any part of the former divorce law. Motley interpreted the 1849 
enactment as merely giving discretion to grant divorces where there had been “a combination of 
such wrongs as might, each, become, by a sufficient length of continuance, a ground of divorce.” 
And in Small, the Court stated:  
If, on every occasion of a departure for a short time, by one of the parties from the other, a 
divorce could be had, the marriage contract could be rescinded with great facility; it would 
in effect, be but an arrangement to continue during the pleasure of both parties. Such a rule 
could not be consistent with public morals. 
 
In 1850, legislature repealed several sections of the former divorce law (see n. 68 above). In 
particular, only one ground for divorce was retained, namely the omnibus clause. Again, though I 
have no evidence, it is plausible to suppose that this was in response to the assertions in Ricker, 
Motley, Small, and Elwell.  
I can find no reported Supreme Court case after 1850 that directly concerned the omnibus clause. 
I thus have no direct evidence as to whether the 1850 reform marked any change to the law in 
                                                 
106 This and another similar remark were made in passing in two cases that did not directly involve the omnibus clause, viz. Jay 
v. East Livermore (56 Me. 107, 1868) and Stilphen v. Stilphen (58 Me. 508, 1870). 
107 Ricker v. Ricker (29 Me. 281, 1849), Motley v. Motley (31 Me. 490, 1850), Small v. Small (31 Me. 493, 1850), and Elwell 
v. Elwell (32 Me. 337, 1850). 
108 Another possibly important change was that henceforth, divorce could be granted by any justice of the supreme judicial 
court rather than by a majority of justices thereof. Compare the precise wording of the 1847 and 1849 enactments. 
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action. But Holyoke v. Holyoke (1886) suggests that the Court did not become much more liberal 
in the next few decades.109 Holyoke was one of the earliest reported divorce cases that took place 
after Maine’s 1883 repeal of its omnibus clause. In Holyoke, the Court stated:  
Divorce should not be a panacea for the infelicities of married life; if disappointment, suf-
fering, and sorrow even be incident to that relation, they must be endured. The marriage 
yoke, by mutual forbearance, must be worn, even though it rides unevenly, and has become 
burdensome withal. Public policy requires that it should be so. Remove the allurements of 
divorce at pleasure, and husbands and wives, will the more zealously strive to even the 
burdens and vexations of life, and soften by mutual accommodation so as to enjoy their 
marriage relation. 
 
Minnesota. In True v. True (1861),110 the Supreme Court of Minnesota wrote, “In 1855, to 
meet a particular case, the legislature (as we think subsequent events have fairly proven) improv-
idently added [the omnibus clause] … The contract of marriage differs from all other contracts, in 
being indissoluble by the action of the parties to it … It is the most important of the social rela-
tions. … It is not pretended, that by the mere consent of the parties the marriage contract may be 
dissolved.” I can find no other reported Minnesota case concerning Minnesota’s omnibus clause.   
Louisiana. Louisiana enacted its omnibus clause in 1870. In Scott v. Scott (1875),111 Mr. Scott 
invoked Louisiana’s omnibus clause. But in its ruling, the Court gave no indication that it was 
even aware that the law had been changed in 1870. Moreover, it wrote: 
No grave and insuperable cause, in our judgment, exists justifying a decree of divorce. It 
was not the intention of the lawmaker that courts should be governed in their decisions of 
cases of this sort by the declarations and wishes of the parties themselves, acting under 
excitement and dissatisfaction. Their allegations of grievances insupportable must be made 
good by proof, to authorize the action of the judge. Trials and troubles from the infirmities 
of our nature constantly assail us, and it is our duty, as best we may, to bear up under them 
and overcome them if in our power. Something must be expected from the parties them-
selves, to overcome their domestic difficulties. It is not every family feud declared by hus-
band or wife to be insupportable that will authorize a divorce. It is in the great interests of 
society that the conjugal relation should not be dissolved except upon weighty and well 
established reasons. 
 
In contrast, in Castell v. Castell (1876),112 the Court referred specifically to the 1870 enactment. 
Allegedly, Mr. Castell had “uniformly treated [Mrs. Castell] with neglect and contumely, failing 
to supply her with means necessary for her support or the support of their child;” had “on one or 
                                                 
109 Holyoke v. Holyoke (78 Me. 404, 1886). 
110 True v. True (6 Minn. 458, 1861). 
111 Scott v. Scott (27 La. Ann. 594, 1875). 
112 Castell v. Castell (28 La. Ann. 91, 1876). 
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two occasions, in the presence of strangers, abused, vilified, and struck her,” and had “for three 
years or more, been addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, making his home a pandemonium 
and those dependent on him miserable and unhappy.” The Court ruled that “the case presented by 
the record comes clearly within the provision of the law, and plaintiff is entitled to the relief she 
asks.” 
Scott and Castell were the only two relevant Louisiana Supreme Court cases during 1870-1877. 
Several cases occurred either after 1877 or outside Louisiana. These are discussed in n. 80 (above) 
and section 7 (below).  
2.4 Weak Omnibus Clauses 
Besides the ten states that enacted omnibus clause, there were also three that enacted what I call 
weak omnibus clauses. These are clauses that do not quite qualify as omnibus clauses.  
Rhode Island’s ancient and still-extant clause requires that the spouse “do, or hath, wilfully and 
wickedly broken and violated the Marriage Covenant.”113 Such language is much harsher than that 
found in other omnibus clauses. It is thus classified as a weak omnibus clause. 
I have found no material explaining the enactment of Arizona’s omnibus clause. But it follows, 
almost verbatim, Bishop’s (1859, pp. 520-521) suggestion. (Bishop was an authority on the law of 
marriage and divorce in nineteenth century America and suggested his own version of an omnibus 
clause.) It is thus reasonable to suppose that the Arizona legislature intended to follow the Bishop’s 
accompanying recommendations, including his dictum that such clause “never be held to permit a 
judge to grant a divorce merely because his own private opinion was favorable to letting parties 
loose when they wish to be unloosed.” Arizona’s omnibus clause should thus be deemed weak.114 
Montana’s 1907 law defined cruelty. Embedded in this definition was the suggestion that any 
“treatment of one party to the marriage, by the other …, which justly and reasonably is of such a 
nature and character as so … entirely to defeat the proper and legitimate objects of marriage” 
                                                 
113 At the GENERAL ASSEMBLY of the GOVERNOR and COMPANY of the English Colony of Rhode-Island, and Providence-
Plantations, in New-England, in America; begun and held at South-Kingston in said Colony, the last Wednesday of October, in the 
Year of our LORD, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Nine. Ad in the Twenty-third Year of the Reign of His Most Sacred 
Majesty GEORGE the Second, by the Grace of GOD, of Great-Britain, France, and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, &c., pp. 
53-54. 
114 Contra Snyder (1889, p. 159), who deems Arizona’s “the most marvellous of all the ‘omnibus clauses,’ and the queerest 
piece of legislation contrived by mortal man.” 
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constitutes “Extreme Cruelty.”115 The language is reminiscent of Connecticut’s omnibus clause. 
But because it is embedded in a definition of cruelty, I classify it merely as a weak omnibus clause. 
3 The Empirical Analysis 
Divorce laws may be thought of as an obstacle that divorce-seekers must overcome. This ob-
stacle may be easier or harder to overcome. This raises the question: To what degree do easier 
divorce statutes affect the rate of absolute divorce? It is this question that the empirical analysis 
below seeks to address. 
The empirical analysis involves a simple regression. The dependent variable is the crude di-
vorce rate (CDR), defined here as divorces per million population. To construct this variable, pop-
ulation numbers are obtained from decennial Census counts and through simple linear interpola-
tion for intercensal years, while annual county-level divorce counts are taken from the Wright and 
North Reports. The independent variables include coding for 44 aspects of the law. The focus is 
on the two that pertain to the omnibus clauses. 
This section proceeds as follows. Subsection 3.1 considers why easier divorce laws may affect 
divorce rates. Subsection 3.2 reviews the older literature on the influence of legislation on divorce. 
Subsection 3.3 discusses how the annual county-level divorce counts were compiled from the 
Wright and North Reports. Subsection 3.4 discusses how the legal coding for the 44 aspects of the 
law was obtained.  
But before proceeding, three restrictions to the scope of the present empirical analysis must be 
noted. The first is that the empirical analysis is restricted to the statutory law. Case law is ignored.  
The second is that all aspects of the divorce law related to procedure (e.g. service, publication 
requirements) and incidental relief (e.g. property division, alimony, child custody) are ignored. 
While these probably do have some influence on the divorce rate, they have relatively little bearing 
on the ease with which a divorce may be procured. Moreover, these aspects of the divorce law are 
subject to great variation and are difficult to consistently code. These are thus ignored.  
The third restriction is that the dependent variable in the present analysis refers only to absolute 
divorce. This is the complete, final, and legal dissolution of a valid marriage.  
One implication is that all extralegal forms of marital breakdown (e.g. informal separations, 
murder) are ignored. These are not unimportant. But pertinent data are difficult to obtain and scarce. 
                                                 
115 Laws, Montana Tenth Regular Session, 1907, Ch. 118, pp. 297-298. 
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For example, even the stupendous Wright and North investigations devoted few resources to gath-
ering such data.  
Another implication is that I also ignore three other legal devices, namely divorce from bed and 
board, annulment, and interlocutory decree. As Bishop (1891, pp. 71-72) suggests, even law-mak-
ers and practitioners were often confused between absolute divorce and these three devices. The 
reader must therefore be clear on the distinction between these various devices.116  
3.1 Theoretical Reasons Why Easier Divorce Laws Might Influence Divorce Rates 
Considered here, in purely qualitative terms, are the possible effects that an easier divorce law 
might have on divorce rates. The first and most obvious effect is that one who was already seeking 
a divorce will enjoy an increased probability of success. A second is that a couple whose marriage 
was already broken (perhaps they had been living apart for decades) may now seek a divorce. A 
third is that an easier divorce law may prompt couples close to the precipice to seek a divorce. For 
example, an unhappy couple that would have clung on to their dysfunctional marriage may now 
instead cut their ties. These first three effects are perhaps not clearly distinguishable, whether in 
practice or in theory.  
The fourth effect is via the channel of social mores. When the divorce law is eased, divorce 
may become less repugnant or shameful. This may increase both the demand for and supply of 
divorce.117 As an example, suppose a woman could easily have gotten a divorce for desertion, but 
                                                 
116 This footnote contains a brief discussion of each. In Western Christendom, from about the eleventh through the fifteenth 
centuries, marriage was indissoluble. Nonetheless, it was possible to get a limited divorce (also known as ‘divorce from bed and 
board’, ‘divorce a mensa et thoro’, ‘partial divorce’, ‘judicial separation’). This granted the couple the privilege of not having to 
live together, but left unscathed their marital bond—neither could remarry and both had to remain sexually faithful.  
It was also possible to get an annulment or a decree of nullity. This declared the marriage void (it never existed in the first 
place) for such reasons as fraud or consanguinity. (This explanation is simplistic. See Mueller (1957) and Goda (1967) for more.) 
The Reformation made possible absolute divorce (also known as ‘divortium a vinculo matrimonii’, ‘final divorce’, ‘legal (or 
total) dissolution of marriage’, ‘divorce from the bond of matrimony’). Confusingly enough, annulments had also been called 
divortium a vinculo matrimonii. (This was less confusing when marriages were indissoluble and the only way to erase the bond of 
matrimony was through an annulment or a decree of nullity.) This is perhaps why the three annulments of Henry VIII are sometimes 
mistakenly referred to as divorces. For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to clearly distinguish between absolute divorce 
and annulments. 
The interlocutory decree or ‘decree nisi’ features less prominently in the history of Western divorce; only a few of the United 
States have ever imposed it. A couple is first granted an interlocutory decree. When the interlocutory period (typically between 
three months and one year) has expired, a final divorce decree may be entered. Until this is done, the couple remains legally married. 
This device was supposed to serve two purposes: Provide additional time for reconciliation and make divorce less attractive. See 
Columbia Law Review (1956) for more details. 
117 This idea was expressed more lyrically by Loomis (1866, p. 444): “It is noticed sometimes in musical instruments that an 
attachment directly connected with but a portion of the scale, and designed primarily to affect but the notes of a single octave, is 
found in practice to give a new tone and character to the whole instrument throughout its entire range. Something analogous to this 
would seem to have been the effect of this general misconduct attachment to our divorce law. Its influence has been felt not only 
in the suits brought specifically in its name, but in extending the loose, vague, and indefinite character of its own terms over the 
language and administration of the entire enactment.” 
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had not done so, for fear of being labeled a divorcée. Suppose a reform adds insanity as a ground 
for divorce, but makes no other changes. The woman may now perceive that there is less stigma 
associated with divorce; she may thus decide to get her divorce for desertion. And on the supply 
side, judges may interpret the new ground as signaling legislative intent to break away from the 
old, moralistic, fault-based view of divorce; they may thus be more easygoing when it comes to 
granting divorce for desertion.  
The fifth is the publicity effect. In an era when divorce was rare, it may simply not have oc-
curred to some that divorce was a possible solution to their marital woes. The publicity generated 
by reforms may have alerted them to this possibility.  
Sixth, divorce law reform may alter the behavior of the married. The sign of this effect is am-
biguous. On the one hand, with the price of divorce lowered, couples may put less effort into 
maintaining domestic harmony, thereby increasing the risk of breakdown. On the other hand, it is 
conceivable that couples actually become more vigilant and work harder at fortifying their mar-
riage.118 But either way, the magnitude of such effect was probably small in the nineteenth century. 
This is because divorce was so rare and unlikely that most couples not already seriously contem-
plating divorce would scarcely have noticed any changes in the price of divorce.  
The seventh is the selection effect. The sign of this effect is again ambiguous. On the one hand, 
a widened escape hatch makes marriage more attractive. This increases marriages and thus also 
the per capita rate of divorce. On the other hand, to the extent that marriage is a commitment device 
whose value is increasing in the price of divorce, an easier divorce law makes marriage less attrac-
tive. This would decrease marriages and thus also the divorce rate. But again, the magnitude of 
such effect was probably small, because divorce was so rare and unlikely that individuals deciding 
whether to wed would scarcely have noticed any changes in the price of divorce. 
Lastly, there are positive feedback effects. One, each additional divorce increases the pool of 
potential remarriage partners. Two, each additional divorce may reduce the stigma associated with 
                                                 
118 The Westminster Review (1867, p. 447) expressed similar ideas: “It is felt indeed, not without a show of reason, that much 
of the mutual toleration existing between husband and wife is due to the prevalent sense of the indissolubility of the union, and 
therefore that greater facility of divorce would only multiply its causes. This argument, however, cuts both ways, and it may be 
equally well said that husbands and wives would treat each other better and more considerately, if they felt that angry words and 
evil temper could not be safely indulged in on either side, without running a risk of losing altogether a really loved and long familiar 
companion.” 
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divorce. This is similar to the channel of social mores discussed above.119 Three, increased demand 
for divorce may lower supplier costs, perhaps through economies of scale or learning by doing.120  
One possible negative feedback effect is that reformers may be roused into action. They may 
campaign for tighter divorce laws. But even without influencing the law, moralists can dampen 
divorce. For example, preachers can discourage divorce in their Sunday sermons. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The US no-fault reforms circa 1970 have been heavily studied and is the subject of Choo 
(2015a). Here I considered only the older literature on the influence of legislation on divorce.  
As mentioned, there are several dated analyses of the data contained in the Wright and North 
Reports. Each takes a qualitative, case-study approach. Wright (p. 150) himself writes: “it seems 
quite apparent that the lines of statistics are curved in accordance with laws enacted just prior to 
the curves. Yet it is quite impossible to reconcile the general increase of divorces in certain states 
with the laws of such states.” Willcox (1897, pp. 47, 55, 61, 72) concludes: “law appears to be a 
relatively unimportant factor in the complete explanation of the diversities of divorce-rate in the 
states.” Lichtenberger (1909, p. 106) concurs, upon examining the 1887-1906 data; and does not 
waver, upon considering also later data: “far from being the cause of the increase of divorce, the 
law is not even an adequate preventive of that increase”; “the main trend of divorce appears to be 
entirely independent of, and undisturbed by, restrictive legal enactments aimed at its control” 
(Lichtenberger, 1931, pp. 154-186). Holbrook (1910, p. 395) finds that changes to the desertion 
period, residency requirement, and remarriage restrictions had little effect. Cahen (1932, p. 92) 
writes, “A detailed analysis and summary of divorce legislation from the Civil War to the present 
time shows that the number of changes has been many, but their importance slight.” 
                                                 
119 Loomis (1868, p. 228) expressed similar ideas (emphases in original text): “Each Divorce sows the seed for others. It is the 
town talk. The newspapers give the often disgusting particulars, with an unholy relish. The men give the details of it in the tavern, 
over the counter, and at the noonday rest. The women gossip over it, month after month, at their calls, tea-drinkings, or sociables. 
The children hear it discussed freely by their elders at the daily meals, with comments and details often that they should not hear. 
They all, men, women, and children see that it is a Legal act, frequently occurring, recognized by the Statute Law, and accepted by 
the people. They see the actors in it, and their children, living in the same reputation as heretofore, and they hear them extenuating 
and justifying their course. They see the Supreme Court of the County, which they have been trained to regard as the very imper-
sonation of Justice and Dignity, sanctioning this dissolution of the Marriage tie. They see Justices of the Peace, perhaps, sometimes, 
Ministers of the Gospel, uniting these Divorced persons again with others in Holy Matrimony. And what is the result? What can it 
be, other than the general corruption of the Public Conscience, and a contemptuous disregard for the appeals of the few remaining 
fastidious, reverent, and religious citizens?” 
120 For example, a lawyer may now specialize in divorce and so process divorce cases ever more efficiently. This may reduce 
the cost of divorce suits. Also, a lawyer may now find it worthwhile to publicize his services—see e.g. American Bar Association 
(1882, pp. 297, 306-308). This would further increase demand for divorce. 
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None of these analyses may be said to be modern. This chapter thus furnishes the very first 
modern econometric analysis of any data contained in the Wright and North Reports. Moreover, 
none of the above analyses looked specifically at the omnibus clauses, to which this chapter pays 
special attention. 
Now considered are some other studies based on data not in the Wright or North Reports. Sev-
eral were cursory examinations of limited data. Using sixteen years of Connecticut data, Loomis 
(1866, p. 443) judged its 1849 omnibus clause enactment ‘revolutionary’. Using a little more data, 
Allen (1880, p. 551) concluded that an easier divorce law at once increases divorce. Dike (1881, 
pp. 127-128) blamed reforms for the increases in divorce in Connecticut and Massachusetts, but 
conceded that they “cannot account for all of this increase” (p. 130). In a survey of the history of 
divorce from Moses, Gwynne (1898, p. 493) found it “abundantly evident that the looser the laws 
regulating divorce and marriage the greater the cruelty and misery produced both in degree and in 
volume.” Payne (1915, p. 212) and Conger (1915, p. 220) did not specify the statistics they ap-
pealed to. But the first asserted that “statistics show us conclusively that legislative changes, both 
as to legal grounds and methods of procedure, produce no visible change in the divorce rate.” In 
contrast, several pages later in the same report, the second asserted that “from all the evidence 
available, it seems almost certain that there is a margin, very important, although narrow, within 
which the statute maker may exert a morally beneficent and even restraining influence.” 
Three early European sociologists—Bodio (1882, p. 56), Bertillon (1883, pp. 9, 23), and Bosco 
(1908, pp. 454, 458)—concluded that divorce rates were no higher with easier laws. In a study of 
Chicago, Mowrer (1927) found that “family disintegration varies widely by communities,” despite 
the uniformity in divorce law (Ch. V). In a study of the 1900 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Wolf, Lüke, 
and Hax (1959, pp. 139, 299-300) concluded that it “had no detectable influence” on divorce rates. 
This conclusion would be reversed by the reanalysis of Glass, Tiao, & Maguire (1971).121 Como 
and Varese (Italy) and Ticino (Switzerland) had different divorce laws but were otherwise similar. 
Rheinstein (1967) investigated them, but ultimately deemed his investigation “inconclusive” (pp. 
387, 408). In a study of 1950 US Census data, Broel-Plateris (1961, p. 215) concluded that “mar-
riage disruption is associated not so much with individual variables as with a system of interrelated 
                                                 
121 But see the rejoinder by Rheinstein (1972, pp. 303-304). 
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variables which may be considered as indices of a greater whole which can be called social stability 
of social cohesiveness.” 
3.3 Annual Divorces in Each County and How They Were Compiled 
Appendix E contains the details of how county-level divorce data were collected from the 
Wright and North Reports. Here I merely mention some salient points.  
The data were often defective. For example, it might be stated that for county X, divorce records 
were destroyed by a fire in 1896. In that case I code the divorce data for county X for years 1896 
and earlier as being defective. Such defective data are dropped in the primary empirical analysis 
below.   
Now, one concern might be that these defects lead to systemic biases. For example, it may be 
that conflagrations happened most often precisely where divorces were most frequent. The possi-
bility of such biases cannot be ruled out. But absent evidence of such biases, it is perhaps reason-
able to ignore them.  
There is one more caveat. Above was stressed the distinction between three other legal devices 
and absolute divorce, to which the regression’s dependent variable refers. It is thus of some con-
cern as to what precisely the divorce counts presented in the Wright and North Reports referred to. 
It turns out that investigators were explicitly instructed to exclude annulments122 and interlocutory 
decrees.123 So these two legal devices are of no worry. Unfortunately, no distinction was made 
between absolute and limited divorces. That is to say, both types of divorce were counted indis-
criminately and simply as divorces in the reports. But limited divorces constituted less than one 
percent of the total number of divorces.124 And so, just like was done in the Wright and North 
Reports, no effort is made to correct for this problem. It is unlikely that this problem seriously 
injures the empirical analysis below. 
                                                 
122 See Wright Report (p. 134) and North Report (p. 31).  
123 See Wright Report (pp. 132, 134). I can find no mention in the North Report of how decrees nisi were treated in the second 
investigation. But given the close parallels, it is reasonable to believe the same treatment was applied in both investigations. 
124 See Wright Report (p. 132) and North Report (p. 19). 
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3.4 The 44 Aspects of the Law 
The empirical analysis below involves 44 regressors of interest. Most are indicators for whether 
the particular aspect of the law was in effect for each county-year observation. Appendix F con-
tains details of how the coding for these 44 independent variables were obtained. 
The two that are of greatest interest are indicators for omnibus clauses and weak omnibus 
clauses. These we have already discussed in considerable detail. We now discuss the other regres-
sors, which are of tangential interest.  
The largest and most important subset of these 44 aspects of the law are the divorce grounds. 
To get a divorce, one must establish a divorce ground. This was true in the nineteenth century and 
remains true today. Adultery, desertion, and cruelty were the three classic Protestant divorce 
grounds. Two other grounds common in the US were neglect and intemperance. During 1867-
1906, the vast majority of divorces across the US involved one of these five grounds.125 
The nineteenth-century American legislator added many more grounds. Here are six: mental 
cruelty, conviction of a felony or imprisonment, insanity (contracted after marriage), acts of sexual 
immorality other than adultery (e.g. buggery, sodomy, bestiality), the ‘living separate and apart’ 
clauses, and religion (e.g. Shakerism). Another two were the omnibus clauses and the weak omni-
bus clauses already discussed. 
Often also added were grounds that would historically have been for an annulment or a decree 
of nullity. Seven of these are bigamy, consanguinity, nonage, fraud, impotency, pregnant (wife 
pregnant by man other than the husband at the time of marriage), and other incapacity (such as 
insanity at the time of marriage). Call these seven grounds improper and the other thirteen dis-
cussed above proper.  
Twenty of the 44 independent variables in the present empirical analysis are indicators for these 
twenty divorce grounds. Table III.2 lists summary statistics for these divorce grounds.  
It is worth noting that, as said in the North Report (p. 25), “Among the several states the legal 
causes of divorce differ widely in number and phraseology.” At one extreme was South Carolina, 
which, before 1949, had zero divorce grounds (1872-1878 excepted).126 New York had one, 
namely adultery, until 1966. Every other state had at least two, often more. 
                                                 
125 See Wright Report (pp. 169-170) and North Report (pp. 25-30). 
126 As McCrady (1896 , p. 11) writes, “There never has been a divorce in South Carolina—province, colony, or State—except 
during the Reconstruction period after the war between the States, under the government of strangers, adventurers, and negroes, 
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TABLE III.2—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR JURISDICTIONS THAT GRANTED AT LEAST ONE DIVORCE 
  1870 1880 1890 1900 
Observations 46 47 47 49 
Number of jurisdictions with the following divorce grounds 
omnibus 8 2 1 1 
weakomnibus 1 2 1 1 
adultery 43 46 47 49 
crime 34 37 38 40 
cruelty 36 39 40 42 
desert 40 45 45 47 
insanity 2 2 3 4 
intemperance 33 35 38 40 
immoral 3 2 2 2 
mental 2 5 6 7 
neglect 15 18 23 26 
religion 3 3 3 3 
volsep 3 2 2 3 
bigamy 15 14 14 14 
consanguinity 6 6 6 6 
fraud 11 9 7 9 
impotency 36 35 34 35 
nonage 4 3 1 1 
otherincapacity 6 5 5 5 
pregnant 12 14 15 17 
Average     
Population 837,917 1,045,962 1,309,317 1,531,558 
Divorces Granted 238 418 711 1,138 
 
The phraseology could also vary widely. Consider for example these three divorce grounds:  
Where either party … shall be guilty of such cruel and barbarous treatment as to endanger 
the life of the other, or shall offer such indignities to the person of the other as shall render 
his or her condition intolerable (A Digest of Statutes of Arkansas, 1893, p. 680).  
                                                 
upheld by Federal bayonets.” Some writers claim that at least prior to 1949, South Carolina had never had a single divorce. This is 
false. The 1868 Constitution first raised the possibility of divorce (“Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed 
but by the judgment of a Court, as shall be prescribed by law”). But whether divorce was actually legal remained uncertain until 
an 1872 law explicitly provided grounds for divorce (No. 21, approved 1872-01-31). Nonetheless, according to the Wright Report 
(p. 388), between 1868 and 1871, there were five divorces in Spartanburgh county and one in Fairfield county. Howard (1904, p. 
38) writes that “these were probably granted by the legislature.” The 1872 law was repealed at the end of 1878 (No. 591, approved 
1878-12-20). For good measure, the 1895 Constitution (Art. 17, Sec. 3) declared that “Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall 
not be allowed in this State.” For more on South Carolina, Millar (1954) is perhaps a good starting point. 
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Where either the husband or wife is guilty of excesses, cruel treatment or outrages toward 
the other, if such ill treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insup-
portable (Sayles’ Annotated Statutes of the State of Texas, Vol. I, 1898, p. 1095).  
For intolerable severity in either party (Vermont Statutes, 1894, p. 507).  
 
One could make a fine distinction between them. But most writers, including the present one, 
choose to code these (and other similar clauses) equally as cruelty clauses. 
The analysis includes two indicators for whether divorce for cruelty or intemperance was 
granted only to wives. Also included are another three continuous variables that measure, in years, 
the duration of desertion, neglect, and voluntary separation required for a divorce to be granted. 
A second subset of divorce laws are the residency requirements. These require that the divorce 
petitioner be a bona fide resident of the jurisdiction in which the suit was filed. The main reason 
for enacting such requirements was to prevent out-of-state divorce seekers from abusing the local 
divorce law. These requirements could vary along multiple dimensions, of which only two are 
included as independent variables in the present empirical analysis. The first is an indicator for 
whether there was any residency requirement. The second is a continuous variable measuring, in 
years, the requisite duration of residency.  
A third subset of divorce laws are the special defenses, the four most important being recrimi-
nation, collusion, connivance, and condonation. In a pith, recrimination says that no divorce shall 
be granted if both spouses are at fault; collusion says that no divorce shall be granted if both 
spouses agree to commit (or appear to commit) a fault in order to get a divorce; connivance says 
that no divorce shall be granted if one spouse sets up or consents to a situation leading to the fault 
complained of; finally, condonation says that no divorce shall be granted on the basis of a fault 
that has been forgiven.  
Of the 44 independent variables in the analysis, three indicate whether the statutes provided 
recrimination, collusion/connivance, or condonation as special defenses. Collusion and conniv-
ance are combined into a single variable because they often cannot be clearly distinguished. An-
other three independent variables indicate whether the bar of recrimination was discretionary, or 
restricted to cases where the complainant had committed adultery or the same fault. Two more 
indicate whether the defense of collusion/connivance or condonation was restricted to where the 
fault complained of was adultery. 
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A fourth subset of divorce laws pertain to constitutional bans of legislative divorce (LD). (These 
were briefly discussed above.) Many state constitutions had unambiguous bans on LD. For exam-
ple, Michigan’s constitutional ban read, “Divorces shall not be granted by the legislature.”127  
A few state constitutions had what may be called ambiguous bans on LD. For example, those 
of Virginia and West Virginia read, “The general assembly shall confer on the courts the power to 
grant divorces …, but shall not, by special legislation, grant relief in such cases, or in any other 
case of which the courts or other tribunals may have jurisdiction.” This is considered an ambiguous 
ban because it seemed to permit LD in those cases where courts had no power to grant divorces.  
Of the 44 independent variables in the present empirical analysis, one indicates whether the 
state constitution had no such ban on LD whatsoever. Another indicates whether the state consti-
tution had an ambiguous ban on LD. (The omitted category thus contains those with unambiguous 
bans on LD.)  
Two independent variables indicate whether there was the interlocutory decree or the limited 
divorce. Another is a continuous variable measuring in years the length of the interlocutory period. 
Some states allowed limited divorces to be converted to absolute divorces, usually after some req-
uisite waiting period. Hence, also included are an indicator for whether this was possible and a 
continuous variable measuring in years the length of this waiting period.  
The penultimate independent variable indicates whether statehood had not been attained. The 
last indicates whether a public defender was required to represent the interests of the State in di-
vorce cases. The main purpose of such a requirement was to prevent collusive divorces.  
4 The Results of the Empirical Analysis 
I use multiple regression to test whether the omnibus clauses were correlated with higher di-
vorce rates. I use a panel of state divorce data. The dependent variable is the CDR. The 44 regres-
sors of interest were just discussed. I also include state and year fixed-effects. Weighted least 
squares (WLS) are used, with population as weights. The results of this regression are reported in 
Table III.3, specification 1. 
                                                 
127 See the Michigan Constitutions of 1835 (Art. XII, Sec. 5), 1850 (Art. IV, Sec. 26), and 1908 (Art. V, Sec. 32). I cannot 
however find any such clause in Michigan’s 1963 Constitution. 
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One concern might be whether the panel is balanced. For all but four of the divorce jurisdictions 
considered, there are observations for each of the 40 years (1867-1906) under consideration. These 
four exceptions are: Indian Territory, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Carolina.  
As additional robustness checks, I also run a number of other specifications. As explained above, 
Utah’s CDR surged dramatically during 1875-1877, for reasons quite unrelated to legal reforms. 
One possible worry is that this unusual episode in history may skew the results. I rerun specifica-
tion 1, but with the two Utah state-year observations for 1876 and 1877 dropped. The results are 
reported under specification 2 of the same table. 
Lee & Solon (2011) suggest the logarithm of the divorce rate as an “obvious alternative” func-
tional form. Following this suggestion, I rerun specifications 1 and 2, but with the dependent var-
iable in log form. The results are reported under specifications 3 and 4 of the same table.  
One may worry that the features of the laws are collinear. Hence, I also run specifications 1 
through 4, but drop the 42 regressors besides the two that pertain to omnibus clauses. These are 
reported under specifications I through IV, at the bottom of the same table. 
Dröes & van Lamoen (2010) and Lee & Solon (2011) point out that if the model is correctly 
specified, then both WLS and ordinary least squares (OLS) should yield unbiased estimates. Fol-
lowing this critique, Table III.4 (printed in section 8) replicates the eight specifications run in Table 
III.3, but uses OLS instead. The estimates across Table III.3 and Table III.4 are fairly similar, 
suggesting that the model is not badly misspecified. 
One may also wonder whether dropping the defective county-year observations (as described 
in section 3.3) materially affects the estimates. Hence, Table III.5 (printed in section 8) replicates 
the eight specifications run in Table III.3, but without dropping any defective county-year obser-
vations. It is seen that the estimates across Table III.3 and Table III.5 are fairly similar. 
It is possible that the enactment and the repeal of an omnibus clause affect the divorce rates 
differently. To test for this possibility, I rerun the above regressions, but with an additional regres-
sor that indicates whether the state used to have an omnibus clause. It turns out that the estimates 
of the correlation between this additional regressor and the CDR is not significant at any conven-
tional significance level, across all of the 24 specifications described above. I thus fail to find any 
evidence that the enactment and the repeal of an omnibus clause affect the divorce rates differently. 
I now discuss the results. The regressors of greatest interest are the omnibus clauses. The results 
suggest that the omnibus clauses were indeed correlated with higher divorce rates. Specification 1 
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in Table III.3 suggests that the presence of an omnibus clause was correlated with a 118-point 
increase in the CDR. Two yardsticks to which this estimate may be compared are the mean and 
the standard deviation of the CDR. Going by these, the 118-point estimate is clearly large, it being 
over a fifth of the mean and nearly a third of the standard deviation. Moreover, the estimates under 
specifications 3 and 4 are statistically significant at the five percent level. The results in Table III.5 
are quite similar. Those in Table III.4 are even stronger. This point estimate implies that Indiana 
for example would have had about 200 additional divorces per annum after it repealed its omnibus 
clause in 1873, rather than the roughly 1000 per annum it enjoyed. Altogether, it is clear that 
omnibus clauses do matter, as typified by my above case study of Utah. An indirect inference that 
may be made from this empirical finding is that not all trial courts interpreted the omnibus clauses 
quite as harshly as in some of the above state Supreme Court cases. Note though that because only 
seven states repealed their omnibus clauses during the 40-year period under study, even if these 
states had never repealed their omnibus clauses, the national divorce statistics would scarcely have 
been affected.  
Yet another yardstick by which the omnibus clause estimates may be compared are the coeffi-
cient estimates for some of the other laws. They are very similar to the estimates for ‘Crime’, 
which is the indicator for whether conviction of felony or incarceration was a ground for divorce. 
They are somewhat smaller than the estimates for ‘Intemperance’ and ‘Immoral’, which are indi-
cators for whether intemperance and sexual acts of immorality (other than adultery) were grounds 
for divorce. They are also a little smaller (in absolute terms)  than the estimates for ‘Recrimination’, 
which is  the indicator for whether recrimination was explicitly listed as a defense. They are much 
smaller (in absolute terms) than the estimates for ‘Nonage’, which is the indicator for whether lack 
of majority at time of marriage was a ground for divorce. 
It appears that the weak omnibus clauses may have been associated with higher divorce rates, 
though none of the estimates in specifications 1 through 4 of Table III.3 are statistically significant 
at any conventional level. Moreover, the estimates in specifications I through IV are negative and 
highly statistically significant. It will further be recalled that in the forty-year period under study, 
there were only states (namely Rhode Island and Arizona) that had weak omnibus clauses. Alto-
gether then, it is doubtful if any conclusions may be drawn from these estimates. 
It will be observed that without the other 42 laws as controls, the estimates for the correlation 
between omnibus clauses and log CDR (specifications III and IV) are much smaller, than when all 
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44 laws are included (specifications 3 and 4). (A similar observation may be made for Table III.5.) 
Why might this be so? One possibility is that the omnibus clauses were negatively correlated with 
some of these other laws, which in turn were positively correlated with the CDR. This is plausible. 
There was a tendency for states with omnibus clauses to have fewer of the other divorce grounds. 
This was most vivid in the case of Maine between 1850 and 1863, when its omnibus clause was 
its only divorce ground—during these years, it did not even have adultery as a divorce ground.  
To test for the possibility that a single divorce law is largely responsible for this discrepancy, I 
reran specification 3 another 42 times—each time, I dropped one of the 42 regressors (that is, other 
than the two pertaining to the omnibus clauses). In all but one of these 42 reruns, the coefficient 
estimate for ‘Omnibus clause’ differed from that in specification 3 by less than 0.05. The only 
instance where the difference was larger than 0.05 was where ‘Desertion’ was dropped. But even 
in this case, the resulting coefficient estimate for ‘Omnibus clause’ was 0.361 (0.125), which 
would explain only a small part of the discrepancy. Altogether it would appear that there is no one 
single divorce law that can be said to be largely responsible for the discrepancy. It is all 42 divorce 
law controls that must be held responsible. 
I turn next to discuss the other eleven ‘proper’ divorce grounds. It appears that crime, intem-
perance, and immoral were associated with higher divorce rates. There is no clear evidence that 
any of the other proper divorce grounds were associated with higher divorce rates. Contemporaries 
lamented the steady accretion of divorce grounds and linked this to the rising divorce rates. The 
results here provide evidence of such a link, in the case of at least three divorce grounds.  
 The presence of a residency requirement was significantly correlated with lower CDR. Most 
popular commentators deemed migratory divorce a serious problem and frequently urged more 
stringent residency requirements. The findings here support their claims.  
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TABLE III.3—CORRELATION BETWEEN DIVORCE LAWS AND DIVORCE RATES 
Variables marked with 
# are continuous and 
measured in years. All 
others are indicators.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basic Drop Utah Same as (1),  Same as (2), 
Specification for 1876-77 but log but log 
Omnibus clause 118 (105) 69 (72) 0.483** (0.182) 0.468** (0.176) 
Weak omnibus clause 519 (532) 551 (472) 1.942 (3.033) 1.951 (3.008) 
Adultery -56 (379) -235 (316) 2.021** (0.792) 1.967** (0.801) 
Crime 73 (111) 106 (114) 0.456*** (0.098) 0.465*** (0.098) 
Cruelty 75 (381) 246 (309) -1.203** (0.572) -1.152* (0.59) 
Desertion -131 (151) -169 (146) 0.847** (0.328) 0.836** (0.328) 
Insanity -143 (104) -139 (102) -0.085 (0.076) -0.084 (0.075) 
Intemperance 335* (185) 192** (89) 0.535* (0.29) 0.493 (0.308) 
Immoral 227** (90) 183*** (51) 0.173 (0.194) 0.160 (0.192) 
Mental cruelty -258 (307) -67 (185) 0.056 (0.481) 0.113 (0.479) 
Neglect 60 (237) 154 (183) -0.418 (0.507) -0.39 (0.513) 
Religion (e.g. Shakers) 429 (389) 421 (350) -1.242 (0.834) -1.244 (0.844) 
Voluntary separation 411 (555) 387 (527) -2.725*** (0.881) -2.733*** (0.886) 
Cruelty only for wives 162 (178) 120 (172) 0.293 (0.204) 0.281 (0.203) 
Duration of desertion #  22 (25) 31 (22) -0.093 (0.058) -0.091 (0.058) 
Intemperance only for 
wives -33 (69) -34 (68) -0.065 (0.084) -0.066 (0.083) 
Duration of neglect # 89 (97) 40 (74) 0.544** (0.25) 0.529** (0.251) 
Duration of Vol. Sep. # -56 (57) -49 (54) 0.221** (0.089) 0.224** (0.089) 
Bigamy -128* (71) -142** (67) 0.382 (0.337) 0.377 (0.335) 
Consanguinity 369*** (55) 377*** (49) -0.213 (0.341) -0.211 (0.339) 
Fraud 75 (52) 71 (51) -1.055*** (0.116) -1.056*** (0.116) 
Impotency -57 (62) -64 (53) -0.091 (0.181) -0.093 (0.182) 
Nonage -1084*** (361) -1066*** (329) -0.612 (1.632) -0.606 (1.618) 
Other Incapacity 400 (321) 429 (320) 0.328 (0.524) 0.337 (0.523) 
Pregnant -184** (78) -210*** (76) 0.214 (0.136) 0.207 (0.136) 
Residency requirement  -198** (74) -162** (66) -0.126 (0.137) -0.115 (0.141) 
Duration of res. req. #  12 (38) 15 (36) 0.142 (0.107) 0.143 (0.107) 
Recrimination -171 (298) -367** (176) -1.006** (0.478) -1.065** (0.477) 
Collusion/connivance 451* (262) 353 (239) 1.083 (0.666) 1.053 (0.667) 
Condonation -768 (469) -600 (393) -1.903 (1.645) -1.853 (1.635) 
Recrimination only for 
adultery 82 (301) 277 (179) 0.584 (0.442) 0.643 (0.441) 
Recrimination only for 
same fault 370 (361) 630*** (217) 0.759 (0.689) 0.836 (0.693) 
Recrimination is dis-
cretionary  232 (612) 493 (427) 0.856 (1.796) 0.934 (1.787) 
Collusion/connivance 
only for adultery 82 (269) 111 (232) 0.849 (1.52) 0.858 (1.508) 
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Condonation only for 
adultery 342 (376) 244 (290) -0.527 (0.753) -0.557 (0.752) 
Limited divorce 54 (84) 55 (83) 0.024 (0.098) 0.024 (0.098) 
Limited divorce is 
convertible to divorce 518 (604) 148 (481) 2.997** (1.397) 2.886** (1.393) 
Waiting period before 
limited divorce can be 
converted #  
-174 (201) -46 (157) -0.864* (0.463) -0.826* (0.461) 
Interlocutory period -214 (146) -337*** (73) -0.358 (0.240) -0.395 (0.240) 
Duration of interlocu-
tory period # -237 (158) -128 (115) -0.597* (0.301) -0.565* (0.300) 
Not a state -499** (194) -548*** (176) -0.128 (0.136) -0.143 (0.131) 
No ban on legislative 
divorce  254*** (48) 254*** (48) -0.059 (0.041) -0.059 (0.041) 
Ambiguous as to 
whether there is a ban 
on legislative divorce  
162** (65) 157** (64) 0.191 (0.121) 0.19 (0.121) 
Public defender re-
quirement -62 (55) -74 (54) 0.029 (0.126) 0.025 (0.127) 
R²  0.8799 0.9001 0.9410 0.9414 
Observations 1920 1918 1920 1918 
Dependent Variable    
Mean 557 556 6.060 6.060 
Standard Deviation 376 371 0.803 0.802 
Specifications (I)-(IV) are the same as (1)-(4) except that the 42 regressors other than omnibus clauses are 
dropped. 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Omnibus clause 102 (92) 71 (80) 0.209 (0.207) 0.197 (0.207) 
Weak omnibus clause -431*** (40) -430*** (40) -0.557*** (0.050) -0.556*** (0.050) 
R²  0.8477 0.8688 0.9025 0.9033 
Notes: In this table, the method of Weighted Least Squares is used. See text for a more detailed description of each 
specification. Every specification includes state and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are robust (clustered at state-
level) and reported in parentheses. Estimates that are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels are, as usual, marked with one, two, and three asterisks. 
 
I turn next to discuss the special defenses. It appears that recrimination and condonation were 
associated with lower divorce rates. This is perhaps surprising, given that these special defenses 
were often applied even where absent and were sometimes ignored even where present. This fur-
nishes yet another instance where the law matters.  
The possibility of converting a limited divorce to an absolute divorce appears to be associated 
with higher CDR. The device of the interlocutory decree appears to be associated with lower CDR. 
It is once again not surprising to find that the law matters very much.  
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FIGURE III.4. POPULATION-WEIGHTED CDR OF THE SIX STATES THAT GAINED STATEHOOD IN 1889 OR 1890 
Notes: Author’s calculations. The six states were the Dakotas (1889-11-02), Montana (1889-11-08), Washington (1889-11-11), 
Idaho (1890-07-03), and Wyoming (1890-07-10). The year 1890 is marked by a vertical line. 
 
To be considered next is whether the CDR was different in states and territories. It is not obvious 
what to expect. One consideration is that Congress had power to moderate the family law of terri-
tories, but not of states. But to my knowledge, only two Congressional constraints were ever placed: 
In 1886, Congress banned the practice of legislative divorce (LD) in territories;128 and in 1896, 
Congress enacted a one year residency requirement in territories.129 But these factors are already 
controlled for in the regression. It is thus not to be expected that states and territories had signifi-
cantly different CDR.  
Somewhat surprisingly, statehood is highly significantly correlated with an increase in the CDR. 
Figure III.4 provides further illustration of this finding—it shows the CDR of a group of six states 
that happened to gain statehood within the same eight month timespan (November 1889 – July 
1890). I am unable to explain why states might have had higher CDR. One possibility is that ter-
ritorial divorces had a murky legal status and were thus less attractive. It may have been thought 
that divorces obtained in territories were less readily recognized than those obtained in states. 
Specifications 1 and 2 of Table III.3 suggest that the presence of an unambiguous constitutional 
ban on legislative divorce (LD) was associated with a lower CDR. This is not surprising. Such 
bans would have had the obvious effect of removing from the market one supplier of divorce, 
namely legislature. The principles of economics imply that this would have tended to reduce the 
total number of divorces issued. It would also dissuade any divorce seekers. 
                                                 
128 Forty-Ninth Congress of the United States, Ch. 818. 
129 Fifty-Fourth Congress of the United States, Ch. 241. 
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Writing in the 1960s, Clark (1968, p. 395) remarks that the requirements that a public defender 
represent the interests of the state were mere “pious affirmations.” The evidence here is not clear 
as to whether during 1867-1906 such statutory requirements were significantly correlated with the 
CDR. This suggests that Clark’s views may also have applied to the nineteenth century. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the correlation between omnibus clauses and divorce rates, during 1867-
1906. Casual contemporary commentators often blamed the lax divorce laws for the high divorce 
rates. Opprobrium was heaped upon the omnibus clauses, which would be somewhat unusual even 
today. This chapter is the first analyze data from that era using computers and modern econometric 
analysis. The analysis revealed that, as expected, the omnibus clauses were associated with higher 
CDR. This is consistent with what contemporary commentators might have supposed. Divorce 
laws did indeed matter a great deal in the nineteenth century.  
Max Rheinstein asserted that there was a dual law of divorce during the mid-twentieth century. 
These assertions tended to be supported by the findings in Choo (2015a). During the nineteenth 
century, at least one writer made a similar assertion:  
One peculiarity in the law of divorce, as it exists in this country, is the wide difference 
between its laxity, and the strictness of the moral sense and customs of the community 
(United States Monthly Law Magazine, 1850). 
 
The above assertion tends to be supported by this chapter’s examination of judicial cases. State 
Supreme Courts tended to interpret the omnibus clauses conservatively. However, this chapter’s 
empirical analysis showed that the law of the books and in particular the omnibus clauses mattered 
a great deal. This tends to undermine the above assertion.  
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6 Appendix: Wording of Omnibus Clauses 
Iowa (1846-1855) when it shall be made fully apparent to the satisfaction of the Court, that the 
parties cannot live in peace or happiness together, and that their welfare requires a separation 
between them 
Minnesota (1855-1866) when it shall be made fully to appear that from any other reason or 
causes existing, the parties cannot live in peace and happiness together, and that their welfare 
requires a separation. 
North Carolina (1827-1872) whenever they may be satisfied, upon due evidence presented, of 
the justice of such application; any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding 
Indiana (1824-1873) in all cases, where the court in its discretion, shall deem the granting a 
divorce just and reasonable 
Illinois (1832-1874) In addition to the causes already provided by law for divorces from the 
bands of matrimony, courts of chancery in this state shall have full power and authority to hear 
and determine all causes for a divorce, not provided for by any law of this state. 
Louisiana (1870-1877) any such misconduct repugnant to the marriage covenant as perma-
nently destroys the happiness of the petitioner 
Connecticut (1849-1878) any such misconduct as permanently destroys the happiness of the 
petitioner, or defeats the purposes of the marriage relation 
Utah (1852-1878) when it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction and conviction of the 
Court, that the parties cannot live in peace and union together, and that their welfare requires 
a separation 
Maine (1847-1883) when in the exercise of a sound discretion, he deems it reasonable and 
proper, conducive to domestic harmony, and consistent with the peace and morality of society 
Washington (1854-1921) for any other cause deemed by the court sufficient, or where the court 
shall be satisfied that the parties can no longer live together 
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WEAK OMNIBUS CLAUSES 
 
Rhode Island (1749-Never) upon due Proof ... that he or she do, or hath wilfully and wickedly 
broken and violated the Marriage Covenant, either by any Act done and committed 
Arizona (1871-1887) And whereas, in the developments of future events, cases may be pre-
sented before the courts falling substantially within the limits of the law, as hereinbefore stated, 
yet not within its terms, it is enacted, that whenever the judge who hears a cause for divorce 
deems the case to be within the reason of the law, within the general mischief the law is intended 
to remedy, or within what it may be presumed would have been provided against, by the legis-
lature establishing the foregoing causes of divorce had it foreseen the specific case and found 
language to meet it without including cases not within the same reason, he shall grant the di-
vorce. 
Montana (1907-1976) Extreme Cruelty is the infliction, or threat of grievous bodily injury, or 
of bodily injury dangerous to life, or the repeated infliction, or threat of bodily injury or personal 
violence, upon the other party, by one party to the marriage, or the repeated publication or 
utterance of false charges against the chastity of the wife by the husband, or the infliction of 
grievous mental suffering upon the other by one party to the marriage by a course of conduct 
towards, or treatment of one party to the marriage, by the other existing and persisted in for a 
period of one year immediately before the commencement of the action for divorce, which justly 
and reasonably is of such a nature and character as so to destroy the peace of mind and happi-
ness of the injured party, or entirely to defeat the proper and legitimate objects of marriage or 
to render the continuance of the married relation between the parties perpetually unreasonable 
or intolerable to the injured party. 
Notes: See Appendix D for sources.  
7 Appendix: Notes to Accompany Section 2.3 
North Carolina. Scroggins v. Scroggins (1832): 
It is when we are told to do what is right, but not told what they deem right, that we are lost 
in the mazes of discretion. I cannot suppose, however, that the discretion conferred is a 
mere personal one, whether wild or sober, but must from the nature of things be confined 
to the cases for which provision was before made by law, or for those of a like kind. 
… lawgivers, acting upon experience and disregarding theory, have generally been agreed 
in refusing them altogether, where the marriage was lawful, except in the case of impotency. 
If the Court could think that the duty to be performed was intended to be referred to the 
private opinions of the judges, it would be promptly, though reluctantly, executed; for there 
is no member of the Court who is not strongly impressed with the conviction that divorces 
ought in no ease to be allowed, but in that already mentioned, and near consanguinity.  
 
At this point, the Supreme Court soliloquized about why the marriage contract should be held 
infrangible. The Court then noted that this view did not seem to be held by all legislators: 
Such considerations have produced the private convictions felt by those who are now the 
judges of the Court. But they seem not to have made the same impressions on all, and it is 
our duty, notwithstanding the unlimited powers which we are commanded to exercise, to 
96 
 
endeavor to ascertain, as well as we may, in what cases the Legislature would, upon ascer-
tained facts, authorize the parties to abandon their former choice, and make a new selection. 
[Emphasis added.] 
 
Remarkably, the 1827 Act was interpreted as legislative desire to make divorce more restrictive: 
To the extent of the Act of 1814, we consider the Court constrained to go. And from the 
second section of the Act of 1827, we suppose that we are not at liberty to stop there, since 
that implies that there are other cases besides those specified in that act in which divorces 
seem to have been expected to be properly applied for, and consequently granted. Yet, from 
the preamble of the last statute, one might infer the contrary, and that the great purpose of 
the Legislature was to free itself from applications which ought not to be granted, but which, 
from the hardship to the parties, and feeling in the members, were sometimes obtained, and 
to turn them over to tribunals which would do more impartial or exact justice. Indeed, it is 
difficult for persons to put a just interpretation upon terms, conferring in themselves such 
boundless power. We cannot intend that the meaning was that the courts should grant di-
vorces where, under like circumstances, the Legislature had or might be expected to grant 
them by statute; for the contrary is implied by commanding the action of courts, usually 
regulated by fixed rules. The Court is then obliged to adopt the middle course, and prescribe 
to itself such principles as we think sound law-givers, who allow of divorces at all, would 
send as rescripts to a judiciary. 
 
The Court would also write, 
And we cannot but say that nothing could be more dangerous than to allow those who have 
agreed to take each other, in terms for better, for worse, to be permitted to say that one of 
the parties is worse than was expected, and therefore the contract ought to be no longer 
binding. 
 
The Court ended by inviting Legislature to make itself clear, if its discussion of the matter were 
thought to be erroneous: 
The full discussion thus entered into has been deemed due to the Legislature and the Court 
itself, that the principles which will guide the Court may be plainly known. It is proper that 
they should be placed before the Legislature, that if thought wrong by them, the Court may 
be spared from running further into error by having an authoritative guide to future action 
in a rule prescribed definitely by the Legislature itself. 
 
The omnibus clause would indeed be reworded in 1837. But I do not know if this 1837 rewording 
was in any way connected to the remarks made in Scroggins. 
Joyner v. Joyner (1862):  
The petioner [sic] states that … her husband manifested great coarseness and brutality, 
“and even inflicted the most severe corporal punishment. This he did on two different oc-
casions, once with a horse-whip, and once with a switch, leaving several bruises on her 
person.” “He used towards her, abusive and insulting language, accused her of carrying 
away articles of property from his premises, to her daughter by a former husband; refused 
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to let said child live with her; has frequently, at night, after she had retired, driven her from 
bed, saying that it was not hers, and that she should not sleep upon it.—He has also forbade 
her sitting down to his table in company with his family,” and that “by such like acts of 
violence and indignity has forced her to leave his house, and that she is now residing with 
her friends and relatives, having no means of support for herself, and an infant son, born 
within the four past weeks.” …  
The wife must be subject to the husband. Every man must govern his household, and if by 
reason of an unruly temper, or an unbridled tongue, the wife persistently treats her husband 
with disrespect, and he submits to it, he not only loses all sense of self-respect, but loses 
the respect of the other members of his family, without which, he cannot expect to govern 
them, and forfeits the respect of his neighbors. Such have been the incidents of the marriage 
relation from the beginning of the human race. Unto the woman it is said, “Thy desire shall 
be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee,” Genesis, chap. 3, v. 16. It follows that the 
law gives the husband power to use such a degree of force as is necessary to make the wife 
behave herself and know her place. Why is it, that by the principles of the common law if 
a wife slanders or assaults and beats a neighbor, the husband is made to pay for it? Or if 
the wife commits a criminal offense, less than felony, in the presence of her husband, she 
is not held responsible? Why is it that the wife cannot make a will disposing of her land? 
and cannot sell her land without a privy examination, “separate and apart from her husband,” 
in order to see that she did so voluntarily, and without compulsion on the part of her hus-
band? It is for the reason that the law gives this power to the husband over the person of 
the wife, and has adopted proper safe-guards to prevent an abuse of it.  
We will not pursue the discussion further. It is not an agreeable subject, and we are not 
inclined, unnecessarily, to draw upon ourselves the charge of a want of proper respect for 
the weaker sex. It is sufficient for our purpose to state that there may be circumstances 
which will mitigate, excuse, and so far justify the husband in striking the wife “with a 
horse-whip on one occasion and with a switch on another, leaving several bruises on the 
person,” so as not to give her a right to abandon him and claim to be divorced. For instance: 
suppose a husband comes home and his wife abuses him in the strongest terms—calls him 
a scoundrel, and repeatedly expresses a wish that he was dead and in torment! and being 
thus provoked in the furor brevis, he strikes her with the horse-whip, which he happens to 
have in his hands, but is afterwards willing to apologise, and expresses regret for having 
struck her: or suppose a man and his wife get into a discussion and have a difference of 
opinion as to a matter of fact, she becomes furious and gives way to her temper, so far as 
to tell him he lies, and upon being admonished not to repeat the word, nevertheless does 
so, and the husband taking up a switch, tells her if she repeat it again, he will strike her, 
and after this notice, she again repeats the insulting words, and he thereupon strikes her 
several blows; these are cases, in which, in our opinion, the circumstances attending the 
act, and giving rise to it, so far justify the conduct of the husband as to take from the wife 
any ground of divorce for that cause, and authorise the Court to dismiss her petition with 
the admonition, “if you will amend your manners, you may expect better treatment”; see 
Shelford on Divorce. So that there are circumstances, under which a husband may strike 
his wife with a horse-whip, or may strike her several times with a switch, so hard as to 
leave marks on her person, and these acts do not furnish sufficient ground for a divorce.  
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Iowa.130 Hunt v. Hunt (1854):  
The apparent facility with which divorces are to be obtained under the Code; the frequency 
of such applications; the rights and duties of parents in relation to their innocent, helpless 
and unfortunate offspring, and the community in which they live. The danger of a growing 
contempt for the sacredness and solemn responsibilities of the marriage contract, imperi-
ously requires that the law should be so administered by our courts, that, in addition to 
statutory facility, a greater, by construction, may not be afforded for the reckless and im-
moral to abrogate this important principle of the social compact.  
 
Smith v. Smith (1854): 
The evidence of the case establishes the fact, by the statement of the plaintiff, that he had 
been advised by an attorney that he could procure a divorce more easily in Iowa than in 
any other state; and that he had been staying in Dubuque long enough for that purpose, and 
no other; that he was on his return to the state of New York, and would never live with his 
wife again.  
In the case of Hunt v. Hunt, decided at this term, we have expressed our unwillingness to 
add to statutory facility that of loose judicial construction, to aid in the procurement of 
divorces from the marriage contract. Upon the most deliberate consideration of the subject, 
we reiterate what we expressed in that case. The family relation lies at the foundation of 
society. Upon it rests the well-being and hopes of the community. In its rights, duties and 
responsibilities are involved the dearest and highest interests of the state. The law, by en-
actment and due administration, should cherish and guard it with sacred fidelity. Otherwise, 
instead of being the legitimate means of individual and general happiness and prosperity, 
it will be perverted, and become the fruitful source of misery and ruin. It is the duty of our 
judicial tribunals to expound faithfully the enactments of the legislature, and give them due 
effect by legal execution. This we will do; but in the absence of legislative provisions re-
quiring it of us, we are not ambitious to establish for Iowa, by judicial construction, the 
humbling distinction of being “the state in which a divorce can be most easily obtained.” 
The effect would be to make our young state the receptacle of those who are regardless of 
domestic and social virtue, and her laws the instrument of wrong, by depriving the innocent 
and unsuspecting of their rights. 
 
 Pinkney v. Pinkney (1854): 
Our Code, §1482, provides for an eighth cause of divorce: “When it shall be made fully 
apparent that the parties cannot live in peace and happiness together, and that their welfare 
requires a separation.” There are no facts or circumstances stated in the petition that can 
render the above conclusion “fully apparent,” and applicable to the present parties. There 
is no averment of act, conduct, or disposition of the wife to justify the inference that the 
parties cannot live in peace and happiness together, or that their welfare requires a separa-
tion.  
A party seeking a divorce, under this head, should state something more than the conclu-
sion sought. He should allege his foundation, make out his case, state facts and reasons 
                                                 
130 For completeness, this footnote lists the other Iowa cases that made tangential reference to the omnibus clause. In Russell v. 
Russell (4 G. Greene 26, 1853, Iowa), the lower court had granted a divorce using the omnibus clause. Likewise in Jolly v. Jolly (1 
Iowa 9, 1855), one of the alleged causes of the divorce suit was the omnibus clause. But in both Russell and Jolly, the Iowa Supreme 
Court said nothing whatsoever about the omnibus clause.  
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sufficient to make the conclusion “fully apparent” to the court, that the peace, happiness 
and welfare of the parties render it necessary to sever the bonds of matrimony.  
The petition should not only distinctly state the facts constituting the cause of divorce, but 
it should also show, prima facie, that complainant is the injured party, in order to admit 
proof of these essential facts, before the court should decree a divorce by default.  
A law so unusual, so relaxing in its influence upon the sacred obligations of marital con-
tracts, should not be loosely administered, nor should the petition under it be bolstered up 
by latitudinarian intendment. 
 
Hinds v. Hinds (1855) was not cited in the main text. Hinds concerned two issues. The first was 
whether Mrs. Hinds had been a bona fide resident of Iowa. The second concerned the omnibus 
clause. The Court ruled that Mrs. Hinds had not been a bona fide resident. And thus, “This view 
renders an examination of the other part of the case unnecessary.” Nonetheless, the Court did make 
a few remarks that might shed some light on its interpretation of the omnibus clause: 
But further, in considering the context, let us look at the eighth cause for a divorce under 
the Code, and the one relied upon in this case. It must be “fully apparent to the court that 
the parties cannot live in peace and happiness,” &c. The court, as we apprehend, is not to 
be satisfied that in years and months past the parties could not live together in peace and 
happiness. The whole past may have been condoned and buried. It has reference to their 
ability to so live at the time of making the application, in determining which much aid 
might be gathered, it is true, from their previous conduct and happiness. But if the husband 
can leave the wife, or the wife the husband, and come to our state, board at hotels, and visit 
any and everywhere within and without the state, and no reliable means are afforded for 
showing the true character of the applicant, as you could in the case of the bona fide resi-
dent, how could it ever be said that the parties could not, at the time, live in peace and 
happiness together. 
I do not understand the last sentence just quoted. But it seems to be suggesting that the parties 
could in fact live in peace and happiness together. And thus a divorce should not, in any case, be 
granted. 
Lyster v. Lyster (1855): 
The law requires that the court shall be satisfied; that it “shall be made fully apparent to 
the court, that the parties cannot live together in peace and happiness,” and not that the 
parties shall be satisfied. 
 
Inskeep v. Inskeep (1857): 
there may be cases where the court would be satisfied that the parties could not live in 
peace and happiness together, and at the same time, it might not be apparent that their 
welfare required their separation. But, as already stated, the chancellor must be satisfied of 
both these things before the divorce should be decreed. 
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Another thing is observable, from the language used in this section, and that is, that these 
things must be made fully apparent to the court. They are not left to be determined or 
judged of by the parties, but by the court. And the chancellor is not to dissolve the relation, 
upon the mere clamor of the parties, nor upon his mere supposition that they cannot live 
together in peace and happiness, but it must be made fully apparent—he must be fully 
satisfied that what is charged, in this respect, is true. Under the statute, the power given to 
the court is not the exercise of a discretion arbitrary in its character; but it must be exercised 
in a sound and legal manner. 
… in all cases the court should be satisfied that the parties have, in good faith, endeavored 
to overcome such incompatibility of disposition—have, in sincerity and in truth, made the 
effort to banish discord and disquiet from their home, and that there is the absence of any-
thing like collusion. The fault, whether mutual or on the part of one, must be real and 
substantial—one which no reasonable effort could eradicate—and not an inconsiderable 
one, or one which would yield to the genial influences of kindness and affection. 
 
Maine. Ricker v. Ricker (1849) is reproduced in full here:  
The enactment of 1847 was not intended to repeal any part of ch. 89, of the R. S. It only 
introduced some classes of causes which should justify a divorce, which were not embraced 
in the former law. That law was not altered as to causes of divorce, which had already been 
prescribed.  
If all the facts alleged in the libel, are to be considered as proved, they, at most, only show 
a desertion; and that desertion was much less than the five years continuance, required by 
the R. S.         Libel dismissed. 
 
Jay v. East Livermore (1868). 
The Legislature has seen fit to give to this Court an almost unlimited power to grant di-
vorces. This authority is only limited by the requirement that, in the judgment of the Justice 
presiding, the granting of the divorce would be “reasonable and proper, conducive to do-
mestic harmony,” &c. 
 
Stilphen v. Stilphen (1870): 
The very act which repealed the former enumeration, reaffirmed the power of the court to 
grant a divorce in any case and for any cause (except where both parties had been guilty of 
adultery, or were guilty of collusion), if the same should be deemed reasonable and proper, 
etc. Act of 1850, c. 171. 
 
Minnesota. True v. True (1861): 
The contract of marriage differs from all other contracts, in being indissoluble by the action 
of the parties to it, and of perpetually binding obligation until discharged by a competent 
court. It is the most important of the social relations. It is sanctioned by Divine authority, 
and recognized by all Christian nations as the palladium of virtue, morality, social order, 
and the permanent happiness of the human race. To its auspicious influence may be traced 
the great advances made in civilization, through the elevation of woman to social equality, 
the education of children, the refinement of manners, the improved sense of justice, the 
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enlightened cultivation of the arts, and the physical development of man; and, above all, is 
it valuable as awakening in the human heart those chaste and exalted conceptions of virtue, 
which, in spiritualizing the mind, and subduing the grosser passions of men, give moral 
character and grandeur to the state. It is the only lawful relation for the continuance of the 
species, and the perpetuity of the choicest benefits permitted by Providence to the enjoy-
ment of man, and as such should engage the most profound solicitude of the legislator and 
the courts, to preserve it unsullied in its purity, and transmit it to posterity with its integrity 
unimpaired.  
It is not pretended, that by the mere consent of the parties the marriage contract may be 
dissolved, and it is for us to determine whether the same end may be attained by the mere 
form of a statement of the facts charged in a complaint by one of the parties, and the con-
fession of them by the other, without any further proof. 
… In 1855, to meet a particular case, the legislature (as we think subsequent events have 
fairly proven) improvidently added the following clause to the law: “When it shall be made 
fully to appear, that from any other reason or causes existing, the parties cannot live in 
peace and happiness together, and that their welfare requires a separation.” Comp. Stat., 
463, § 7. It is not for us to criticise, but to expound and apply. This section has been gravely 
quoted in other cases, as showing the intention of the legislature to be the encouragement 
of divorces, by affording unusual facilities for their attainment; but while we concede that 
it allows the courts a wide field for the exercise of discretion in determining such causes, 
we do not think it in any manner relaxes the rules by which such applications should be 
scrutinized, and such relief administered. 
 
Louisiana. Strangely enough, it would be a reported New York Supreme Court case that made 
the most substantial ruling with regards Louisiana’s omnibus clause. In Hunt v. Hunt (1877),131 
the appellant claimed that Louisiana’s omnibus clause was unconstitutional. This claim was re-
jected. Even though the decision of one state’s Supreme Court is not binding on the courts of 
another state, it is nonetheless plausible that the Louisiana Supreme Court would have come to the 
same conclusion as the New York Supreme Court.  
                                                 
131 Hunt v. Hunt (16 Hun. 622, 1877, New York). 
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8 Appendix: Replicas of Table III.3 
TABLE III.4—REPLICA OF TABLE III.3, EXCEPT THAT ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ARE USED INSTEAD 
Variables marked with 
# are continuous and 
measured in years. All 
others are indicators.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basic Drop Utah Same as (1),  Same as (2), 
Specification for 1876-77 but log but log 
Omnibus clause 306** (135) 188* (97) 0.598** (0.289) 0.560* (0.292) 
Weak omnibus clause 383 (544) 664 (457) 1.333 (2.204) 1.424 (2.181) 
Adultery 111 (356) -45 (295) 0.545 (1.075) 0.493 (1.07) 
Crime 88 (122) 154 (113) 0.520** (0.197) 0.541*** (0.196) 
Cruelty -31 (330) 138 (264) 0.068 (1.126) 0.124 (1.122) 
Desertion -56 (120) -110 (106) 0.908* (0.485) 0.890* (0.498) 
Insanity -7 (99) 0 (95) -0.057 (0.071) -0.055 (0.070) 
Intemperance 319 (234) 161 (190) 0.579 (0.380) 0.527 (0.384) 
Immoral 181 (125) 132* (76) 0.055 (0.295) 0.039 (0.300) 
Mental cruelty -369 (341) -8 (230) 0.163 (0.521) 0.281 (0.533) 
Neglect -78 (332) 33 (292) -0.043 (0.442) -0.007 (0.444) 
Religion (e.g. Shakers) 444 (505) 299 (405) 0.109 (1.137) 0.062 (1.136) 
Voluntary separation 871* (444) 670* (365) 0.177 (1.803) 0.112 (1.787) 
Cruelty only for wives 191 (173) 118 (153) 0.446* (0.253) 0.422* (0.248) 
Duration of desertion #  -20 (32) 1 (26) -0.236* (0.126) -0.229* (0.123) 
Intemperance only for 
wives -86 (110) -108 (109) 0.035 (0.211) 0.028 (0.211) 
Duration of neglect # 127 (126) 99 (110) 0.451 (0.288) 0.442 (0.288) 
Duration of Vol. Sep. # -110** (45) -85** (36) -0.058 (0.18) -0.050 (0.179) 
Bigamy -104 (82) -130 (82) 0.037 (0.163) 0.028 (0.161) 
Consanguinity 467*** (95) 463*** (87) 0.271 (0.178) 0.270 (0.175) 
Fraud 159*** (58) 119*** (34) -0.893*** (0.076) -0.905*** (0.075) 
Impotency 31 (128) -22 (95) -0.085 (0.179) -0.102 (0.178) 
Nonage -705* (381) -861** (334) -0.483 (1.454) -0.533 (1.442) 
Other Incapacity 218 (432) 437 (375) -1.235 (1.746) -1.163 (1.727) 
Pregnant -225 (181) -307* (171) -0.184 (0.386) -0.211 (0.386) 
Residency requirement  -205 (137) -122 (101) -0.071 (0.237) -0.044 (0.233) 
Duration of res. req. #  -24 (55) -10 (46) -0.044 (0.134) -0.039 (0.132) 
Recrimination 406 (366) -28 (230) -0.346 (0.666) -0.487 (0.675) 
Collusion/connivance 266 (345) 30 (300) 1.240 (0.844) 1.163 (0.837) 
Condonation -815* (419) -575 (350) -1.118 (1.411) -1.040 (1.411) 
Recrimination only for 
adultery -417 (355) 10 (222) 0.091 (0.614) 0.230 (0.622) 
Recrimination only for 
same fault -256 (521) 398 (348) -0.224 (1.215) -0.010 (1.207) 
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Recrimination is dis-
cretionary  -241 (686) 299 (498) 2.345 (1.516) 2.521 (1.524) 
Collusion/connivance 
only for adultery 300 (296) 426 (256) 0.368 (1.111) 0.409 (1.101) 
Condonation only for 
adultery 452 (474) 206 (376) 0.152 (0.896) 0.072 (0.904) 
Limited divorce -78 (61) -56 (51) -0.115 (0.153) -0.108 (0.154) 
Limited divorce is 
convertible to divorce 383 (704) 99 (595) 2.157 (1.931) 2.064 (1.938) 
Waiting period before 
limited divorce can be 
converted #  
-167 (230) -63 (193) -0.628 (0.645) -0.594 (0.647) 
Interlocutory period -119 (155) -288*** (97) -0.348 (0.362) -0.403 (0.372) 
Duration of interlocu-
tory period # -321** (159) -197 (131) -1.043* (0.547) -1.002* (0.545) 
Not a state -467*** (132) -482*** (129) 0.025 (0.155) 0.020 (0.155) 
No ban on legislative 
divorce  293*** (37) 292*** (35) -0.063 (0.047) -0.063 (0.047) 
Ambiguous as to 
whether there is a ban 
on legislative divorce  
234*** (58) 195*** (38) 0.304*** (0.082) 0.291*** (0.081) 
Public defender re-
quirement -222** (94) -197** (76) -0.557 (0.399) -0.548 (0.396) 
R²  0.7347 0.8317 0.7804 0.8085 
Observations 1920 1918 1920 1918 
Dependent Variable    
Mean 639 633 6.134 6.131 
Standard Deviation 462 421 1.004 1.001 
Specifications (I)-(IV) are the same as (1)-(4) except that the 42 regressors other than omnibus clauses are 
dropped. 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Omnibus clause 438* (245) 256** (109) 0.614** (0.280) 0.550** (0.259) 
Weak omnibus clause -339*** (31) -329*** (27) -0.147** (0.056) -0.144** (0.055) 
R²  0.6786 0.7804 0.6421 0.7177 
Notes: This table is an exact replica of Table III.3, except that the method of Ordinary Least Squares is used. Notes 
from that table apply here. 
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TABLE III.5—REPLICA OF TABLE III.3, EXCEPT THAT DEFECTIVE COUNTY-YEAR OBSERVATIONS ARE NOT DROPPED 
Variables marked with 
# are continuous and 
measured in years. All 
others are indicators.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basic Drop Utah Same as (1),  Same as (2), 
Specification for 1876-77 but log but log 
Omnibus clause 76 (109) 29 (77) 0.423** (0.193) 0.408** (0.187) 
Weak omnibus clause 370 (506) 437 (436) 0.801 (3.469) 0.821 (3.440) 
Adultery -134 (382) -297 (317) 1.797** (0.790) 1.747** (0.797) 
Crime 79 (120) 111 (122) 0.469*** (0.100) 0.479*** (0.101) 
Cruelty 132 (376) 286 (301) -1.023* (0.554) -0.975* (0.570) 
Desertion -173 (163) -209 (159) 0.766** (0.335) 0.755** (0.335) 
Insanity -141 (104) -136 (102) -0.076 (0.077) -0.074 (0.077) 
Intemperance 314* (184) 180** (89) 0.503* (0.268) 0.462 (0.283) 
Immoral 278*** (98) 230*** (55) 0.261 (0.202) 0.246 (0.198) 
Mental cruelty -250 (299) -62 (175) 0.089 (0.475) 0.147 (0.471) 
Neglect 55 (228) 148 (175) -0.436 (0.500) -0.408 (0.505) 
Religion (e.g. Shakers) 481 (399) 459 (350) -1.083 (0.819) -1.090 (0.827) 
Voluntary separation 487 (552) 445 (511) -2.501*** (0.884) -2.513*** (0.887) 
Cruelty only for wives 153 (191) 113 (185) 0.284 (0.228) 0.272 (0.227) 
Duration of desertion #  22 (26) 31 (24) -0.089 (0.059) -0.086 (0.059) 
Intemperance only for 
wives -33 (72) -34 (71) -0.049 (0.086) -0.050 (0.085) 
Duration of neglect # 82 (95) 35 (72) 0.530** (0.243) 0.515** (0.244) 
Duration of Vol. Sep. # -64 (57) -55 (53) 0.198** (0.09) 0.200** (0.090) 
Bigamy -88 (68) -102 (67) 0.400 (0.322) 0.396 (0.320) 
Consanguinity 336*** (52) 343*** (50) -0.212 (0.324) -0.210 (0.322) 
Fraud 82 (51) 78 (50) -1.027*** (0.117) -1.029*** (0.117) 
Impotency -64 (69) -70 (61) -0.098 (0.170) -0.100 (0.171) 
Nonage -835** (340) -837*** (306) 0.129 (1.829) 0.129 (1.813) 
Other Incapacity 338 (327) 375 (319) 0.212 (0.541) 0.223 (0.538) 
Pregnant -171** (80) -196** (76) 0.202 (0.135) 0.195 (0.135) 
Residency requirement  -186** (73) -150** (66) -0.126 (0.150) -0.115 (0.154) 
Duration of res. req. #  -4 (37) -1 (36) 0.125 (0.122) 0.126 (0.123) 
Recrimination -174 (292) -367** (167) -1.029** (0.472) -1.088** (0.469) 
Collusion/connivance 492* (264) 400 (241) 1.140 (0.681) 1.112 (0.682) 
Condonation -622 (422) -483 (361) -1.250 (1.835) -1.207 (1.825) 
Recrimination only for 
adultery 84 (294) 276 (170) 0.608 (0.437) 0.667 (0.434) 
Recrimination only for 
same fault 324 (338) 576*** (194) 0.781 (0.695) 0.859 (0.697) 
Recrimination is dis-
cretionary  193 (554) 429 (378) 1.570 (1.968) 1.643 (1.957) 
Collusion/connivance 
only for adultery 101 (260) 147 (215) 0.392 (1.757) 0.406 (1.744) 
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Condonation only for 
adultery 235 (348) 139 (270) -0.659 (0.745) -0.689 (0.745) 
Limited divorce 54 (82) 56 (80) 0.009 (0.100) 0.010 (0.100) 
Limited divorce is 
convertible to divorce 520 (616) 155 (493) 2.849** (1.357) 2.736** (1.353) 
Waiting period before 
limited divorce can be 
converted #  
-175 (205) -49 (161) -0.820* (0.448) -0.782* (0.446) 
Interlocutory period -210 (155) -336*** (76) -0.364 (0.238) -0.402* (0.237) 
Duration of interlocu-
tory period # -238 (163) -126 (111) -0.606** (0.279) -0.572** (0.277) 
Not a state -500** (194) -549*** (175) -0.152 (0.138) -0.167 (0.132) 
No ban on legislative 
divorce  261*** (49) 261*** (49) -0.033 (0.045) -0.033 (0.045) 
Ambiguous as to 
whether there is a ban 
on legislative divorce  
174*** (64) 169** (63) 0.248* (0.123) 0.246* (0.123) 
Public defender re-
quirement -72 (55) -84 (54) 0.011 (0.132) 0.007 (0.133) 
R²  0.8724 0.8934 0.9356 0.9360 
Observations 1923 1921 1923 1921 
Dependent Variable    
Mean 546 546 6.043 6.043 
Standard Deviation 367 362 0.799 0.799 
Specifications (I)-(IV) are the same as (1)-(4) except that the 42 regressors other than omnibus clauses are 
dropped. 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Omnibus clause 83 (95) 52 (83) 0.187 (0.205) 0.175 (0.205) 
Weak omnibus clause -360*** (39) -359*** (39) -0.494*** (0.052) -0.494*** (0.052) 
R²  0.8386 0.8603 0.8962 0.8969 
Notes: This table is an exact replica of Table III.3, except that defective county-year observations are not dropped. 
Notes from that table apply here. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Revealed Relative Utilitarianism132 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Revealed Preference Approach to Welfare Judgments 
Welfare judgments are ubiquitous in economics. One of the most prominent welfare functions 
is the utilitarian welfare function, according to which welfare equals a weighted sum of individuals’ 
utilities. There are several approaches to understanding and justifying utilitarianism in economics. 
For this paper the difference between two particular such approaches is important. The first ap-
proach is to assume that, when making welfare judgments, we are given not only individuals’ 
ranking of alternatives, but also some information about interpersonal comparisons of utility. That 
is, the input into the welfare judgments, or mathematically speaking the argument of the welfare 
function, includes interpersonal comparisons. Examples of this approach are papers by 
d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) and Maskin (1978).133 
The second approach to the justification of utilitarianism only uses individual preferences as 
input into the social welfare assessment. This approach originates with Harsanyi (1955). Harsanyi 
assumed every individual in society to have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences regarding all 
lotteries over a given set of alternatives. Society’s preference over lotteries is also assumed to 
satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. In this setting, utilitarianism means that any Ber-
noulli utility function representing society’s preferences is a weighted sum of Bernoulli utility 
functions representing the individuals’ preferences.134 Harsanyi showed that utilitarianism in this 
                                                 
132 This chapter is co-authored with Tilman Börgers. We are grateful to Lars Ehlers for comments and to Philippe Mongin and 
John Weymark for pointers regarding the formal literature on utilitarianism. We owe special thanks to Jim Belk who suggested to 
us the idea on which the proof of Proposition 3 is built. 
133 Mongin (1994) derives the set of possible interpersonal comparisons of utility from more elementary axioms. 
134 It has been disputed that Harsanyi’s (1955) is “really” about utilitarianism because it treats utility functions only as repre-
sentations of ordinal preferences rather than as primitive concepts (see Weymark’s (1991) review of the Harsanyi-Sen debate). For 
simplicity, we shall ignore this issue in this paper. 
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sense is implied by a simple “indifference axiom”: if all individuals are indifferent between two 
lotteries, then so should society be.135 Importantly, the indifference axiom is a single profile axiom, 
that is, it can be checked for every profile of preferences separately. The indifference axiom im-
plies no restrictions across preference profiles. Also, of course, the indifference axiom does not 
pin down the weights assigned to different individuals’ utility functions. The weights may even be 
negative, although this is easily ruled out by strengthening the indifference axiom to a Pareto ax-
iom.136  
But even with strictly positive weights, the weights don’t need to be equal for different individ-
uals, and the weights may depend on the preference profile that is considered. Thus, individual 1 
may always receive particularly high weight. Alternatively, an individual who ranks alternative a 
over alternative b may be considered to display “bad taste” and therefore may receive low weight 
(unless all individuals rank a over b.) In this way, the welfare function may incorporate a form of 
“paternalism.” Also an individual whose preferences deviate particularly strongly from those of 
all others may receive a particularly high weight, which might be justified as a form of “minority 
protection.” All of this is allowed by Harsanyi’s theorem. 
“Relative utilitarianism” is one way to go further, and to come up with a single welfare defini-
tion. Relative utilitarianism defines welfare to be the sum of agents’ Bernoulli utilities where all 
agents have the same weight, and where agents’ Bernoulli utility functions are normalized so that 
each individual’s utility function assigns utility 0 to this individual’s least preferred outcome and 
utility 1 to this individual’s most preferred outcome. The subject of this paper is the axiomatic 
basis of relative utilitarianism. 
To develop this axiomatic perspective we adopt a “revealed preference” approach to welfare 
judgments. Suppose we observed sufficiently many choices of each member of society to infer 
their preferences, and also sufficiently many choices of a “social planner” to infer the planner’s 
preferences. Suppose all these preferences satisfied the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. As-
sume also that we made observations not just for one profile of individuals’ preferences but for 
many. And finally, imagine that we knew that the social planner, when choosing, knew the profile 
                                                 
135 Note that this argument is different from the justification of utilitarianism as the rational choice criterion for a fictitious 
observer choosing behind the veil of ignorance, that is, not knowing which individual she herself will be in society. This justification 
was proposed by Harsanyi (1953). In the setting of Harsanyi’s (1953) paper, an axiomatization of the welfare definition that we 
discuss in this paper, “relative utilitarianism,” was provided by Karni (1998). 
136 For a modern statement and proof of Harsanyi’s theorem, and of versions of the theorem with the indifference axiom 
strengthened to a variety of Pareto axioms, see Weymark (1994). 
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of individuals’ preferences, and that his choices satisfy a strengthened version of Harsanyi’s indif-
ference axiom, namely a Pareto axiom. Then the social planner’s choices reveal, in a sense that we 
shall make precise, for every preference profile how much weight the planner assigns to any par-
ticular individual in comparison to any other individual. More precisely, we shall introduce a con-
cept of the social planner’s “marginal rates of substitution” between any individual i and j’s most 
preferred alternative, and explain how these marginal rates of substitution are revealed by the plan-
ner’s choices. We shall show that three axioms about the social planner’s choices imply that these 
marginal rates of substitution have to be equal to 1 for all preference profiles, and we shall infer 
from that that the planner’s choices must reveal a relative utilitarian welfare function.  
We can now re-phrase the difference between the two approaches to justifying utilitarianism 
that we distinguished above. While in the first approach, comparisons among individuals’ utilities 
are taken as input into the welfare judgment, in the second approach the weight of different indi-
viduals in the welfare function are revealed by the planner’s choices. We don’t model what these 
comparisons are based on. Indeed, we don’t ask how these comparisons “should” be made. Our 
approach is positive, not normative: if the planner’s choices satisfy a certain set of axioms, then 
the planner’s choices will reveal relative utilitarianism. 
1.2 Axioms for Revealed Relative Utilitarianism 
As we mentioned above, the key concept in our axiomatization of relative utilitarianism are the 
“marginal rates of substitutions” of the welfare function. The “marginal rates of substitution” are 
defined for a given profile of individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and are derived 
from the social planner’s von Neumann-Morgenstern preference that corresponds to this profile. 
We assume that the social planner’s preference satisfies a Pareto axiom. The marginal rate of sub-
stitution between agents i and j is then the answer to the following question: To keep the social 
planner indifferent, how much probability of agent i’s most preferred alternative must be shifted 
to his least preferred alternative, if “one small unit of probability” is shifted from agent j’s least 
preferred alternative to his most preferred alternative? In this question we assume implicitly that 
the shift in probabilities from agent i’s most preferred alternative to his least preferred alternatives 
does not affect the utility of agents other than i, and we make the same implicit assumption for 
agent j. Using a theorem due to Weymark (1994) we show that, when the preference profiles sat-
isfies a condition that is called the “Independent Prospects” condition, this is a well-defined 
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thought experiment for all i and j, and for every pair of i and j there is a unique number that is the 
answer to our question. 
We then consider a social planner who assigns to many profiles of individuals’ preferences a 
social preference that satisfies the Pareto axiom. Whenever the profile of individuals’ preferences 
satisfies the Independent Prospects condition, then the planner’s preference reveals a complete set 
of pairwise marginal rates of substitutions. The axioms that we study in this paper address how 
these marginal rates of substitution are allowed to change as individuals’ preferences change. 
When the social preference can be represented by the relative utilitarian welfare function, then the 
marginal rates of substitution equal 1, regardless of individuals’ preferences. The objective of our 
analysis is to derive this as a conclusion from more elementary axioms. 
The key axiom is a separability axiom. It requires that the marginal rate of substitution between 
the probabilities of agent i’s and agent j’s most preferred alternatives only depends on agent i and 
agent j’s preferences, not on other agents’ preferences. Any preference that satisfies (i) a Pareto 
axiom and (ii) the separability axiom can be represented as the sum of 0-1 normalized Bernoulli 
utilities such that each agent’s weight depends only on that agent’s preference, and not on the other 
agents’ preferences. Separability thus rules out in particular that an agent’s weight depends on the 
comparison between her preference and other agents’ preferences, as in the “minority protection” 
example that we offered above. 
We then add the “invariance axiom.” This axiom requires that the marginal rates of substitution 
between probabilities of agents’ most preferred alternatives do not change when a change in agents’ 
preferences concerns only alternatives which all agents regard as equivalent to lotteries over the 
other alternatives, and which are thus “redundant.” What changes in these cases is only agents’ 
views of which lotteries the redundant alternatives are equivalent to. Such a change is required by 
our axiom not to affect the marginal rates of substitution. A short argument that is conceptually 
and mathematically not very deep shows that the invariance axiom has a surprisingly strong im-
plication if the domain of preferences that is considered is sufficiently rich. It then implies that in 
the representation of social welfare as the sum of 0-1 normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ities each agent’s weight must be constant, and not vary with the preference profile at all. Thus, in 
particular, the invariance axiom rules out the paternalism example that we offered above. 
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The final step of the argument is simple. We add an anonymity axiom, which requires that all 
agents are treated symmetrically. We then conclude that all agents’ weights have to be equal, and 
thus that social welfare has to be relative utilitarian. 
It is of technical importance for our analysis that we restrict our argument to a sub-domain of 
the space of all profiles of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. For example, we only consider 
preference profiles that satisfy the “Independent Prospects” condition mentioned earlier. There 
will be other constraints on the sub-domain that we are considering. In fact, this sub-domain is not 
explicitly constructed in the paper. Instead we list in the paper all properties of the sub-domain 
that we make use of, and we construct the sub-domain explicitly in the appendix. The sub-domain 
is in a natural sense “dense” in the universal domain, if we exclude from the universal domain all 
profiles in which some individual is completely indifferent between all alternatives. The construc-
tion of the sub-domain is somewhat artificial. Whether there is a natural axiomatization of relative 
utilitarianism on the domain of all profiles of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences is an open 
question.  
We will be able to construct the sub-domain of preferences for which our results holds only 
under restrictive assumptions regarding the number of agents and alternatives. Specifically, we 
require that there are at least three agents, and that the number of alternatives is more than six 
times the number of agents. The paper will make clear that the assumptions that there are more 
alternatives than agents, and that there are at least three agents, are made for transparent conceptual 
reasons. The final assumption that the number of alternatives exceeds the number of agents by a 
factor of more than six is made for purely mathematical reasons which the appendix clarifies. That 
there are many more alternatives than agents seems not unreasonable: there are probably many 
more possible income tax codes than there are citizens of the United States. 
1.3 Relation with Dhillon and Mertens’s Axiomatization of Relative Utilitarianism 
Our axiomatization of relative utilitarianism is closely related to the axiomatization in Dhillon 
(1998). Our three axioms are in fact very similar to the three axioms that Dhillon uses.137 Dhillon 
derives the separability axiom from a more complicated axiom, the “extended Pareto axiom,” that 
can only be formulated in a richer framework than the one we consider here. This richer framework 
                                                 
137 Dhillon introduces a fourth axiom, “neutrality,” but never uses it. 
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considers the aggregation of preferences in groups of different size. It is easy to see that the ex-
tended Pareto axiom implies the separability axiom (see our discussion following Definition 6). 
Using separability directly makes our paper much simpler than it would otherwise be. 
Unlike Dhillon, we adopt a revealed preference approach to social welfare. In particular, we 
use throughout the new concept of revealed marginal rates of substitution of a social welfare func-
tion. The introduction of this concept is another factor that allows us to provide much simpler and 
more transparent proofs than Dhillon offered. Our approach of considering, as we mentioned ear-
lier, only a sub-domain of the full domain of preferences also contributes to the simplification that 
we achieve in this paper. Dhillon works with the full domain, and, remarkably, does not use any 
continuity axiom.138 
A paper that is closely related to Dhillon (1998) is Dhillon and Mertens (1999). They offer an 
axiomatization of relative utilitarianism that differs from Dhillon’s by replacing the extended Pa-
reto axiom by a very weak “monotonicity” axiom, and then requiring continuity of the social wel-
fare function.139 Unfortunately, the role of continuity in this paper is quite opaque. If continuity is 
not assumed, Dhillon and Mertens’s axioms allow, for example, the weights of any one individual 
to depend on the number of other individuals with the same preferences.140 
1.4 Historical Notes 
Our interpretation of welfare theory as a theory of the revealed preferences of a fictitious social 
planner echoes language used by Harsanyi when summarized the conclusion of his 1955 paper 
thus: “In the same way as ... it has been shown that a rational man ... must act as if he ascribed 
numerical subjective probabilities to all alternative hypotheses ... --- so in welfare economics we 
have also found that a rational man ... must likewise act as if he made quantitative interpersonal 
comparisons of utility...” (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 321). 
 
                                                 
138 Unfortunately, Dhillon (1998) contains errors that affect both the statement of the main result its proof. We elaborate on 
this in Appendix G. We do not know whether statement and proof of the main result in Dhillon (1998) can be repaired. 
139 The continuity notion that Dhillon and Mertens use is intricate. It needs to be, because with a more simple notion of conti-
nuity, Chichilnisky’s (1985) impossibility result that we mention below would apply. 
140 See the example on page 485 in Dhillon and Mertens (1999), which they use to illustrate that the continuity axiom cannot 
be dropped from the theorem. This example also disproves the assertion of Dhillon and Mertens on page 483 of their paper that 
monotonicity implies separability, where separability is meant to mean that an individual’s weight may only depend on that indi-
vidual’s preferences, and not other agents’ preferences. 
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Harsanyi (1955) discussed in detail an earlier paper by Fleming (1952) that also provided axi-
omatic foundations for weighted utilitarianism, interpreting his own work as reaching the same 
conclusion as Fleming’s but with weaker axioms. Harsanyi thought that the main difference be-
tween his and Fleming’ s framework that made it possible to drop axioms was that he considered 
lotteries as outcomes, while Fleming did not, and then could assume that individual and social 
preferences satisfied the von Neumann-Morgenstern postulates. However, Harsanyi obtained a 
weaker conclusion than Fleming, namely only a single profile theorem, whereas Fleming’s theo-
rem was a multi-profile theorem.141 Interestingly, the axiom that Harsanyi dropped142 was a sepa-
rability axiom that is quite similar to the separability axiom that we use. One might thus view our 
work as integrating Fleming’s and Harsanyi’s approaches. 
1.5 Related Literature 
The invariance axiom in this paper is related to, but much weaker, than Arrow’s (1951) “inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives.” The main difference between these axioms concerns  what is 
regarded as an irrelevant alternative. According to Arrow’s axiom, for the comparison of any two 
alternatives, all other alternatives are irrelevant. By contrast, according to the invariance axiom, 
for the social preferences over all alternatives, only those alternatives are regarded as irrelevant 
for which all agents agree that they are equivalent to lotteries over the given subset. 
If, instead of the invariance axiom, Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom were 
used, one would obtain versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This is not completely obvious 
because we are considering a social welfare function with a smaller domain than Arrow’s (1951) 
social welfare function. Arrow considers a “full” domain, whereas we only consider expected util-
ity preferences. But it was shown by Sen (1970, Theorem 8*2) that Arrow’s theorem remains valid 
on this restricted domain. Stronger versions of Sen’s result were shown by Kalai and Schmeidler 
(1977) and Hylland (1980). This literature sometimes refers to “cardinal utilities” rather than Ber-
noulli utilities, but the results that we have quoted, even if they refer to cardinal utilities, can also 
be interpreted as results about Bernoulli utilities. Note that these results imply that relative utili-
tarianism does not satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
 
                                                 
141 In a comment on Harsanyi’s paper, Fleming (1957) does not raise the issue of single-profile vs. multi-profile results. 
142 Although Harsanyi argued for the plausibility of the axiom (Harsanyi, 1955, pp. 310-312). 
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Chichilnisky (1985) proved another impossibility result in this area, namely the non-existence 
of a continuous aggregation rule for von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences that also respects 
unanimity and that is anonymous. Notice that relative utilitarianism is not continuous. For example, 
if agent 1’s Bernoulli utility over three alternatives is given by the vector (1,0.5 – ε, 0), and agent 
2’s Bernoulli utility for the same three alternatives is (0, 0.5(1 + ε), 1), then for every ε > 0 the sum 
of these two utility vectors is (1, 1 + 0.5ε, 1), which corresponds to the same preferences as the 
vector (1, 2, 1), but in the limit, as ε → 0, the sum of the utility vectors corresponds to complete 
indifference. In our development here, we shall not impose any continuity requirements. 
Dhillon and Mertens (1997) proved another impossibility result in this area. They showed that 
the Pareto axiom and a strong form of monotonicity cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Note that 
this result implies that relative utilitarianism does not satisfy this strong form of monotonicity.  
An axiomatization of relative utilitarianism that is very different from the one pursued in this 
paper was provided by Segal (2000). Whereas this paper follows Arrow’s (1951) approach and 
considers for a variety of lists of individuals’ preferences how welfare is defined, holding the set 
of alternatives constant, Segal considers for a variety of sets of alternatives how welfare is defined, 
holding the individuals’ preferences fixed. 
1.6 Outline of the Paper 
We proceed as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we review Harsanyi’s (1955) aggregation theorem, 
and explain how a social preference that satisfies a Pareto Axiom reveals the marginal rates of 
substitution between the probabilities of different agents’ most preferred alternatives. In Section 4 
we extend the framework and consider multi-profile social welfare functions. In Sections 5, 6, and 
7 we successively introduce the three axioms which characterize relative utilitarianism, and dis-
cuss each axiom’s implications. As we develop our argument, we shall make three assumptions 
regarding the domain of the social welfare function. These assumptions greatly simplify our argu-
ments. In Section 8 we provide a result that asserts the existence of a domain that satisfies our 
assumptions, and that is dense in the set of all preference profiles that satisfy von Neumann-Mor-
genstern axioms. This result is proved in an appendix. Section 9 concludes. 
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2 The Pareto Axiom 
There are a finite set of alternatives, A = {a1, a2, …, am}, and a finite set of individuals N = {1, 
2, …, n}. We assume that both n and m are at least 2. We denote the set of all lotteries over A by 
ΔA. The set of all preference orderings over ΔA that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms 
will be denoted by ℛ� . Every individual i ∈ N will be assumed to have a preference ordering ≿i ∈ 
ℛ� . We assume that no individual is indifferent between all lotteries. The set of all preference or-
derings over ΔA that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and that are not indifferent 
between all lotteries will be denoted by ℛ. Thus, ≿i ∈ ℛ for all i ∈ N. The assumption that no 
individual is indifferent between all alternatives is very mild. Individuals who are indifferent be-
tween all alternatives could arguably be dropped from the analysis. The strict preference derived 
from ≿i will be denoted by ≻i, and the indifference relation derived from ≿i will be denoted by ∼i. 
In this and the next section we take as given and fixed a profile ∼ = (≿i)i ∈ N ∈ ℛ𝑛𝑛  of prefer-
ences, one for each individual. We seek to investigate a benevolent social planner’s preference. 
We denote this preference by ≿s. We shall also refer to ≿s as the “social preference.” We assume 
that ≿s satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. We allow for the possibility that ≿s is 
indifferent between all alternatives. Thus, ≿s ∈ ℛ� . We denote by ≻s the strict preference order 
derived from ≿s and by ∼s the indifference relation. 
 
Definition 1. The social preference ≿s satisfies the Pareto Axiom with respect to ≿ if for all p, q 
∈ ΔA:  
(i) If p ≿i  q for all i ∈ N, then p ≿s q. 
(ii) If p ≿i  q for all i ∈ N, and p ≻i q for at least one i ∈ N, then p ≻s q.  
The following proposition, which is closely related to Harsanyi’s (1955) theorem on utilitari-
anism, is the first part of Theorem 3 in Weymark (1994). 
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Theorem 1. The following two conditions are equivalent: 
(i) ≿s satisfies the Pareto axiom with respect to ≿. 
(ii) Whenever for every i ∈ N, ui: A → ℝ is a Bernoulli utility function that represents ≿i, 
and us: A → ℝ is a Bernoulli utility function that represents ≿s, then there are strictly 
positive real numbers wi for all i ∈ N, and a real number μ, such that:  
us(a) = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁  + μ for all a ∈ A. 
3 Revealed Marginal Rates of Substitution 
We now investigate for any two agents i and j whether the social preference relation ≿s reveals 
how much “relative weight” the social preference attaches to agent i’s and agent j’s preferences. 
As our approach to relative utilitarianism in this paper is purely based on preferences, and not on 
their numerical representations, we shall define this “relative weight” in terms of the preferences 
only. We shall introduce a concept called “the social preference’s marginal rate of substitution 
between agents i and j.” This marginal rate of substitution indicates how much probability of agent 
j’s most preferred alternative we can subtract and keep welfare constant if we raise the probability 
of agent i’s most preferred alternative by one unit. Here, we shall assume that all subtractions 
(additions) from (to) the probability of an agent’s most preferred alternative are accompanied by 
equal additions (subtractions) to (from) the probability of an agent’s least preferred alternative, 
and we shall assume that all agents other than i and j are indifferent towards these changes in 
probability. If this marginal rate of substitution is large, then intuitively agent i’s “relative weight” 
in comparison to agent j is large, whereas if the marginal rate of substitution is small, then intui-
tively agent i’s “relative weight” in comparison to agent j is low. 
To define marginal rates of substitution formally, we introduce some more notation. For any 
agent i ∈ N, we denote by bi one of agent i’s most preferred outcomes in A and by ℓi one of agent 
i’s least preferred outcomes in A (in each case it does not matter which one we pick, if there are 
multiple most or least preferred outcomes). For any two outcomes a, b ∈ A and for any λ ∈ [0,1] 
we write λa + (1 – λ)b for the lottery in ΔA that places probability λ on A and probability 1 – λ on 
b. Note that for any agent i ∈ N and any lottery q ∈ ΔA, because ≿i is not indifferent between all 
elements of ΔA, there is a unique number αi(q) such that q ∼i αi(q)bi + (1 – αi(q))ℓi. We can now 
define the marginal rate of substitution between agents i and j that is revealed by a social preference. 
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Definition 2. Suppose ≿ ∈ ℛN, i, j ∈ N, and i ≠ j. Let ≿s be the social preference. If there are 
lotteries p, q ∈ ΔA such that: p ∼s q, p ∼k q for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, p ≻i q, q ≻j p, then ≿s reveals that 
the marginal rate of substitution between i and j is: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝) − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝) − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗(𝑞𝑞) 
 
This definition of the revealed marginal rate of substitution is based on a movement from some 
lottery p to another lottery q. As in any definition of marginal rates of substitution we consider 
movements along a indifference curve; this is expressed in the definition by the assumption p ∼s 
q. Because we want to focus on the marginal rate of substitution between agents i and j, we require 
that all other agents are indifferent between p and q. Finally, as we are interested in how agent i’s 
and agent j’s preferences are traded off against each other, we assume that i and j have strict and 
opposite preferences over p and q. The marginal rate of substitution is then defined as the change 
in the probability of the most preferred alternative of i that is for i equivalent to the movement 
from q to p divided by the same change, reversing the order of p and q, for j. Thus, roughly speak-
ing, as we mentioned above, the marginal rate of substitution indicates by how much probability 
of agent j’s most preferred alternative we can subtract and keep welfare constant if we raise the 
probability of agent i’s most preferred alternative by one unit. 
Before we can use the concept of revealed marginal rate of substitution, we have to address 
whether such rates always exist, and whether, if they exist, they are unique. We begin with exist-
ence. Not every social preference that satisfies the Pareto axiom reveals a marginal rate of substi-
tution. Suppose, for example, that two individuals have identical preferences. Then, regardless of 
the other agents’ preferences, and regardless of what the social preference is, it will be impossible 
to reveal a marginal rate of substitution that involves either of these two individuals because lot-
teries satisfying the conditions of Definition 2 don’t exist.  
In addition to the preference profiles in the previous paragraph, there are also profiles ≿ such 
that some, but not all social preferences that satisfy the Pareto axiom reveal a marginal rate of 
substitution between i and j. Here is an example. Suppose society consists of just two individuals, 
1 and 2, and there are just two alternatives, a and b. Suppose the preference profile is such that 1 
prefers a to b but 2 prefers b to a. The social preference where society is indifferent between a and 
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b reveals that the marginal rate of substitution between 1 and 2 is 1. In contrast, the social prefer-
ence where society prefers a to b fails to reveal a marginal rate of substitution between 1 and 2, 
because there do not exist lotteries p and q such that 1 prefers the former, 2 prefers the latter, and 
society is indifferent between the two. 
We now ask: For which preference profiles ≿ does any social preference ≿s that satisfies the 
Pareto axiom reveal at least one marginal rate of substitution between i and j for all i, j ∈ N with i 
≠ j? A sufficient condition for this to be the case was introduced by Fishburn (1984), who used it 
for a slightly different purpose than we do. Weymark (1994) introduced the name “Independent 
Prospects” for this condition. One may interpret this condition as saying that for every individual 
i in society there is at least one pair of lotteries such that the difference between these lotteries is a 
private matter of that individual, and is of no concern to any other individual.  
 
Definition 3. A profile of preferences ≿ ∈ ℛn satisfies the Independent Prospects condition if for 
every i ∈ N there are lotteries pi, qi ∈ ΔA such that pi ≻i qi, and pi ∼k qi for all k ∈ N \ {i}. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose ≿ satisfies the Independent Prospects condition, and suppose that the 
social preference ≿s satisfies the Pareto axiom. Then ≿s reveals a marginal rate of substitution 
between every pair i,j ∈ N, i ≠ j of agents.  
 
Proof. Let i,j ∈ N, i ≠ j. To prove the Proposition, it suffices to construct lotteries p, q that satisfy 
the conditions in Definition 2. We start with the lotteries pi, qi, pj, qj whose existence is given by 
Definition 3. For any α ∈ [0, 0.25] let: 
𝑝𝑝(𝛼𝛼) = (0.5 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + (0.25 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + (0.25 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗.                         (1) 
𝑞𝑞(𝛼𝛼) = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + (0.5 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + (0.25 + 𝛼𝛼)𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + (0.25 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗.                         (2) 
  
If α = 0, then p(α) ≻i q(α) and p(α) ∼k q(α) for all k ≠ i, so that by the Pareto axiom, p(α) ≻s q(α). 
Conversely, if α = 0.25, then q(α) ≻j p(α) and q(α) ∼k p(α) for all k ≠ j, so that by the Pareto axiom, 
q(α) ≻s p(α). Hence, by the continuity of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, there exists 𝛼𝛼� ∈ 
(0,1) such that p(𝛼𝛼�) ∼s q(𝛼𝛼�). We now set p ≡ p(𝛼𝛼�) and q ≡ q(𝛼𝛼�). By construction p ∼s q. The claim 
is proved if we show that p ≻i q and q ≻j p. But this follows directly from the fact that 𝛼𝛼� is in the 
interior of [0, 0.25]. ∎  
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Suppose next that a social preference that satisfies the Pareto axiom does reveal at least one 
marginal rate of substitution between agents i and j. Is this marginal rate of substitution uniquely 
determined, or could several values of the marginal rate of substitution be revealed? It is one of 
the implications of the following result that the marginal rate of substitution is uniquely determined. 
But first, some notation: For any ≿i ∈ ℛ let u(≿i) denote the Bernoulli utility function that 
represents ≿i and that is normalized: u(≿i)(bi) = 1 and u(≿i)(ℓi) = 0. If it is clear from the context 
that individual i’s preference relation is ≿i, then we shall write ui(a) instead of u(≿i)(a).  
 
Proposition 2. Consider a given preference profile ≿ ∈ ℛ𝑛𝑛, and let ≿s ∈ ℛ�  be the corresponding 
social preference. Suppose that ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(≿𝑗𝑗)𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁  is a Bernoulli utility function that represents ≿s, 
where each wi ∈ ℝ++. Suppose that the social preference ≿s reveals that the marginal rate of 
substitution between i and j is MRSi,j. Then: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 . 
 
There may be multiple pairs of lotteries p, q that satisfy the conditions of Definition 2. But 
under the conditions of Proposition 2 for all such pairs of lotteries the revealed marginal rate of 
substitution equals wj  / wi, and therefore the revealed marginal rate of substitution is unique. 
 
Proof. Because the social preference is indifferent between p and q: 
 
� 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝)
𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁
= � 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘(𝑞𝑞)
𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁
                                               (3) 
 
Because agents other than i and j are indifferent between p and q, this is equivalent to:  
 
� 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘(𝑝𝑝)
𝑘𝑘∈{𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗} = � 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘(𝑞𝑞)𝑘𝑘∈{𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗}                                                (4) 
 
which simplifies to: 
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𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝) − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞)
𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖                                                            (5) 
 
Because the utility functions uk are normalized so that the utility of uk(bk) = 1 and uk(wk) = 0, we 
can replace uk(p) by αk(p) and uk(q) by αk(q) for k = i, j, and we obtain the desired result. ∎ 
4 Social Welfare Functions 
We now consider preference aggregation not only for one preference profile, but for every pref-
erence profile in some set of preference profiles. Our interest is in the full domain ℛ𝑛𝑛. But for 
most of the paper it is useful to restrict attention to a subset R  of ℛ𝑛𝑛. We won’t specify this set 
here, but rather throughout the paper we will make assumptions regarding this set as we use them, 
and in Section 8 and in the appendix we shall construct an example of a domain that satisfies all 
our assumptions. The set R  will later be assumed to be topologically dense in ℛ𝑛𝑛.  
 
Assumption 1. R  is the Cartesian product of non-empty sets of preferences for each agent. That 
is, R  = ×i ∈ N Ri, where for each i ∈ N, ∅ ≠ R i ⊂ ℛ. Moreover, every ≿ ∈ R  satisfies the 
Independent Prospects condition.  
 
Before we comment on this assumption, we define the object of our study in this paper.  
 
Definition 4. A social welfare function (SWF) is a function: φ: R  →  ℛ� . 
 
We now comment on Assumption 1. If R  were not a Cartesian product, the set of preferences 
of some agent i that we consider would depend on the preferences of all other agents. In other 
words, our study of preference aggregation would implicitly assume a form of correlation among 
agents’ preferences. We see no good intuitive reason to introduce such a correlation. Moreover, 
the Cartesian product assumption simplifies our terminology and notation and makes our main 
arguments, for example in the next section, easier to follow. On the other hand, this assumption 
complicates our construction of the set R  in the appendix. For us the transparency of the arguments 
in the main text of the paper is more important. The second part of Assumption 1 is that every ≿ 
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∈ R  satisfies the Independent Prospects condition. This will allow us to infer from the social 
preference φ(≿) unique marginal rates of substitution for each preference profile ≿ and each pair 
of agents i, j with i ≠ j. 
Our focus will be on the SWFs that satisfy the Pareto Axiom. We extend this axiom from single 
profiles to SWFs as follows.  
 
Definition 5. A SWF φ satisfies the Pareto Axiom if for all preference profiles ≿ ∈ R , the social 
preference φ(≿) satisfies the Pareto Axiom with respect to ≿. 
 
Let φ be a SWF that satisfies the Pareto Axiom. Then for every ≿ ∈ R  and all i, j ∈ N with i ≠ 
j, we can identify the revealed marginal rate of substitution for i and j. We denote these marginal 
rate of substitution by MRSi,j(≿). In the next three sections we shall consider the implications of 
three axioms regarding the marginal rates of substitution.  
5 Separability of Revealed Marginal Rates of Substitution 
Our axiomatization of relative utilitarianism will focus on the marginal rates of substitution 
revealed by a utilitarian welfare function. The first axiom is separability.  
 
Definition 6. Suppose that the domain R  of a SWF φ satisfies Assumption 1, and that φ itself 
satisfies the Pareto Axiom. Then we say that φ satisfies in addition also the Separability Axiom if 
for all i, j ∈ N with i ≠ j and for all ≿, ≿�  ∈ R  such that ≿i = ≿�𝑖𝑖  and ≿j= ≿�𝑗𝑗 we have: 
 MRS𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(≿) = MRS𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(≿�) 
 
Separability is implied by Axiom 1 in Dhillon (1998).143 The idea underlying this axiom offers 
one possible motivation for requiring separability. Suppose, instead of aggregating the preferences 
of all agents in N simultaneously, we proceeded in two steps: First, we aggregated the preferences 
of the sub-group consisting of only two individuals, i and j, and then we treated the subgroup as if 
                                                 
143 The idea of this axiom also appears in Dhillon and Mertens (1999, pp. 481-2). 
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it was one individual with preference equal to the social preference of the subgroup, and aggre-
gated this artificial individual’s preference and the preferences of all individuals in N \{i, j}. Dhil-
lon’s Axiom 1 requires this two step procedure to lead to the same social preference as the aggre-
gation of all agents’ preferences simultaneously.144 She formalizes this by postulating that for any 
subset of N there is a social welfare function that assigns to each vector of preferences of the 
individuals in this subset a social preference, and by postulating that these social welfare functions 
are consistent with each other in the sense that for any group of agents the social preference could 
be obtained by partitioning this group into subsets, aggregating each subset’s preferences sepa-
rately according to the social welfare function for that subset, and then aggregating the preferences 
that one has obtained in that way. Moreover, she requires that each social welfare function satisfies 
the Pareto Axiom, and thus has the utilitarian form. Our Separability Axiom restricts attention to 
groups of two. It is an implication of Dhillon’s axiom because implicit in Dhillon’s construction 
is that the social welfare function for the group consisting of i and j is independent of the prefer-
ences of the other members of N. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, separability was also a key axiom in Fleming’s (1952) axio-
matization of utilitarianism. Harsanyi (1955) provided an eloquent defense of separability, alt-
hough he did not use it in his own theorem. Harsanyi draws a parallel with the Pareto axiom, and 
writes that “both postulates make social choice dependent solely on the individual interests directly 
affected. They leave no room for the separate interests of a superindividual state or of impersonal 
cultural values ...” (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 311). 
 
Theorem 2. Suppose n ≥ 3 and let the domain R   of the social welfare function φ satisfy Assump-
tion 1. Then φ satisfies the Pareto and the Separability Axioms if and only if for every i ∈ N there 
are functions λi: R i  → ℝ++ such that for every ≿ ∈ R   the social preference φ(≿) can be repre-
sented by: 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = � 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖).
𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁
 
 
                                                 
144 Axiom 1 in Dhillon (1998) is not phrased as we describe it here. But Dhillon’s comments following Axiom 1 indicate that 
her Axiom 1 is equivalent to the condition that we describe. 
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Proof. The “if part” is obvious. We prove the “only if part”. For every ≿ ∈ R  let the Bernoulli 
utility function ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁  represent φ(≿). In the following proof we shall construct the 
weights λi(≿i) the existence of which is asserted in Theorem 2. To be able to appeal to standard 
results on additive separability we shall use the logarithms of the weights in the welfare function. 
We define for every ≿ ∈ R  and every i ∈ N: 
  
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(≿) = ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(≿).                                                           (6) 
 
The Separability Axiom implies for all i, j ∈ N:  
 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(≿) − 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗(≿) = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖�≿�� − 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�≿��.                                                   (7) 
 
whenever ≿i = ≿� 𝑖𝑖  and ≿j = ≿�𝑗𝑗. Define for every i ∈ N a function hi: R i × R i+1 → ℝ such that: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖, ≿𝑖𝑖+1) = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖+1(≿) − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(≿)                                                   (8) 
 
where, because of the Separability Axiom, it does not matter which preference profile ≿ we con-
sider as long as i’s preference in this profile is ≿i, and i + 1’s preference in the profile is ≿i+1. We 
can extend this definition to the case i = n by identifying n + 1 with 1.  
Now notice that for all ≿ ∈ R  we have:  
 
𝑣𝑣1(≿) = 𝑣𝑣1(≿) + � ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
⇔                                                    (9) 
 � ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
= 0.                                                                                                    (10) 
 
This implies that for any ≿, ≿�  ∈ R  we have:  
  � ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
=  � ℎ𝑖𝑖�≿�𝑖𝑖 , ≿�𝑖𝑖+1�.𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
                                                   (11) 
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In the special case in which ≿j = ≿�𝑗𝑗 for all j except one i, this equation can be simplified by drop-
ping all terms that appear on both sides of the equation. We then obtain: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖−1(≿𝑖𝑖−1, ≿𝑖𝑖) − ℎ𝑖𝑖−1�≿𝑖𝑖−1, ≿� 𝑖𝑖� = ℎ𝑖𝑖�≿�𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1� − ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1)                   (12) 
 
Because n ≥ 3, we know that i – 1 ≠ i + 1. This means, that in this equation the left hand side must 
not depend on ≿i-1, because this preference does not appear on the right hand side. This applies in 
fact to all i and all ≿ ∈ R . Thus the increments of the function hi when the second argument is 
changed, must not depend on the first argument, and also the increments of the function hi, when 
the first argument is changed, must not depend on the second argument. These conditions imply 
by standard arguments that the functions hi are additively separable, i.e. there exist functions fi:   
R i → ℝ and gi: Ri → ℝ such that:  
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1) = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖+1(≿𝑖𝑖+1)                                           (13) 
 
for all i ∈ N and all ≿ ∈ R. 
Plugging equation (13) into equation (10) we get: 
 
 ��𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖+1(≿𝑖𝑖+1)�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
= 0,                                                   (14) 
 
which is, of course, the same equation as: 
 
��𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
= 0,                                                          (15) 
 
This equation can be true for all ≿ ∈ R  only if each of the terms in the sum on the left hand side 
is a constant that is independent of ≿i, i.e. there is some ki ∈ ℝ such that: 
  
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)  + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖                                                             (16) 
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for every ≿i ∈ R i. Using this, we can re-write (13) as: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖+1) = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+1(≿𝑖𝑖+1).                                    (17) 
 
Substituting this into (8) we obtain: 
 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖+1(≿) − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(≿) = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+1(≿𝑖𝑖+1).                                    (18) 
 
Now we return to the original variables that we are interested in, rather than their logarithms. 
We define for every i∈ N and for every ≿i ∈ R i :  
                                 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) = exp�−𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)� ,                                                   (19) 
 
and: 
 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖).                                                              (20) 
 
We can now apply the exponential function to both sides of (18) and get: 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖+1(≿)
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(≿) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖+1(≿)𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(≿)                                                   (21) 
 
Now if we define for every i ∈ N: 
 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼1 ⋅ 𝛼𝛼2 ⋅ … ⋅ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝜓𝜓i(≿𝑖𝑖),                                              (22) 
 
then:  
 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖+1(≿𝑖𝑖+1)
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+1 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖+1(≿𝑖𝑖+1)𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖) ,                                                (23) 
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and thus the vector (λ1, …, λn) is proportional to the vector (w1, …, wn). Therefore,  
 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = � 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢(≿𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁
                                                    (22) 
 
is a representation of the social preference. ∎ 
6 Invariance of Marginal Rates of Substitution 
We now introduce our third axiom. This axiom, together with the previous two axioms, implies 
that the marginal rates of substitution remain the same across all preference profiles. In this axiom, 
if A’ ⊆ A, we denote by ≿i |Δ(A’) the restriction of the preference relation ≿i to lotteries that have 
support in A’. 
 
Definition 7. A SWF φ that satisfies the Pareto Axiom, satisfies in addition also the Invariance 
Axiom} if for all i ∈ N, ≿, ≿�  ∈ R , and a, b, c ∈ A (all different from each other) the following 
holds. If 
• ≿j = ≿� j for all j ∈ N \{i},  
• a ∼j b ∼j c for all j ∈ N \ {i}, 
• ≿i |Δ(A\{b}) = ≿�𝑖𝑖 |Δ(A\{b}), 
• a ≿i b ≿i c and a ≿�𝑖𝑖 b ≿�𝑖𝑖 c, 
then: 
MRSi,j(≿) = MRSi,j(≿�) for all j ∈ N, j ≠ i. 
 
In words, the axiom requires that, under certain conditions, the marginal rates of substitution 
involving agent i don’t change if agent i’s preference alone changes while all other agents’ prefer-
ences stay the same. If we required this regardless of what agent i’s and all other agents’ prefer-
ences are, then we would assume our intended conclusion, as long as we also imposed the Pareto 
and the Separability axioms. However, it is sufficient to require invariance of the marginal rates 
of substitution under much more restrictive conditions, namely those listed in the bullet points in 
Definition 7. These conditions are that there are alternatives a, b and c such that (i) all agents other 
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than i are indifferent between a, b and c, whereas agent i ranks b between a and c, and (ii) only i’s 
preferences regarding lotteries assigning positive probability to b change, leaving his preferences 
on Δ(A \ {b}) unchanged, and also leaving unchanged that b is ranked between a and c.  
Why is it interesting to explore the implications for the social welfare function of the assump-
tion that, in these circumstances, marginal rates of substitution don’t change? Before the change 
of preference, there is a lottery over a and c such that all agents are indifferent between that lottery 
and the alternative b. After the change of preference, there is some (potentially different) lottery 
over a and c such that the same is true. Hence, both before and after the change of agent i’s pref-
erence alternative b is, in the words of Dhillon and Mertens, “redundant.” It might be plausible to 
argue that i’s preferences over a redundant alternative should not affect the marginal rates of sub-
stitution involving i. 
Dhillon and Mertens motivate their version of the invariance axiom by pointing out that the 
preference change that is considered in the invariance axiom leaves the set of vectors of expected 
utilities that correspond to lotteries over A unchanged. Thus, if one assumes that what matters for 
welfare is only the image of the choice space in expected utility space, then the Invariance Axiom 
follows. 
The Invariance Axiom has bite only if the domain of the welfare function is sufficiently rich. 
Assumption 2 below ensures this richness. We first need a definition: 
 
Definition 8. A “simple modification” of a preference ≿i ∈ R i is a preference ≿� 𝑖𝑖 ∈ R i such that 
u(≿�𝑖𝑖) assigns the same utility to all alternatives in A as u(≿i) except to one alternative b ∈ A, and 
moreover such that there is an alternative a ≠ b to which u(≿i) assigns 1, and also an alternative c 
≠ b to which u(≿i) assigns 0. We say that “a preference relation ≿�𝑖𝑖 ∈ R i can be reached from a 
preference relation ≿i ∈ R i through a sequence of simple modifications” if there is a sequence 
�≿𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘�
𝑘𝑘=1,2,…,𝐾𝐾 of elements of R i such that ≿𝑖𝑖1=≿𝑖𝑖 , ≿𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾=≿�𝑖𝑖  , and for every k = 1, 2, …, K – 1 the 
preference relation �≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘+1� is a simple modification of the preference relation ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘. 
 
In Figure IV.1 we illustrate how one preference can be reached from another through simple 
modifications. Each row corresponds to an alternative, each column corresponds to a preference, 
and preferences are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions the values of 
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which constitute the entries in the table in Figure IV.1. The sequence of simple modifications by 
which ≿�𝑖𝑖   is reached from ≿i proceeds from the left to the right. 
 
 ≿i ≿𝑖𝑖2 ≿𝑖𝑖3 ≿𝑖𝑖4 ≿𝑖𝑖5 ≿�𝑖𝑖 
a 1 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
b 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0 0 
c 0.4 1 1 1 1 1 
d 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 
e 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 
 
FIGURE IV.1. ≿� 𝑖𝑖 ∈ R i CAN BE REACHED FROM ≿i ∈ R i THROUGH A SEQUENCE OF SIMPLE MODIFICATIONS.1 
 
The starting and end points of the sequence in Figure IV.1 have been chosen quite arbitrarily. 
This is to suggest that it is in fact easy to connect any pair of preferences through a sequence of 
simple modifications as long as the sets R i are sufficiently large. Implicitly, part (i) of Assumption 
2 below is therefore a richness assumption for the domain of the SWF that we are considering.  
 
Assumption 2. (i) For every i ∈ N, every preference ≿�𝑖𝑖 ∈ R i can be reached from every other 
preference ≿i ∈ R i through a sequence of simple modifications.  
(ii) For every i ∈ N, for any three alternatives a, b, c ∈ A, there is a preference ≿i ∈ R i such that 
a ∼i b ∼i c.  
 
Theorem 3. Suppose n ≥ 3 and suppose that R  satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Then a SWF φ 
satisfies the Pareto, Separability, and Invariance Axioms if and only if for every i ∈ N there is a 
number λi ∈ ℝ++ such that for every ≿ ∈ R  the social preference φ(≿) can be represented by: 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = � 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢(≿𝑖𝑖).
𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁
 
 
Proof. The “if part” is obvious. We prove the “only if part”. By Theorem 2 there are functions λi: 
Ri → ℝ++ such that for every ≿ ∈ R  the social preference φ(≿) can be represented by: 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 =
∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(≿𝑖𝑖)𝑢𝑢(≿𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁 . It remains to show that for every i ∈ N and all ≿i, ≿�𝑖𝑖 we have: λi(≿i) = λi(≿�𝑖𝑖). 
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By part (i) of Assumption 2 ≿�𝑖𝑖 can be reached from ≿i through a sequence of simple modifications 
�≿𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘�
𝑘𝑘=1,2,…,𝐾𝐾. We shall prove the claim by showing that for every k = 1, 2, …, K – 1 we have 
λi�≿𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘� = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖�≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘+1�. 
We first construct for given k ∈ {1, 2, …, K – 1} a preference profile �≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘�𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖≡ ≿−𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘  such that 
the Invariance Axiom applies when agent i’s preference changes from ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 to ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘+1 while all other 
agents’ preferences remain ≿−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 . Denote by b the alternative whose utility changes when agent i’s 
preferences switch from ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 to ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘+1, denote by a an alternative other than b that is ranked top by 
≿𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘, and by c an alternative other than b that is ranked bottom by ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘. These alternatives exist 
because ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘+1 is a simple modification of ≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘. For every j ≠ i we now pick some preference ≿𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 ∈ 
ℛj such that a ∼𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 b ∼𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 c. Part (ii) of Assumption 2 implies that such a preference exists. Let ≿−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ,  
be the list of the preferences ≿𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘,  for all j ≠ i.  
The Invariance Axiom implies that for every j ≠ i the marginal rate of substitution for agent i 
and agent j is the same for �≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, ≿−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � and �≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘+1, ≿−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �. This is the case if and only if λi�≿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘� = 
λi�≿𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘+1�. ∎  
7 Anonymity 
We now add an anonymity axiom to obtain the conclusion that all marginal rates of substitution 
must equal 1, and therefore that the SWF must be Relative Utilitarian. A natural definition of 
anonymity may seem to be the requirement that for all preference profiles (≿k)i ∈ N, all permutations 
π of n, and all i, j ∈ N, i ≠ j the marginal rate of substitution MRSi,j((≿𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁) equals the marginal 
rate of substitution MRSπ(i),π(j)��≿𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘)�𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁�. Unfortunately, given our domain restrictions, any 
two individuals’ sets of possible preferences are disjoint, so that for any non-trivial permutation π 
if (≿k)k ∈ N ∈ R  then �≿𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘)�𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁 ∉ R. 
We shall instead work with an “approximate” version of anonymity. Roughly speaking, it will 
require that if (≿k)k ∈ N ∈ R , if π is a permutation of n, and if (≿�𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘))k ∈ N ∈ R  is “close to” (≿𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘))k 
∈ N, then the marginal rate of substitution MRSi,j((≿𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁) is “close to” the marginal rate of sub-
stitution MRSπ(i),π(j)��≿� 𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘)�𝑘𝑘∈𝑁𝑁� for all i, j ∈ N, i ≠ j. 
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To formalize this requirement, we need to introduce a metric on von Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences. We shall define the distance between two preferences ≿, ≿�  ∈ ℛ to be the Euclidean 
distance between their normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern representations: ||u(≿) – u(≿�)||. For 
our definition of anonymity it only matters which sequences of preferences are convergent. It is 
simple to verify that a sequence (≿ν)𝜈𝜈∈ℕ  of elements of ℛ converges to ≿ ∈ ℛ if and only if the 
upper contour sets of ≿ν converge in Hausdorff distance to the upper contour sets of ≿. Thus, the 
notion of convergence that we use can be defined in purely ordinal terms. 
 
Definition 9. A SWF φ that satisfies the Pareto axiom satisfies in addition the Anonymity axiom if 
for any preference profile ≿ ∈ R, any permutation π of n, and any sequence of preference profiles (≿ν)𝜈𝜈∈ℕ  in R  such that ≿𝜋𝜋(𝑖𝑖)ν  → ≿i  for all i ∈ N we have: MRS𝜋𝜋(𝑖𝑖),𝜋𝜋(𝑗𝑗)(≿ν) → 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗(≿)                                                (25) 
for all i, j ∈ N, i ≠ j. 
 
Whether our formalization of anonymity has bite depends on the richness of the domain of the 
SWF. If the domain is finite, for example, then anonymity, as defined above, will always be satis-
fied, because no sequence of preferences of some agent i will ever converge to a preference of 
some other agent j. Therefore, to derive any further implications from the additional condition of 
anonymity, we have to make a richness assumption for the domain. We shall make a very strong 
assumption that allows a simple argument.  
 
Assumption 3. For every i ∈ N the set of possible preferences of agent i, R i is a dense subset of 
the set ℛ of all von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries over A. 
 
Theorem 4. Suppose n ≥ 3, and that R  satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Then a SWF φ satisfies 
the Pareto, Separability, Invariance, and Anonymity axioms if and only if for every ≿ ∈ R  the 
social preference φ(≿) can be represented by:  
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 = � 𝑢𝑢(≿𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁
. 
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Proof. The “if part” of the result is obvious. We only prove the “only if part.” Assumption 3 implies 
that for any preference profile ≿ ∈ R  and any permutation π of n, there is a sequence of preference 
profiles (≿ν)ν ∈ ℕ  in R  such that ≿𝜋𝜋(𝑖𝑖)𝜈𝜈  → ≿i  for all i ∈ N. From Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 we 
can infer that the sequence of marginal rates of substitution on the left hand side of condition (25) 
converges to λπ(i) / λπ(j) whereas the marginal rate of substitution on the right hand side of that 
condition equals λi / λj. We conclude that to satisfy the anonymity axiom we must have for every 
permutation π of n that λπ(i) / λπ(j) = λi / λj for all i, j ∈ N, i ≠ j. But this implies λi = λj for all i, j ∈ N, 
and hence, without loss of generality, we can set λi = 1 for all i ∈ N. This implies that the social 
preference can be represented by the utility function shown in the theorem. ∎ 
 
Our formalization of anonymity in this section appears to be closely related to the requirement 
that the SWF be continuous. This raises the question how our result is compatible with the impos-
sibility result due to Chichilnisky (1985) that we cited in the Introduction, and in which the conti-
nuity axiom is crucial to the result. The key point is that continuity in Chichilnisky’s work refers 
to the way in which the social preference itself depends on the individuals’ preference profile. By 
contrast, in our definitions above we refer to the way in which the marginal rates of substitution 
revealed by the social preference depend on the individuals’ preference profile. 
8 Constructing the Domain 
In this section we demonstrate the existence of an example of a domain R  of a social welfare 
function that satisfies all assumptions that we have made in this paper. We go, in fact, one step 
further and also show that one can construct such a domain that is dense in the full domain ℛn. 
Denseness is interesting because it emphasizes that our construction does not leave any “holes” in 
the set of all preference profiles. To make this claim precise, we have to endow ℛn with a metric. 
The metric that we use is defined by setting the difference between two preferences ≿i and ≿�𝑖𝑖 
equal to the Euclidean distance of their normalized utility representations: ||u(≿i) – u(≿�𝑖𝑖)||. The 
metric on ℛn is then the product metric. 
The following result will be proved in the appendix, where we construct explicitly a domain 
that has all the properties listed in the Proposition. The construction is simple, but assumes that the 
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number of alternatives is “much larger” than the number of agents: m > 6n. Recall that so far, our 
assumptions regarding the number of alternatives and agents have been: m > n ≥ 3. 
 
Proposition 3. If m > 6n, then there exists at least one set R  ⊆ ℛn that is the union of sets of 
preference profiles that each satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. 
 
One might ask whether Proposition 3 would remain true if we also required R  to be open. 
Unfortunately, if R  = ×i ∈ N R i is open and dense in ℛn, then there is a preference profile (≿i)i ∈ N 
∈ R  which violates Independent Prospects. To see this note that if R  is open and dense in ℛn 
then also each R i is open and dense in ℛ. Pick any ≿1∈ ℛ1. Since ℛ1 is open, there exists an open 
ball b around ≿1 with B ⊆ R 1. Now, since R 2 is dense in ℛ, it must be that R 2 ∩ B is non-empty. 
Pick any ≿ ∈ R 2 ∩ B. Note that since B ⊂ R 1, it follows that ≿ ∈ R 1. For each i ≥ 3, pick any ≿i 
∈ Ri. The profile (≿, ≿, ≿3, …, ≿n) ∈ R  clearly violates Independent Prospects.  
9 Conclusion 
This paper’s main purpose has been to develop a simple and transparent axiomatization of rel-
ative utilitarianism using the concept of the revealed marginal rates of substitution. We have done 
so considering a subset of the set of all preference profiles. We could try to extend our result by 
considering the complete set of all profiles of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences by requiring 
continuity of the marginal rates of substitution with respect to the topology for the domain intro-
duced in the previous section. We would then obtain that for all profiles for which the social wel-
fare function reveals a marginal rate of substitution between two agents i and j these two agents 
must have the same weight in the social welfare function. Nothing would follow if the social wel-
fare function does not reveal a marginal rate of substitution, a possibility that we discussed in 
Section 3. When the social welfare function does not reveal any marginal rate of substitution for 
some pair of agents i and j (this can only be true for profiles that violate the Independent Prospects 
Condition) then our approach does not have any implications for the relative weight of i and j in 
the social welfare function. It seems natural that in such a case an approach based on revealed 
marginal rates of substitution does not make any predictions about how the social planner would 
choose. 
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In this paper we have made strong assumptions regarding the number of individuals and the 
number of alternatives. It appears worthwhile to investigate the implications of our axioms on 
domains that do not satisfy these assumptions. Further future work can include the investigation 
of the consequences of alternative axioms in our framework. 
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10 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3 
It will be convenient to sometimes write the set of alternatives is A = {1, 2, …, m} and at other 
times write it as A = {a1, a2, …, am}. We first construct for each agent i the set Ui ⊂ [0,1]m of 
possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations of her preferences. We then define that 
agent’s set of possible preference relations by: 
 
R i= {≿𝑖𝑖∈ ℛ|∃𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 : 𝑢𝑢(≿𝑖𝑖) = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖}.                                                   (26) 
 
Let p: ℕ → ℝ be the map that assigns to every x ∈ ℕ the square root of the xth prime number 
(so p(1) = √2, p(2)= √3, p(3) = √5, p(4) = √7, etc.). Define, for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A: 
                                                  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎 = �𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑎𝑎)�𝑞𝑞 ∈ ℚ� ∩ (0,1).                                                        (27) 
 
Now define Ui to be the set of vectors ui = (ui,1, ui,2,… ui,m) with these properties: Each ui,a ∈ Ti,a 
∪ {0,1}; and the number of entries in ui which read 1 is one, two, or three, while the number which 
read 0 is one or two. This completes our construction, for each i ∈ N, of the set Ui and hence also 
the set R i. Define R  = R 1 × R 2× … × R n. We now verify that R  is a domain that satisfies the 
three assumptions.  
Assumption 1: The first sentence is obviously satisfied. It remains to prove that every profile ≿ 
= (≿1, ≿2, …, ≿n) ∈ R satisfies Independent Prospects. The preference relations ≿1, ≿2, …, ≿n 
correspond to the normalized utility vectors u1, u2, …, un. 
Use these vectors to form this m × (n + 1) matrix: 
                                                                     
⎝
⎜
⎛
| | … | 1| | … | ⋮
𝑢𝑢1 𝑢𝑢2 … 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 1| | … | ⋮| | … | 1⎠⎟
⎞                                                    (28) 
By construction, each ui has at most 5 entries that are not elements of some Ti,a. Hence, the 
above matrix has at most 5n rows that contain an entry that reads either 0 or 1. By the assumption 
that m > 6n, this means that there are at least n + 1 rows of the above matrix whose entries are all 
members of some Ti,a. Take any such n + 1 rows to form this (n + 1) × (n + 1) sub-matrix:  
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⎝
⎜
⎛
| | … | 1| | … | ⋮
𝑣𝑣1 𝑣𝑣2 … 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 1| | … | ⋮| | … | 1⎠⎟
⎞
(𝑛𝑛+1)×(𝑛𝑛+1)
                                        (29) 
 
We claim that the determinant of this sub-matrix is non-zero. The argument is as follows. This 
determinant can be expressed as a non-trivial rational polynomial in ep(1), ep(2), …, ep(n·m). The 
Lindemann-Weierstrass Theorem (Theorem 1.4 in Baker (1975)) says that such a polynomial is 
non-zero if the numbers p(1), p(2), …, p(n·m) are algebraic and linearly independent over ℚ. That 
they are algebraic is obvious. That they are linearly independent over ℚ is shown in Theorem 2 in 
Besicovitch (1940). 
Because the determinant of the above sub-matrix is non-zero, we can find for every i, some 
non-zero vector ri ∈ ℝn+1 such that ri · vi ≠ 0, ri · 1 = 0, and for all j ≠ i, ri · vj = 0. Pick any ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∈ 
ℝ+𝑛𝑛+1\ {0} such that ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ≫ ri. Let 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 –  ri. Observe that 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+𝑛𝑛+1\ {0} and that 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 · 1 = (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 – 
ri) · 1 = ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 · 1 – ri · 1 = ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 · 1. Now divide both ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖  by ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 · 1 to get 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖  = ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 / (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 · 1) and 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖= 
𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 / (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 · 1). Let pi be the lottery that assigns to the n + 1 alternatives (that were involved in forming 
the sub-matrix) probability weights as per the probability vector 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 and assigns to all other alter-
natives probability weight 0. Analogously, let qi be the lottery that assigns to the n + 1 alternatives 
probability weights as per the probability vector 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 and assigns to all other alternatives probability 
weight 0. We now verify that the lotteries pi, qi satisfy the conditions in Independent Prospects. 
For any j ≠ i, 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 = 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 = (𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖) ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 = (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖) ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗/?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝟏𝟏 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗/?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝟏𝟏 = 0/?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝟏𝟏 = 0. 
 
So pi · uj = qi · uj, that is to say, pi ∼j qi. On the other hand, 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 = 𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = (𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖) ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = (?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑖𝑖) ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖/?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝟏𝟏 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖/?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝟏𝟏 ≠ 0. 
 
So pi · ui ≠ qi · ui, that is to say, pi  ≁ qi. 
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Assumption 2: (ii) is obviously satisfied. We prove (i). Let ≿i = ≿𝑖𝑖1, ≿�𝑖𝑖 = ≿𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 ∈ R . If ≿𝑖𝑖1 ranks 
more than one alternative top, then pick any top alternative (call it a1). Let ≿𝑖𝑖2 ∈ R i be the prefer-
ence relation that assigns to the alternative a1 some Bernoulli utility from the set 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎1 and assigns 
to all other alternatives the same Bernoulli utility as did ≿𝑗𝑗1. Repeat this procedure as many times 
as is possible, to arrive at some ≿𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ∈ R i that ranks exactly one alternative top (call this alternative 
aa). Through an analogous procedure, we can arrive at some ≿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏 ∈ R i that ranks exactly one alter-
native bottom (call it ab) and still ranks aa as the only top alternative. 
Now pick any alternative ab+1 that isn’t ab or aa. Let ≿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏+1∈R i be the preference relation that 
ranks ab+1 top and assigns to all other alternatives the same Bernoulli utility as did ≿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏. So now  
≿𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏+1 ranks aa and ab+1  as the only top alternatives and ab as the only bottom alternative. 
Now pick any alternative ac that is ranked bottom by ≿� 𝑖𝑖. If ac = ab (meaning that ≿𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏+1 already 
ranked ac bottom), then simply let ≿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = ≿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏+1. Otherwise, let ≿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏+2 ∈ R i be the preference relation 
that ranks ac bottom and assigns to all other alternatives the same Bernoulli utility as did ≿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏+1. So 
now ≿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏+2 ranks as top only ab+1 (and also aa, if aa ≠ ac) as the only top alternatives and as bottom 
only ab and ac. Next, let ≿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ∈ R i be the preference relation that assigns to the alternative ab some 
Bernoulli utility from the set 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 and assigns to all other alternatives the same Bernoulli utility as 
did ≿𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏+2. So now ≿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ranks ac as the only bottom alternative. 
Next pick any alternative ad that is ranked top by ≿�𝑖𝑖. Through similar steps, we can get from 
≿𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐 to some ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 that continues to rank ac as the only bottom, but now also ranks ad as the only top. 
Now construct ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+1, ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+2, …, ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+𝑖𝑖 as follows: Let ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+𝑠𝑠 ∈ R i be the preference relation 
that assigns to the alternative as the same Bernoulli utility as does ≿�𝑖𝑖 and assigns to all other alter-
natives the same Bernoulli utility as did ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+𝑠𝑠−1. We have that ≿𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑+𝑖𝑖 = ≿𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 = ≿�𝑖𝑖. This completes 
the construction of a sequence of single modifications connecting ≿i to ≿𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾. 
Assumption 3: Each of the constructed sets Ti,a is obviously dense in [0,1]. So Di is dense in 
[0,1]m. Thus R i is dense in ℛ.  
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APPENDIX A 
Sources of US Divorce Data Used in Chapter II 
 
For every year except for 1999, US CDR is calculated as “total divorces × 1000 ÷ total popu-
lation”. The 1999 US CDR of 4.1 is taken from source 4 below. Unless otherwise noted, Alaska 
and Hawaii are included from 1940 onwards. 
Here are the sources for total US divorces:  
1. 1860-1866: Jacobson (1959, p. 90).  
2. 1867-1939: Statistical Abstract of the US (1948, p. 89). 
3. 1940-1990: Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990, p. 9. Note that this 
source does not include divorces for Alaska for 1940-1958 or for Hawaii for 1940-1959. Thus, 
for these years, I add in Alaska and Hawaii divorces (see next subsection for sources of state 
divorces).  
4. 1991-1997: National Center for Health Statistics Press Room blog, https://nchspress-
room.files.wordpress.com/2007/07/divorce.pdf (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1025). 
5. 1998: National Vital Statistics Reports From the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
v. 47, no. 21, July 6, 1999. 
6. 2000-2012: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mar-
riage_divorce_tables.htm (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1030). As noted, divorce and population 
totals exclude data for California, Indiana, Louisiana, and Oklahoma for the years 2000 and 
2001; for California, Hawaii, Indiana, and Oklahoma for 2002; for California, Indiana, and 
Oklahoma for 2003; for California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, and Louisiana for 2004; and for 
California, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, and Minnesota for the years 2005 through 
2012. 
Here are the sources for total US population: 
7. 1860-1899: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part I (p. 8). 
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8. 1900-1999: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/pre-
1980/tables/popclockest.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1126). Note that this source does not in-
clude population for Alaska or Hawaii for 1940-1949. Thus, for these years, I add in Alaska 
and Hawaii population (see next subsection for sources of state population). 
9. 2000-2012: Same as source 6 above.  
TABLE A.1—US ANNUAL TOTAL DIVORCES, POPULATION, AND CRUDE DIVORCE RATE, 1860-2012 
Year Divorces Population CDR 1898 47849 73494000 0.65 1937 249000 128824829 1.93 1975 1036000 215973199 4.80 
1860 7380 31513000 0.23 1899 51437 74799000 0.69 1938 244000 129824939 1.88 1976 1083000 218035164 4.97 
1861 6540 32351000 0.20 1900 55751 76094000 0.73 1939 251000 130879718 1.92 1977 1091000 220239425 4.95 
1862 6230 33188000 0.19 1901 60984 77584000 0.79 1940 265154 132625446 2.00 1978 1130000 222584545 5.08 
1863 6760 34026000 0.20 1902 61480 79163000 0.78 1941 294398 133949471 2.20 1979 1181000 225055487 5.25 
1864 8940 34863000 0.26 1903 64925 80632000 0.81 1942 322753 135582553 2.38 1980 1189000 227224681 5.23 
1865 10090 35701000 0.28 1904 66199 82166000 0.81 1943 360932 137622353 2.62 1981 1213000 229465714 5.29 
1866 11530 36538000 0.32 1905 67976 83822000 0.81 1944 401936 139441345 2.88 1982 1170000 231664458 5.05 
1867 9937 37376000 0.27 1906 72062 85450000 0.84 1945 486837 140882165 3.46 1983 1158000 233791994 4.95 
1868 10150 38213000 0.27 1907 76571 87008000 0.88 1946 611838 142032566 4.31 1984 1169000 235824902 4.96 
1869 10939 39051000 0.28 1908 76852 88710000 0.87 1947 484532 144760071 3.35 1985 1190000 237923795 5.00 
1870 10962 39905000 0.27 1909 79671 90490000 0.88 1948 409738 147268302 2.78 1986 1178000 240132887 4.91 
1871 11586 40938000 0.28 1910 83045 92407000 0.90 1949 398464 149829130 2.66 1987 1166000 242288918 4.81 
1872 12390 41972000 0.30 1911 89219 93863000 0.95 1950 386624 152271417 2.54 1988 1167000 244498982 4.77 
1873 13156 43006000 0.31 1912 94318 95335000 0.99 1951 382098 154877889 2.47 1989 1157000 246819230 4.69 
1874 13989 44040000 0.32 1913 91307 97225000 0.94 1952 393754 157552740 2.50 1990 1182000 249464396 4.74 
1875 14212 45073000 0.32 1914 100584 99111000 1.01 1953 391853 160184192 2.45 1991 1187000 252153092 4.71 
1876 14800 46107000 0.32 1915 104298 100546000 1.04 1954 380813 163025854 2.34 1992 1215000 255029699 4.76 
1877 15687 47141000 0.33 1916 114000 101961000 1.12 1955 378902 165931202 2.28 1993 1187000 257782608 4.60 
1878 16089 48174000 0.33 1917 121564 103414000 1.18 1956 383888 168903031 2.27 1994 1191000 260327021 4.58 
1879 17083 49208000 0.35 1918 116254 104550000 1.11 1957 382734 171984130 2.23 1995 1169000 262803276 4.45 
1880 19663 50262000 0.39 1919 141527 105063000 1.35 1958 369808 174881904 2.11 1996 1150000 265228572 4.34 
1881 20762 51542000 0.40 1920 170505 106461000 1.60 1959 396378 177829628 2.23 1997 1163000 267783607 4.34 
1882 22112 52821000 0.42 1921 159580 108538000 1.47 1960 393000 180671158 2.18 1998 1135000 270248003 4.20 
1883 23198 54100000 0.43 1922 148815 110049000 1.35 1961 414000 183691481 2.25 1999 - 272690813 4.10 
1884 22994 55379000 0.42 1923 165096 111947000 1.47 1962 413000 186537737 2.21 2000 944000 233550143 4.04 
1885 23472 56658000 0.41 1924 170952 114109000 1.50 1963 428000 189241798 2.26 2001 940000 236416762 3.98 
1886 25535 57938000 0.44 1925 175449 115829000 1.51 1964 450000 191888791 2.35 2002 955000 243108303 3.93 
1887 27919 59217000 0.47 1926 184678 117397000 1.57 1965 479000 194302963 2.47 2003 927000 243902090 3.80 
1888 28669 60496000 0.47 1927 196292 119035000 1.65 1966 499000 196560338 2.54 2004 879000 236402656 3.72 
1889 31735 61775000 0.51 1928 200176 120509000 1.66 1967 523000 198712056 2.63 2005 847000 233495163 3.63 
1890 33461 63056000 0.53 1929 205876 121767000 1.69 1968 584000 200706052 2.91 2006 872000 236094277 3.69 
1891 35540 64361000 0.55 1930 195961 123076741 1.59 1969 639000 202676946 3.15 2007 856000 238352850 3.59 
1892 36579 65666000 0.56 1931 188003 124039648 1.52 1970 708000 205052174 3.45 2008 844000 240545163 3.51 
1893 37468 66970000 0.56 1932 164241 124840471 1.32 1971 773000 207660677 3.72 2009 840000 242610561 3.46 
1894 37568 68275000 0.55 1933 165000 125578763 1.31 1972 845000 209896021 4.03 2010 872000 244122529 3.57 
1895 40387 69580000 0.58 1934 204000 126373773 1.61 1973 915000 211908788 4.32 2011 877000 246273366 3.56 
1896 42937 70885000 0.61 1935 218000 127250232 1.71 1974 977000 213853928 4.57 2012 851000 248041986 3.43 
1897 44699 72189000 0.62 1936 236000 128053180 1.84         
Notes: See accompanying text for explanation and sources.  
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APPENDIX B 
Sources of State Divorce Data Used in Chapter II 
 
For each state and each year, CDR is calculated as “total divorces × 1000 ÷ total population”. 
Here are the sources for state annual divorce totals: 
10. 1922-1932: Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 9, No. 60, p. 832-3, 1938. These data cover 
the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia.  
11. 1933-1935: Stouffer & Spencer (1936) who state in turn that “Figures for 1933, 1934, and 
1935 are from state annual reports and correspondence with state registrars of vital statistics.” 
These data cover only these states: AL, CT, FL, IN, IA, KS, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, NE, NV, 
NH, OR, RI, SD, VT, VA, WI.  
12. 1936: Stouffer & Spencer (1939). These data cover the same states as were covered by the data 
for 1933-1935, less IN, KS, MS, and RI. 
13. 1937-1939: Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 15, No. 18, p. 196, 1942. These data cover 
the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia.  
14. 1940-1949: Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 36, No 1-23, p. 22, 1949. As noted, “By place 
of occurrence. Includes reported annulments and partial or incomplete estimates for some 
States.” Again, these data cover the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia.  
15. 1950-1951: Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 38, No. 7, p. 136, 1951. As noted, “Includes 
reported annulments.” Again, these data cover the lower 48 states and the District of Columbia.  
16. 1952-1955: Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 46, No. 17, p. 332, 1957. As noted, “By place 
of occurrence. Includes only events (divorces and reported annulments) occurring within the 
continental United States.” Again, these data cover the lower 48 states and the District of Co-
lumbia. 
17. 1940-1955 Alaska and Hawaii data: Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 50, No. 7, p. 191, 
1957. As noted, “By place of occurrence. Includes reported annulments.”  
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18. 1956-60: 1960 Vital Statistics of the United States (VSUS), Vol. III, Table 3-B (page 3-17). 
These data and data sources 18 through 24 cover all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  
19. 1961-66: 1966 VSUS, Vol III, Table 2-2 (page 2-6). 
20. 1967-72: 1972 VSUS, Vol III, Table 2-2 (page 2-6). 
21. 1973-78: 1978 VSUS, Vol III, Table 2-2 (page 2-6). 
22. 1979-83: 1983 VSUS, Vol III, Table 2-3 (page 2-6). 
23. 1984-88: 1988 VSUS, Vol III, Table 2-3 (page 2-3). 
24. 1989-90: Same as source 3 above. 
Here are the sources for state annual population totals. The July 1st estimate of each year is used, 
except in the cases of 1970, 1980, and 1990, where instead the April 1st estimate is used. 
25. 1922-1929: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st2029ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). These data cover the lower 48 states and the 
District of Columbia. 
26. 1930-1939: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st3039ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). Again, these data cover the lower 48 states 
and the District of Columbia. 
27. 1940-1949: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st4049ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). Again, these data cover the lower 48 states 
and the District of Columbia. 
28. 1940-1949 Alaska and Hawaii population: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 79th Annual 
Edition, 1958, p. 908. 
29. 1950-1959: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st5060ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). These data and data sources 30 through 32 
cover all 50 states and the District of Columbia.  
30. 1960-1969: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st6070ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). 
31. 1970-1979: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st7080ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). 
32. 1980-1990: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/ta-
bles/st8090ts.txt (retrieved on 2015-07-06-1151). 
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Here are the sources for California total divorce filings: 
33. 1926-1928: Second Report of the Judicial Council of California to the Governor and the Leg-
islature, Appendix F. 
34. 1929-1940: Eleventh Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, p. 16. 
35. 1941-1948: Thirteenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, p. 14. 
36. 1949-1951: Seventeenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, p. 69. 
37. 1952-1962: Nineteenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, p. 139. 
38. 1963-1990: Vital Statistics of California, various editions.  
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APPENDIX C 
Sources of Other Countries’ Divorce Data Used in Chapter II 
 
Here are the sources used to construct the 1946-1989 CDRs of England and Wales, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Scotland, Germany, and France. 
39. England and Wales: Office for National Statistics, “Mid-1838 to Mid-2012 Population Esti-
mates: Total persons, Single year of age and Quinary age groups for England and Wales; esti-
mated resident population.” and “Number of divorces, age at divorce and marital status before 
marriage”. 
40. Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics, “3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population 
Statistics, 2008”—Tables 1 and 12 ; “3101.0 Australian Demographic Statistics. Table 4. Es-
timated Resident Population, States and Territories (Number)”; “3310.0 Marriages and Di-
vorces, Australia, 2012”. 
41. New Zealand: New Zealand Official Year Book 1932, 1943, 1951-2, 2012, Historical popula-
tion estimates tables, Statistics New Zealand Table reference VSM003AA.  
42. Canada: Statistics Canada, “Chart 6 Crude marriage rate and crude divorce rate, Canada, 1926 
to 2008” and “Number of marriages and divorces, Canada, 1926 to 2008”; North Report (p. 
428); Snell (1991, p. 10).  
43. Scotland: “Mid-year population estimates: Scotland, all ages by sex: 1855 to 2012” and “Di-
vorces, Scotland, 1855 to 2011”.  
44. West Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt; http://www.gesis.org/histat/en/table/de-
tails/28C85274A6D453BCED20443C68DBA6D3 (retrieved 2015-07-06-1411); Kuller (2004, 
p. 47); The Nation, “Divorces and Suicides in Germany” (1924, v. 119, No. 3093, p. 428). 
45. France (metropolitan): Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, “Évolution 
de la population” and “Bilan démographique 2013 - Trois mariages pour deux Pacs”. 
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APPENDIX D 
Sources of Enactment and Repeal Dates of Omnibus Clauses 
 
46. Iowa. Enactment: Laws, 1846, Ch. 24, p. 23, approved January 17th, 1846. Abolition: Laws, 
1855, Ch. 76, pp. 112-113, approved January 24th, 1855.  
47. Minnesota. Enactment: Session Laws, 1855, Ch. 17, pp. 61-62. Abolition: Minnesota’s omni-
bus clause is absent from the General Statutes of 1866 (Ch. 62, pp. 408-412). Although I cannot 
be certain that it had not been repealed even before 1866, both Kingsley (1932, p. 257) and the 
Minnesota Law Review (1951, p. 173) say it was the revision of 1866 that repealed it.  
48. North Carolina. Enactment: Acts, 1827-1828, Ch. 29, pp. 19-20. In 1837, the wording of North 
Carolina’s omnibus clause was changed to: “or that any other just cause for a divorce exists” 
(Revised Statutes, 1837, Vol. I, Ch. 39, pp. 238-239). Abolition: Acts, 1871-1872, Ch. 193, pp. 
339-340.  
49. Indiana. Enactment: Revised Laws, 1824, Ch. 32, pp. 156-157, approved January 22, 1824. 
The precise wording of Indiana’s omnibus clause changed thrice. In 1831, to “for any other 
cause, and in any other case where the court, in their discretion, shall consider it reasonable 
and proper that a divorce should be granted” (Revised Laws, 1831, Ch. 31, pp. 213-215). In 
1838, to “in any other case where the court in the exercise of sound discretion, shall deem it 
reasonable and proper that a divorce should be granted” (Revised Laws, 1838, Ch. 31, pp. 242-
244). And in 1852, to “Any other cause for which the court shall deem it proper that a divorce 
should be granted.” (Revised Laws, 1852, Ch. 4, pp. 233-238, approved May 13, 1852). Abo-
lition: Revised Laws, 1873, Ch. 43, pp. 107-112, approved March 10, 1873.  
50. Illinois. Enactment: Revised Laws, 1833, pp. 234-235—In force December 4, 1832. Abolition: 
Revised Statutes, 1874, Ch. 40, pp. 420-422—Approved March 10, 1874. In force July 1, 1874.  
51. Louisiana. Enactment: Acts, 1870, No. 76, p. 108, approved March 9, 1870. Abolition: Acts, 
1877, No. 122, p. 192, approved April 30, 1877.  
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52. Connecticut. Enactment: Public Acts, 1849 May Session, Ch. XXI, p. 17, approved June 19th, 
1849. Abolition: Public Acts, 1878 Session, Ch. LXXI, p. 305, approved March 27, 1878.  
53. Utah. Enactment: First Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, p. 83, 
approved March 6th, 1852. Abolition: Session Laws, 1878, Ch. 1, pp. 1-2, approved February 
2, 1878.  
54. Maine. Enactment: Acts and Resolves, 1847, Ch. 13, pp. 8-9, approved July 13, 1847. Abolition: 
Acts and Resolves, 1883, Ch. 212, pp. 175-176, approved March 13, 1883.  
55. Washington. Enactment: The First Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of 
Washington, 1854 Statutes, pp. 405-407. I came across only one change to the wording of 
Washington’s omnibus clause: “a divorce may be granted … for any other cause deemed by 
the court sufficient, or and the court shall be satisfied that the parties can no longer live together” 
(Pierce’s Code, 1919, Vol. 2, p. 2216). Abolition: Session Laws, 1921, Ch. 109, pp. 331-333, 
approved by the Governor March 17, 1921. The omnibus clause, formerly appended to the end 
of paragraph 7 of §982, is now dropped.  
56. Rhode Island. Enactment: General Assembly of the Governor and Company of the English 
Colony of Rhode-Island, and Providence-Plantations, in New-England, in America; begun and 
held at South-Kingston in said Colony, the last Wednesday of October, in the Year of our 
LORD, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Nine, pp. 53-54.  In 1822, the wording was 
changed slightly: “for any other gross misbehavior and wickedness in either of the parties, 
repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant” (Public Laws, 1822, pp. 367-370). 
Abolition: Never. Same today as it was in 1822.  
57. Arizona. Enactment: Compiled Laws, from 1864 to 1871 inclusive, pp. 303-304, approved Feb-
ruary 26, 1871. Abolition: Revised Statutes, 1887, pp. 373-375, approved February 28, 1887, 
took effect July 1, 1887.  
58. Montana. Enactment: Acts, 1907, Ch. 118, pp. 297-298, approved March 6, 1907. Abolition: 
This broad definition of cruelty remained until the 1975 adoption of the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act, which abolished all grounds for divorce save one—irretrievable breakdown. 
(Laws, 1975, Ch. 536, p. 1520, approved May 6, 1975, effective January 1, 1976.) 
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APPENDIX E 
Sources of Divorce Data Used in Chapter III 
 
Annual county-level divorce counts are compiled from these two sources: 
59. 1867-1886: Wright Report, Table I, pp. 214-441. (To illustrate, Figure E.1 partially reproduces 
pp. 216-217.)  
60. 1887-1906: North Report, Part II, Tables 18-20 (pp. 707-825). 
I take note of instances where the data are defective. As stated in the Wright Report (p. 130), 
for 1867-1886, for 161 out of 2,627 counties “the figures do not cover the whole of the twenty 
years” because “the records, either of marriage or divorce, have been destroyed by fire or other-
wise”. But aside from Cook county, Illinois and Hamilton county, Ohio, “the counties whose rec-
ords have been destroyed are small.” And as similarly stated in the North Report (p. 6), for 1887-
1906, there were, similarly, “a considerable number of counties for which records of marriages or 
divorces were lacking for a part of the period” (p. 6), of which the most notable instance was San 
Francisco county, whose records were destroyed in the 1906 earthquake. Such destruction, absence, 
or defects of data were documented as footnotes to the tables.  
For example, for DeKalb county, Alabama, the Wright Report (p. 216, n. b, reproduced in Fig-
ure 1) states that “The divorce records are defective.” No dates are specified. Hence, I code the 
1867-1886 divorce data for DeKalb county as being defective. In contrast, for King William 
county, Virginia, the Wright Report (p. 422, n. a) specifies that “Divorce records destroyed by fire 
January 18, 1885.” And so King William observations up to and including 1885 are coded as being 
defective, but not that for 1886.  
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FIGURE E.1. EXCERPTS FROM WRIGHT REPORT (PP. 216-217) 
 
Note that often, even though the records were defective, they were not completely missing. 
DeKalb county is a case in point: Even though its divorce records were defective, some divorce 
records were still obtained (see Figure E.1). Still, I simply code DeKalb county’s 1867-1886 ob-
servations as defective.  
Note also that the Wright and North Reports already took into account changes in county bound-
aries and names. I have therefore made no additional effort to account for such changes.  
One final note is that no effort is made to correct for any errors that the authors of the reports 
did not seem to notice. For example, although the 1903 divorce numbers for Rhode Island, as 
reported by the North Report (p. 735), are probably incorrect,145 I do not correct them. 
Decennial county-level population counts are compiled from: 
61. US Census Bureau, “Population of States and Counties of the United States: 1790 to 1990”, 
Part III: Population of Counties, Earliest Census to 1990, http://www.census.gov/popula-
tion/www/censusdata/Population_PartIII.xls (Excel file, retrieved 2015-07-06-1406). 
Intercensal county-level population estimates are then obtained through simple interpolation. 
For each state and each year, total divorces and population are calculated as the sum of divorces 
and population across all counties in the state. In the primary analysis, the defective county-year 
data are dropped. Each state’s annual CDR is then calculated as “total divorces × 1000000 ÷ total 
population”. 
                                                 
145 The 1903 divorce numbers for the five counties of Rhode Island—Bristol, Kent, Newport, Providence, and Washington—
are given as 1, 8, 11, 177, and 13 divorces, for a total of 210 divorces (North Report, p. 735). These numbers are anomalous. They 
are about half those reported for the adjacent years. They are also inconsistent with those reported in the 50th Report relating to 
the Registry and Return of Births, Marriages, and Deaths, and of Divorces in the State of Rhode Island, which instead reports the 
five counties as having had 9, 28, 17, 355, and 18 divorces, for a total of 427 divorces. For the adjacent years, the Rhode Island 
reports have numbers similar to those in the North Report. 
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APPENDIX F 
How the Divorce Law Coding in Chapter III Was Compiled 
 
The sources for the divorce law coding were the various state statutes and state session laws 
were: 
62. HeinOnline, State Statutes: A Historical Archive, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Index?in-
dex=sstatutesstates&collection=sstatutes (retrieved 2015-07-06-1540). 
63. HeinOnline, Session Laws Library, http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Index?collection=ssl (re-
trieved 2015-07-06-1540). 
To illustrate how the coding was compiled, consider the example of Georgia. Georgia published 
a compiled code in each of 1867, 1873, 1882, 1895 (with a 1901 Supplement), and 1910. And so, 
to obtain the coding for Georgia in 1873, the 1873 Code is examined (p. 297 is partially reproduced 
in Figure F.12). Based on §1712, Georgia in 1873 is coded as having absolute divorce on the fol-
lowing grounds: consanguinity, insanity at time of marriage, impotency, fraud, pregnant, adultery, 
desertion (three years), and conviction of felony. 
The remainder of the coding for Georgia 1873 is similarly obtained, on the basis of other infor-
mation furnished by the 1873 Code. The coding for Georgia in the years 1867, 1882, 1895, 1901, 
and 1910 is likewise obtained from the information given in the aforementioned published codes 
(and supplement). 
To code the intervening years, it is helpful that Georgia’s published codes explicitly state when 
each section of the law was last enacted or amended. So for example, as shown in Figure F.12, the 
1873 Code tells us that §1712 was last enacted or amended by the Act of 1850. This would suggest 
that the 1872 law was the same. For confirmation, the 1867 Code is checked. There it is found that 
§1712 is indeed exactly the same as in 1873. Also checked are the session laws in each of the 
intervening years, to make sure that indeed, no amendments were made to this particular section 
between 1867 and 1873.  
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FIGURE F.12. EXCERPT FROM CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 1873, P. 297 
The coding for other states was obtained through similar means. It must however be noted that 
not all states were as straightforward to code as Georgia. Numerous judgment calls have had to be 
made, while coding the divorce laws of the multiple states across forty years.  
Another caveat is that the many nuances of the laws are not fully accounted for. For example, 
the variously-worded cruelty clauses are not finely differentiated. As another example, consider 
the matter of whether a state had a residency requirement. In one state, the requirement might 
simply be that the petitioner was a bona fide resident of the state. In another, it might be that the 
couple had married and cohabited in that state. Such nuances are, however, not accounted for; both 
states would be coded equally as simply having a residency requirement.  
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APPENDIX G 
A Note on Dhillon (1998) 
 
This note provides a counterexample to Theorem 1 in Amrita Dhillon, Extended Pareto Rules 
and Relative Utilitarianism, Social Choice and Welfare 15 (1998), 521-542. The paper concerns 
the aggregation of von Neumann Morgenstern utilities of individuals into a social preference. The-
orem 1 is a characterization of social welfare functions (SWFs) that satisfy an axiom that Dhillon 
calls the “extended Pareto axiom.’’ According to Theorem 1 the axiom is satisfied if and only if 
social welfare is the expected value of a weighted sum of individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utilities, where the weight of an individual may depend on the individual’s identity and preference, 
but not on the other individuals’ preferences. 
We use the notation and the definitions from Dhillon (1998). We begin by reproducing the 
“Extended Pareto Axiom” from Dhillon (1998). 
Extended Pareto Axiom (EP) For any profile of preferences R  N ∈ L  N and for any 2 element 
partition {G1, G2} of N, ∃𝜓𝜓𝐺𝐺1, 𝜓𝜓𝐺𝐺2 such that: for any pair of lotteries p and q 
 
p R Gi q i=1,2 
⇒ pR  q 
 
And if further, pP  Gi q, then 
pP  q. 
 
As stated, this axiom does, in fact, not say what Dhillon has in mind. This is because, as stated, 
in the axiom the group aggregation functions 𝜓𝜓𝐺𝐺1 and 𝜓𝜓𝐺𝐺2 are allowed to be different for different 
preference profiles R  N. But then it is clear that the axiom cannot have any implications for the 
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way in which the weights of an individual’s utility function in social welfare depend on the pref-
erence profile. So, Theorem 1, stated below, cannot possibly follow from EP. In this note, we 
assume that this is a simple oversight, and that Dhillon, in fact, meant to write: 
 
Extended Pareto Axiom (EP) For every G ⊂ N there exists a group aggregation rule 𝜓𝜓𝐺𝐺  such 
that for any profile of preferences R  N ∈L  N, any 2 element partition {G1, G2} of N, and any pair 
of lotteries p and q 
 
p R Gi q i=1,2 
⇒ p R  q 
And if further, p P  G1 q, then 
p P   q. 
 
We next reproduce Theorem 1 from Dhillon (1998). We only reproduce part (A) of the result, 
because our counterexample will be a counterexample to part (A).  
 
Theorem 1:  
(A) If A ≥ 4 and N ≥ 4, a SWF satisfies EP iff it can be represented by: 
 
                                             U = ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛′𝑛𝑛∈𝑁𝑁 (R n), whenever d(𝑢𝑢�⃗ ) > 2,    (1) 
 
where U is a vN-M utility representation of social preferences, and each 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛′  is a (unique, up to the 
function 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛) representation of individual preferences, such that 
 
                                                    𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛′ (𝑎𝑎) = �ℎ(𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛)(𝑎𝑎)�/𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 ��ℎ(𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛)(⋅)��                                    (2) 
 
where h(uN) = uN v– mina∈A uN(a), is a utility function in ℝA, and FN: ℝA → ℝ+ is positively homo-
geneous of degree 1 (if uN is not constant) and translation invariant.146 
                                                 
146 Note that 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 ��ℎ𝑛𝑛(𝑢𝑢 − 𝑛𝑛)�(⋅) + 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛�(𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛)(⋅)�� by translation invariance. If 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 is constant define 𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛(𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛) = 1. (Dhillon’s 
footnote.) 
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The result thus claims necessary and sufficient conditions for a social welfare function to satisfy 
(EP). However, Theorem 1 imposes no restrictions on social preferences when the rank of the 
collection of real vectors corresponding to the individuals’ Bernoulli utility functions, i.e. the rank 
of the collection of vectors �𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)�𝑎𝑎∈𝐴𝐴 for every i ∈ N, is less than 3. The conditions provided 
therefore cannot be sufficient. A sufficient condition must also impose restrictions on profiles of 
utility functions with a rank below 3. If, for example, all utility functions are identical, thus the 
rank of the collection is 1, but society’s preference is represented by a Bernoulli utility function 
that corresponds to preferences that are different from all individuals’ preferences, then the ex-
tended Pareto axiom does not hold for this social welfare function, even if it satisfies the condition 
of Dhillon’s Theorem 1(A). We assume that this is a simple oversight, and that Dhillon intended 
to restrict the domain of SWFs to utility profiles that satisfy the condition d(𝑢𝑢�⃗ ) > 2. 
With the domain restriction provided in the previous paragraph, Dhillon’s conditions is obvi-
ously sufficient for EP. We argue here that it is not necessary. We first note that Dhillon’s proof 
contains errors. Specifically, we shall show that equation (10) on page 529 of Dhillon (1998) is 
incorrect. To show this, we provide a counterexample. Let:  
 
#A = 4, u = (1, 1, 0, 0), v = (0, 1, 0, 0), w = (0, 0, 1, 1), 𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺′  = (1, 2, 0, 0), UG = (1, 3, 1, 1). 
 
Note that the dimension of the collection of vectors {u, v, w} is three, as required in Dhillon’s 
claim. We also note that the extended Pareto axiom is not violated. Indeed, UG is a possible repre-
sentation of the relative utilitarian welfare function. (If we add up the individuals’ utility functions, 
we obtain the vector (1, 4, 1, 1), but, of course, this vector and UG = (1, 3, 1, 1) represent the same 
preferences.) 
Trivial calculations show: 
 
λi,G’(u, v)= 1,  λj,G’(u, v)= 1, λi,G(u, v) = 1, λj,G(u, v)= 2, 
 
which contradicts Dhillon’s equation (10) which we reproduce here: 
 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝐺′(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)
𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝐺𝐺′(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣) = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝐺(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣)𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗,𝐺𝐺(𝑢𝑢, 𝑣𝑣). 
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In this example, whether Dhillon’s equation (10) holds depends on the representation of the 
preferences of group G that we choose. The proof to which equation (10) belongs, however, begins 
with the words (page 526): “A fixed utility representation un, is assumed for individual n. Similarly 
UG and U are fixed (up to translation) utility representations of group (respective social) prefer-
ences.” The example shows that if these representations are chosen arbitrarily, then the proof need 
not hold. It is an open question whether there exists at least one choice of the representations of 
individuals’ and group preferences for which the claim of (10) goes through.  
We conclude this note by providing a fully-fledged counterexample to Dhillon’s Theorem 1 (A) 
where we interpret the theorem as described above. Our counterexample will satisfy (EP), but not 
the condition in Dhillon’s theorem. Thus, the condition provided by Dhillon, although in our in-
terpretation of the result clearly sufficient, is not necessary for (EP). Some additional notation will 
be convenient: If v, w ∈ ℝA, then v ∼ w means that v and w both represent the same preference. 
Also, u denotes the map that assigns to each von Neumann Morgenstern preference R   that is not 
complete indifference the unique 0-1 normalized von Neumann Morgenstern utility representation. 
We interpret u(R  ) as a vector in ℝA.  
TABLE G.1—DEFINITION OF GROUP AGGREGATION RULES 
The preference or-
dering 
can be represented by 
𝜓𝜓12(R 1, R 2) 6𝑢𝑢(R 1) + 9𝑢𝑢(R 2) =: 𝑢𝑢12(R 1, R 2) for all (R 1, R 2) 
𝜓𝜓13(R 1, R 3) 6𝑢𝑢(R 1) + 5𝑢𝑢(R3) =: 𝑢𝑢13(R 1, R 3) for all (R 1, R 3) 
𝜓𝜓14(R 1, R4) 6𝑢𝑢(R 1) + 𝑢𝑢(R 4) =: 𝑢𝑢14(R 1, R 4) for all (R 1, R 4) 
𝜓𝜓23(R 2, R 3) 9𝑢𝑢(R 2) + 5𝑢𝑢(R 3) =: 𝑢𝑢23(R 2, R 3) for all (R 2, R 3) 
𝜓𝜓24(R 2, R 4) 9𝑢𝑢(R 2) + 𝑢𝑢(R 4) =: 𝑢𝑢24(R 2, R 4) for all (R 2, R 4) 
𝜓𝜓34(R 3, R 4) 5𝑢𝑢(R 3) + 𝑢𝑢(R 4) =: 𝑢𝑢34(R 3, R 4) for all (R 3, R 4) 
𝜓𝜓123(R 1, R 2, R 3) 6𝑢𝑢(R 1) + 9𝑢𝑢(R 2) + 5𝑢𝑢(R 3) =: 𝑢𝑢123(R 1, R 2, R 3) for all (R 1, R 2, R 3) 
𝜓𝜓124(R 1, R 2, R 4) 6𝑢𝑢(R 1) + 9𝑢𝑢(R 2) + 𝑢𝑢(R 4) =: 𝑢𝑢124(R 1, R 2, R 4) for all (R 1, R 2, R 4) 
𝜓𝜓134(R 1, R 3, R 4) 6𝑢𝑢(R 1) + 5𝑢𝑢(R 3) + 𝑢𝑢(R 4) =: 𝑢𝑢134(R 1, R 3, R 4) for all (R 1, R 3, R 4) 
𝜓𝜓234(R 2, R 3, R 4) 9𝑢𝑢(R 2) + 5𝑢𝑢(R 3) + 𝑢𝑢(R 4) =: 𝑢𝑢234(R 2, R 3, R 4) for all (R 2, R 3, R 4) 
 
We now construct our counterexample. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Let the 
preference profile R�
  𝑁𝑁 = �R�  1, R�  2, R�  3, R�  4� be defined by:  
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�𝑢𝑢�R�  1�, 𝑢𝑢�R�  2�, 𝑢𝑢�R�  3�, 𝑢𝑢�R�  4�� = {(1,0,0,0), (0,1,0,0), (0,0,1,1), (1,1,0,0)}. 
 
Note that R�  N satisfies the dimension condition d(𝑢𝑢�⃗ ) > 2. Construct the SWF φ so that φ(R�   N) 
can be represented by  
 
2u(R�  1) + 3u(R�  2) + 2u(R�  3) + u(R�  4) 
 
and, for all other preference profiles R  N = (R  1, R  2, R  3, R 4) in the domain, φ(R  N) can be 
represented by  
 
6u(R  1) + 9u(R  2) + 5u(R  3) + u(R  4). 
 
This completes the construction of our counterexample. 
We now show first that φ satisfies EP. We then show that φ does not satisfy the condition of 
Theorem 1 (A). To show that EP is satisfied, we construct group aggregation rules ψ12, ψ13, ψ14, 
ψ23, ψ24, ψ34: L 2 → L   and ψ124, ψ134, ψ234: L  3 → L  . We show the definition of these aggregation 
rules in Table 1.  
We now verify that φ indeed satisfies EP. We do this by showing that whenever we partition N 
into two subsets, society’s preference can be represented by a weighted utility function that is a 
weighted sum of utility functions that represent the two groups preferences, where all weights are 
strictly positive, and where the groups’ preferences are determined by the group aggregation rules 
in Table 1. This clearly implies EP.  
Consider any preference profile R  N ≠ R�   N. By construction, the social preference φ(R  ) can 
be represented by 6u(R  1) + 9u(R  2) + 5u(R  3) + u(R  4). It can be easily seen that:  
 
6u(R  1) + 9u(R  2) + 5u(R  3) + u(R  4)  ∼  u12(R  1,R  2) + u34(R  3,R  4) 
∼ u13(R  1, R  3) + u24(R  2, R  4)    ∼  u14(R  1,R  4) + u23(R  2,R  3) 
∼ u123(R  1, R  2, R  3) + u(R  4)   ∼ u124(R  1,R  2,R  4) + u(R  3) 
∼ u134(R  1, R  3, R  4) + u(R  2)   ∼ u234(R  2,R  3,R  4) + u(R  1) 
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Next consider the preference profile R�   N. The social preference φ(R�   N) can be represented by 
2u(R�  1) + 3u(R�  2) + 2u(R�  3) + u(R�  4) = (3, 4, 2, 2) ∼ (1, 2, 0, 0). It is not difficult to verify that: 
 
(1, 2, 0, 0)    ∼ 4
3
u12(R�  1, R�  2) + u34(R�  3, R�  4) 
∼ 8
7
 u13(R�  1, R�  3) + u24(R�  2, R�  4)   ∼ 14
13
u14(R�  1, R�  4) + u23(R�  2, R�  3) 
∼ 1
2
 u123(R�  1, R�  2, R�  3) + u(R�  4)  ∼ 1
4
u124(R�  1, R�  2, R�  4) + u(R�  3) 
∼ 1
8
 u134(R�  1, R�  3, R�  4) + u(R�  2)   ∼  2
13
u234(R�  2, R�  3, R�  4) + u(R�  1) 
 
This completes the proof that φ satisfies EP. 
Dhillon’s Theorem 1(A) now claims that for every SWF that satisfies EP there exist functions 
λi with λi(I   )=0 and λi(R  i) > 0 for all R  i ≠ I   (recall that I    denotes complete indifference), such 
that for all R  N, φ(R  N) can be represented by ∑i∈ N λi(R  i)u(R  i). We now show that such functions 
do not exist. Consider the profile R�  N (already given above) and in addition also the profiles R�   ≡ 
(R�  1, R�  2, R�  3,I   ) and Ṙ  N = (R�  1,I  , R�  3, R�  4). (Note that these latter two profiles also satisfy 
the dimension condition). Observe that φ(R�  N), φ(R�  N), and φ(Ṙ  N) can be represented by (1, 2, 0, 
0), (1, 4, 0, 0), and (3, 0, 2, 2). Suppose, for contradiction, that the functions λi do exist. Then: 
 
(1, 2, 0, 0)  ∼ λ1(R�  1)(1, 0, 0, 0) + λ2(R�  2)(0, 1, 0, 0) + λ3(R�  3)(0, 0, 1, 1) + λ4(R�  4)(1, 1, 0, 0) 
= (λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R� 4), λ2(R� 2) + λ4(R�  4), λ3(R�  3), λ3(R�  3)) 
(1, 4, 0, 0) ∼ λ1(R�  1)(1, 0, 0, 0) + λ2(R�  2)(0, 1, 0, 0) + λ3(R�  3)(0, 0, 1, 1) + λ4(I  )(1, 1, 1, 1) 
= (λ1(R�  1), λ2(R�  2), λ3(R�  3), λ3(R�  3)) 
(3, 0, 2, 2) ∼ λ1(R�  1)(1, 0, 0, 0) + λ2(I  )(1, 1, 1, 1) + λ3(R�  3)(0, 0, 1, 1) + λ4(R�  4)(1, 1, 0, 0) 
= (λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4), λ4(R�  4), λ3(R�  3), λ3(R�  3)) 
 
And so there exist x1, x2, x3 > 0, y1, y2, y3 ∈ ℝ such that: 
 
(1, 2, 0, 0) = (x1[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4)] + y1, x1[λ2(R�  2) + λ4(R�  4)] + y1,  
x1[λ3(R�  3)] + y1, x1[λ3(R�  3)] + y1)             (3) 
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(1, 4, 0, 0) = (x2[λ1(R�  1)] + y2, x2[λ2(R�  2)] + y2,  
x2[λ3(R�  3)] + y2, x2[λ3(R�  3)] + y2)             (4) 
(3, 0, 2, 2) = (x3[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4)] + y3, x3[λ4(R�  4)] + y3,  
x3[λ3(R�  3)] + y3, x3[λ3(R�  3)] + y3)             (5) 
 
Subtracting the first entry from the second in equation (3), we have 2 – 1 = 1 = x1[λ2(R�  2) –
λ1(R�  1)]. Doing the same for equation (4), we have 4 – 1 = 3 = x2[λ2(R�  2) – λ1(R�  1)]. Hence, x2 = 
3x1. We can thus rewrite equation (4) as : 
 
       �1
3
, 4
3
, 0,0� = �𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆1�R� 1�� + 𝑦𝑦23 , 𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆2�R� 2�� + 𝑦𝑦23 , 𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆3�R� 3�� + 𝑦𝑦23 , 𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆3�R� 3�� + 𝑦𝑦23 �    (6) 
 
Comparing the fourth entries of equations (3) and (6), we see that 𝑦𝑦2
3
= 𝑦𝑦1. So equation (6) can 
further be rewritten as: 
 
       �1
3
, 4
3
, 0,0� = �𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆1�R� 1�� + 𝑦𝑦1, 𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆2�R� 2�� + 𝑦𝑦1, 𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆3�R� 3�� + 𝑦𝑦1, 𝑥𝑥1�𝜆𝜆3�R� 3�� + 𝑦𝑦1�    (7) 
 
Now subtract the first entry of equation (7) from that of equation (3) to get  
 
x1λ4(R�  4) = 2
3
. 
 
Next, subtract the third entry from the first in equation (3) to get 1 – 0 = 1 = x1[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4) 
– λ3 (R�  3)]. Do the same for equation (5) to get 3 – 2 = 1 = x3[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4) – λ3(R�  3)]. Hence, 
x1 = 3x3. We can thus rewrite equation (5) as: 
 
(3, 0, 2, 2) = (x1[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4)] + y3, x1[λ4(R�  4)] + y3, x1[λ3(R�  3)] + y3, x1[λ3(R�  3)] + y3)        (8) 
 
Comparing the fourth entries in equations (3) and (8), we see that y3 = y1 + 2. So equation (8) can 
be further rewritten as:  
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(1, -2, 0, 0) = (x1[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4)] + y1, x1[λ4(R�  )4)] + y1, x1[λ3(R�  3)] + y1,  x1[λ3(R�  3)] + y1)      (9) 
The second entry of this equation says that x1[λ4(R�  4)] + y1 = –2 . Since x1λ4(R�  4) = 2
3
, we have also 
that y1 = – 8
3
. Equation (9) can be rewritten as 
 
             �11
3
, 2
3
, 8
3
, 8
3
� = (x1[λ1(R�  1) + λ4(R�  4)], x1[λ4(R�  4)], x1[λ3(R�  3)], x1[λ3(R�  3)])                      (10) 
 
Examining equations (7) and (10), we see that 
 
                                  λ1(R�  1) : λ2(R�  2) : λ3(R�  3) : λ4(R�  4) = 9 : 12 : 8 : 2                                    (11) 
 
Now consider profile R�   = (I  , R�  2, R�  3, R�  4) (note that this satisfies the dimension condition). 
By our construction of φ, the social preference ordering φ(R�  ) can be represented by (0, 9, 4, 4). 
Given the functions λi, it can also be represented by λ2(R�  2)(0, 1, 0, 0) + λ3(R�  3)(0, 0, 1, 1) + 
λ4(R�  4)(1, 1, 0, 0), which, given equation (11), is some multiple of 12(0, 1, 0, 0) + 8(0, 0, 1, 1) + 
2(1, 1, 0, 0) = (2, 14, 8, 8) ∼ (0, 12, 6, 6) ∼ (0, 2, 1, 1). We now have a contradiction, because 
clearly (0, 9, 4, 4) and (0, 2, 1, 1) do not represent the same preference ordering. This completes 
our proof that Dhillon’s Theorem 1 (A) is incorrect. 
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APPENDIX H 
Sources of No-Fault Approval and Effective Dates 
 
The following 492 pages contain the documentation that was used to determine the approval 
and effective dates of each state’s first no-fault divorce law. 
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 $&$   
5HWXUQ WR 6HDUFK 5HVXOWV
$&$      &RS\ Z &LWH 3DJHV 
$&$  
$UNDQVDV &RGH RI  $QQRWDWHG
&RS\ULJKW    E\ WKH 6WDWH RI $UNDQVDV
$OO ULJKWV UHVHUYHG
 /HJLVODWLRQ LV FXUUHQW WKURXJK WKH  6HFRQG ([WUDRUGLQDU\ 6HVVLRQ 
 DQG XSGDWHV UHFHLYHG IURP WKH $UNDQVDV &RGH 5HYLVLRQ &RPPLVVLRQ 
 WKURXJK 'HFHPEHU   
7LWOH   )DPLO\ /DZ  
6XEWLWOH   'RPHVWLF 5HODWLRQV  
&KDSWHU   'LYRUFH DQG $QQXOPHQW  
6XEFKDSWHU    $FWLRQV IRU 'LYRUFH RU $OLPRQ\
$&$    
  *URXQGV IRU GLYRUFH
D $ SODLQWLII ZKR VHHNV WR GLVVROYH DQG VHW DVLGH D FRYHQDQW PDUULDJH VKDOO VWDWH LQ KLV RU
KHU SHWLWLRQ IRU GLYRUFH WKDW KH RU VKH LV VHHNLQJ WR GLVVROYH D FRYHQDQW PDUULDJH DV
DXWKRUL]HG XQGHU WKH &RYHQDQW 0DUULDJH $FW RI    HW VHT
E 7KH FLUFXLW FRXUW VKDOO KDYH SRZHU WR GLVVROYH DQG VHW DVLGH D PDUULDJH FRQWUDFW QRW RQO\
IURP EHG DQG ERDUG EXW IURP WKH ERQGV RI PDWULPRQ\ IRU WKH IROORZLQJ FDXVHV
      :KHQ HLWKHU SDUW\ DW WKH WLPH RI WKH FRQWUDFW ZDV DQG VWLOO LV LPSRWHQW;
      :KHQ HLWKHU SDUW\ VKDOO EH FRQYLFWHG RI D IHORQ\ RU RWKHU LQIDPRXV FULPH;
      :KHQ HLWKHU SDUW\ VKDOO
         $ %H DGGLFWHG WR KDELWXDO GUXQNHQQHVV IRU RQH  \HDU;
         % %H JXLOW\ RI VXFK FUXHO DQG EDUEDURXV WUHDWPHQW DV WR HQGDQJHU WKH OLIH RI WKH
RWKHU; RU
         & 2IIHU VXFK LQGLJQLWLHV WR WKH SHUVRQ RI WKH RWKHU DV VKDOO UHQGHU KLV RU KHU FRQGLWLRQ
LQWROHUDEOH;
      :KHQ HLWKHU SDUW\ VKDOO KDYH FRPPLWWHG DGXOWHU\ VXEVHTXHQW WR WKH PDUULDJH;
      :KHQ KXVEDQG DQG ZLIH KDYH OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW IURP HDFK RWKHU IRU HLJKWHHQ
 FRQWLQXRXV PRQWKV ZLWKRXW FRKDELWDWLRQ WKH FRXUW VKDOO JUDQW DQ DEVROXWH GHFUHH RI
GLYRUFH DW WKH VXLW RI HLWKHU SDUW\ ZKHWKHU WKH VHSDUDWLRQ ZDV WKH YROXQWDU\ DFW RI RQH 
SDUW\ RU E\ WKH PXWXDO FRQVHQW RI ERWK SDUWLHV RU GXH WR WKH IDXOW RI HLWKHU SDUW\ RU ERWK
SDUWLHV;
       $ ,Q DOO FDVHV LQ ZKLFK D KXVEDQG DQG ZLIH KDYH OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW IRU WKUHH
 FRQVHFXWLYH \HDUV ZLWKRXW FRKDELWDWLRQ E\ UHDVRQ RI WKH LQFXUDEOH LQVDQLW\ RI RQH  RI
WKHP WKH FRXUW VKDOO JUDQW D GHFUHH RI DEVROXWH GLYRUFH XSRQ WKH SHWLWLRQ RI WKH VDQH VSRXVH
LI WKH SURRI VKRZV WKDW WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH KDV EHHQ FRPPLWWHG WR DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ IRU WKH FDUH
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DQG WUHDWPHQW RI WKH LQVDQH IRU WKUHH  RU PRUH \HDUV SULRU WR WKH ILOLQJ RI WKH VXLW KDV
EHHQ DGMXGJHG WR EH RI XQVRXQG PLQG E\ D FRXUW RI FRPSHWHQW MXULVGLFWLRQ DQG KDV QRW EHHQ
GLVFKDUJHG IURP VXFK DGMXGLFDWLRQ E\ WKH FRXUW DQG WKH SURRI RI LQVDQLW\ LV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH
HYLGHQFH RI WZR  UHSXWDEOH SK\VLFLDQV IDPLOLDU ZLWK WKH PHQWDO FRQGLWLRQ RI WKH VSRXVH RQH
 RI ZKRP VKDOO EH D UHJXODUO\ SUDFWLFLQJ SK\VLFLDQ LQ WKH FRPPXQLW\ ZKHUHLQ WKH VSRXVH
UHVLGHG DQG ZKHQ WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH KDV EHHQ FRQILQHG LQ DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ IRU WKH FDUH DQG
WUHDWPHQW RI WKH LQVDQH WKDW WKH SURRI LQ WKH FDVH LV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH HYLGHQFH RI WKH
VXSHULQWHQGHQW RU RQH  RI WKH SK\VLFLDQV RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ ZKHUHLQ WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH KDV
EHHQ FRQILQHG
         %  L ,Q DOO GHFUHHV JUDQWHG XQGHU WKLV VXEGLYLVLRQ E WKH FRXUW VKDOO UHTXLUH WKH
SODLQWLII WR SURYLGH IRU WKH FDUH DQG PDLQWHQDQFH RI WKH LQVDQH GHIHQGDQW VR ORQJ DV KH RU VKH
PD\ OLYH
             LL 7KH WULDO FRXUW ZLOO UHWDLQ MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH SDUWLHV DQG WKH FDXVH IURP WHUP WR
WHUP IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI PDNLQJ VXFK IXUWKHU RUGHUV DV HTXLW\ PD\ UHTXLUH WR HQIRUFH WKH
SURYLVLRQV RI WKH GHFUHH UHTXLULQJ WKH SODLQWLII WR IXUQLVK IXQGV IRU VXFK FDUH DQG PDLQWHQDQFH
         &  L 6HUYLFH RI SURFHVV XSRQ DQ LQVDQH VSRXVH VKDOO EH KDG E\ VHUYLFH RI SURFHVV
XSRQ WKH GXO\ DSSRLQWHG TXDOLILHG DQG DFWLQJ JXDUGLDQ RI WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH RU XSRQ D GXO\
DSSRLQWHG JXDUGLDQ DG OLWHP IRU WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH DQG ZKHQ WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH LV FRQILQHG LQ
DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ IRU WKH FDUH RI WKH LQVDQH XSRQ WKH VXSHULQWHQGHQW RU SK\VLFLDQ LQ FKDUJH RI WKH
LQVWLWXWLRQ ZKHUHLQ WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH LV DW WKH WLPH FRQILQHG
             LL +RZHYHU ZKHQ WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH LV QRW FRQILQHG LQ DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ VHUYLFH RI
SURFHVV XSRQ WKH GXO\ DSSRLQWHG TXDOLILHG DQG DFWLQJ JXDUGLDQ RI WKH LQVDQH VSRXVH RU GXO\
DSSRLQWHG JXDUGLDQ DG OLWHP DQG WKHUHDIWHU SHUVRQDO VHUYLFH RU FRQVWUXFWLYH VHUYLFH RQ DQ
LQVDQH GHIHQGDQW E\ SXEOLFDWLRQ RI ZDUQLQJ RUGHU IRU IRXU  ZHHNV VKDOO EH VXIILFLHQW; DQG
      :KHQ HLWKHU VSRXVH OHJDOO\ REOLJDWHG WR VXSSRUW WKH RWKHU DQG KDYLQJ WKH DELOLW\ WR
SURYLGH WKH RWKHU ZLWK WKH FRPPRQ QHFHVVDULHV RI OLIH ZLOOIXOO\ IDLOV WR GR VR
+,6725< &LYLO &RGH  ; $FWV  1R   >@ S ; & 	 0 'LJ  ; $FWV
 1R   ; 3RSH
V 'LJ  ; $FWV  1R    ;  1R   ; 
1R   ;  1R   ;  1R   ;  1R   ;  1R   ;
 1R   ; $6$   ; $FWV  1R    ;  1R   
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'& &RGH      &RS\ Z &LWH 3DJHV 
'& &RGH  
'LVWULFW RI &ROXPELD 2IILFLDO &RGH
&RS\ULJKW   &RS\ULJKW F  E\ WKH 'LVWULFW RI &ROXPELD $OO 5LJKWV 5HVHUYHG
$OO ULJKWV UHVHUYHG
 &XUUHQW WKURXJK ODZV LQ HIIHFW DV RI )HEUXDU\   DQG WKURXJK '& $FW  
'LYLVLRQ ,,  -XGLFLDU\ DQG -XGLFLDO 3URFHGXUH  
7LWOH   3DUWLFXODU $FWLRQV 3URFHHGLQJV DQG 0DWWHUV  
&KDSWHU   'LYRUFH $QQXOPHQW 6HSDUDWLRQ 6XSSRUW (WF
'& &RGH    
   *URXQGV IRU GLYRUFH OHJDO VHSDUDWLRQ DQG DQQXOPHQW
D $ GLYRUFH IURP WKH ERQGV RI PDUULDJH PD\ EH JUDQWHG LI
      ERWK SDUWLHV WR WKH PDUULDJH KDYH PXWXDOO\ DQG YROXQWDULO\ OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW
ZLWKRXW FRKDELWDWLRQ IRU D SHULRG RI VL[ PRQWKV QH[W SUHFHGLQJ WKH FRPPHQFHPHQW RI WKH
DFWLRQ;
      ERWK SDUWLHV WR WKH PDUULDJH KDYH OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW ZLWKRXW FRKDELWDWLRQ IRU D
SHULRG RI RQH \HDU QH[W SUHFHGLQJ WKH FRPPHQFHPHQW RI WKH DFWLRQ
E $ OHJDO VHSDUDWLRQ IURP EHG DQG ERDUG PD\ EH JUDQWHG LI
      ERWK SDUWLHV WR WKH PDUULDJH KDYH PXWXDOO\ DQG YROXQWDULO\ OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW
ZLWKRXW FRKDELWDWLRQ; RU
      ERWK SDUWLHV WR WKH PDUULDJH KDYH OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW ZLWKRXW FRKDELWDWLRQ IRU D
SHULRG RI RQH \HDU QH[W SUHFHGLQJ WKH FRPPHQFHPHQW RI WKH DFWLRQ
      5HSHDOHG
      5HSHDOHG
F )RU SXUSRVHV RI VXEVHFWLRQV  DQG  RI SDUDJUDSKV D DQG E RI WKLV VHFWLRQ SDUWLHV
ZKR KDYH SXUVXHG VHSDUDWH OLYHV VKDULQJ QHLWKHU EHG QRU ERDUG VKDOO EH GHHPHG WR KDYH
OLYHG VHSDUDWH DQG DSDUW IURP RQH DQRWKHU HYHQ WKRXJK
      WKH\ UHVLGH XQGHU WKH VDPH URRI; RU
      WKH VHSDUDWLRQ LV SXUVXDQW WR DQ RUGHU RI D FRXUW
G 0DUULDJH FRQWUDFWV PD\ EH DQQXOOHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ FDVHV
      ZKHUH VXFK PDUULDJH ZDV FRQWUDFWHG ZKLOH HLWKHU RI WKH SDUWLHV WKHUHWR KDG D IRUPHU
VSRXVH OLYLQJ XQOHVV WKH IRUPHU PDUULDJH KDG EHHQ ODZIXOO\ GLVVROYHG;
      ZKHUH VXFK PDUULDJH ZDV FRQWUDFWHG GXULQJ WKH LQVDQLW\ RI HLWKHU SDUW\ XQOHVV WKHUH
KDV EHHQ YROXQWDU\ FRKDELWDWLRQ DIWHU WKH GLVFRYHU\ RI WKH LQVDQLW\;
      ZKHUH VXFK PDUULDJH ZDV SURFXUHG E\ IUDXG RU FRHUFLRQ;
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 ZKHUH HLWKHU SDUW\ ZDV PDWULPRQLDOO\ LQFDSDFLWDWHG DW WKH WLPH RI PDUULDJH ZLWKRXW
WKH NQRZOHGJH RI WKH RWKHU DQG KDV FRQWLQXHG WR EH VR LQFDSDFLWDWHG; RU
      ZKHUH HLWKHU RI WKH SDUWLHV KDG QRW DWWDLQHG WKH DJH RI OHJDO FRQVHQW WR WKH FRQWUDFW RI
PDUULDJH XQOHVV WKHUH KDV EHHQ YROXQWDU\ FRKDELWDWLRQ DIWHU DWWDLQLQJ WKH DJH RI OHJDO
FRQVHQW EXW LQ VXFK FDVHV RQO\ DW WKH VXLW RI WKH SDUW\ ZKR KDG QRW DWWDLQHG VXFK DJH
+,6725< 'HF    6WDW  3XE /   ; 6HSW    6WDW
 3XE /   ; $SU   '& /DZ  WLWOH ,    '&5 ; 0DU 
 '& /DZ   I  '&5 ; 2FW   '& /DZ   E  '&5
; 6HSW   '& /DZ   D  '&5 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3 ULRU &RGLILFDWLRQV 
 (G  
 (G  
(IIHFW RI DPHQGPHQWV 
'& /DZ  LQ VXEVHF E PDGH QRQVXEVWDQWLYH FKDQJHV LQ SDUV  DQG  DQG
UHSHDOHG SDUV  DQG 
'& /DZ  LQ VXEVHF G VXEVWLWXWHG VSRXVH IRU ZLIH RU KXVEDQG
/HJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ RI /DZ   
)RU OHJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ RI '& /DZ  VHH +LVWRULFDO DQG 6WDWXWRU\ 1RWHV IROORZLQJ  

/HJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ RI /DZ   
/DZ  WKH 7HFKQLFDO $PHQGPHQWV $FW RI  ZDV LQWURGXFHG LQ &RXQFLO DQG DVVLJQHG
%LOO 1R  ZKLFK ZDV UHIHUUHG WR WKH &RPPLWWHH RI WKH :KROH 7KH %LOO ZDV DGRSWHG RQ
ILUVW DQG VHFRQG UHDGLQJV RQ 1RYHPEHU   DQG 'HFHPEHU   UHVSHFWLYHO\ 6LJQHG
E\ WKH 0D\RU RQ 'HFHPEHU   LW ZDV DVVLJQHG $FW 1R  DQG WUDQVPLWWHG WR ERWK
+RXVHV RI &RQJUHVV IRU LWV UHYLHZ '& /DZ  EHFDPH HIIHFWLYH RQ 0DUFK  
/HJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ RI /DZ   
/DZ  WKH 'RPHVWLF 5HODWLRQV /DZV &ODULILFDWLRQV $FW RI  ZDV LQWURGXFHG LQ
&RXQFLO DQG DVVLJQHG %LOO 1R  ZKLFK ZDV UHIHUUHG WR &RPPLWWHH RQ WKH -XGLFLDU\ 7KH
%LOO ZDV DGRSWHG RQ ILUVW DQG VHFRQG UHDGLQJV RQ -XQH   DQG -XO\   UHVSHFWLYHO\
6LJQHG E\ WKH 0D\RU RQ -XO\   LW ZDV DVVLJQHG $FW 1R  DQG WUDQVPLWWHG WR ERWK
+RXVHV RI &RQJUHVV IRU LWV UHYLHZ '& /DZ  EHFDPH HIIHFWLYH RQ 2FWREHU  
/HJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ RI /DZ   
/DZ  WKH 2PQLEXV 'RPHVWLF 3DUWQHUVKLS (TXDOLW\ $PHQGPHQW $FW RI  ZDV
LQWURGXFHG LQ &RXQFLO DQG DVVLJQHG %LOO 1R  ZKLFK ZDV UHIHUUHG WR WKH &RPPLWWHH RQ
3XEOLF 6DIHW\ DQG WKH -XGLFLDU\ 7KH %LOO ZDV DGRSWHG RQ ILUVW DQG VHFRQG UHDGLQJV RQ $SULO 
 DQG 0D\   UHVSHFWLYHO\ 6LJQHG E\ WKH 0D\RU RQ -XQH   LW ZDV DVVLJQHG
$FW 1R  DQG WUDQVPLWWHG WR ERWK +RXVHV RI &RQJUHVV IRU LWV UHYLHZ '& /DZ 
EHFDPH HIIHFWLYH RQ 6HSWHPEHU  
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 $G  
+ :LIH 'HIHQGDQW %HORZ $SSHOODQW
Y
+ +XVEDQG 3ODLQWLII %HORZ $SSHOOHH
$SULO  
6XSUHPH &RXUW RI 'HODZDUH
*HRUJH & +HULQJ ,,, RI 0RUULV -DPHV +LWFKHQV 	 :LOOLDPV :LOPLQJWRQ IRU GHIHQGDQW EHORZ DSSHOODQW
9LFWRU ) %DWWDJOLD RI %LJJV 	 %DWWDJOLD DQG $ -DPHV *DOOR :LOPLQJWRQ IRU SODLQWLII EHORZ DSSHOOHH
&$5(< DQG +(550$11 -XVWLFHV DQG 0(66,&. -XGJH VLWWLQJ
&$5(< -XVWLFH
7KH DSSHOODQW :LIH KDV DSSHDOHG IURP D GHFUHH HQWHUHG LQ 6XSHULRU &RXUW JUDQWLQJ D GLYRUFH WR KHU
KXVEDQG 7KH JURXQG IRU WKH GHFUHH ZDV LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ 7    ZKLFK EHFDPH SDUW RI
'HODZDUH ODZ RQ -XQH  
7KHUH DSSHDUV WR EH OLWWOH GLVDJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWLHV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH ODZ DSSOLFDEOH WR WKH FDVH
$V -XGJH :ULJKW SRLQWHG RXW LQ 'RUDQ Y 'RUDQ 'HO6XSHU  $G   RXU $FW GLIIHUV IURP
WKRVH RI RWKHU 6WDWHV ZKLFK DFFHSW LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ DV D SURSHU JURXQG IRU GLYRUFH DQG ZKRVH VWDWXWHV
VSHFLI\ LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ RU LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ RI WHPSHUDPHQW ZLWKRXW IXUWKHU GHILQLWLRQ OHDYLQJ LW XS WR WKH
&RXUWV WR GHILQH ZKDW DPRXQWV WR LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ 6HH DQQRWDWLRQ LQ  $/5G  2EYLRXVO\ WKH $FW
LV D UHFRJQLWLRQ E\ WKH /HJLVODWXUH WKDW WKHUH DUH LQVWDQFHV ZKHUH WKH PDQ DQG ZLIH FDQQRW JHW DORQJ
WRJHWKHU DQG WKHLU GLVVHQWLRQV DUH VXIILFLHQWO\ JUHDW WR MXVWLI\ UHOLHI IURP WKH REOLJDWLRQV RI PDUULDJH; DW WKH
VDPH WLPH WKH UHVWULFWLRQV LPSRVHG XSRQ WKH  JURXQG RI DFWLRQ PDQLIHVW D OHJLVODWLYH LQWHQW WKDW WKLV
JURXQG LV QRW WR EH OLJKWO\ UHJDUGHG DQG LV WR EH UHOLHG XSRQ RQO\ ZKHUH WKH GLIIHUHQFHV DUH GHHSURRWHG
RI VXEVWDQWLDO VLJQLILFDQFH DQG KDYH FRQWLQXHG RYHU D VXIILFLHQW SHULRG RI WLPH WR MXVWLI\ WKH EHOLHI WKDW
WKHUH LV QR OLNHOLKRRG RI UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ
8QGHU   WKHUH PXVW EH  ULIW RU GLVFRUG  SURGXFHG E\ UHFLSURFDO FRQIOLFW RI SHUVRQDOLWLHV 
H[LVWLQJ IRU WZR FRQVHFXWLYH \HDUV SULRU WR WKH ILOLQJ RI WKH DFWLRQ  ZKLFK KDV GHVWUR\HG WKHLU
UHODWLRQVKLS DV KXVEDQG DQG ZLIH WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW WKHUH LV QR UHDVRQDEOH SRVVLELOLW\ RI UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ
(PSKDVLV DGGHG 7KH LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ PXVW EH WKH UHVXOW RI VXFK GHHS DQG LQWHQVH FRQIOLFWV RI
SHUVRQDOLWLHV DQG GLVSRVLWLRQ VR DV WR EH LUUHPHGLDEOH
7KH WULDO MXGJH IRXQG WKDW WKH SODLQWLII KDG IXOO\ PHW KLV UHTXLUHG EXUGHQ RI SURRI E\ WKH SUHSRQGHUDQFH RI
WKH HYLGHQFH ,Q PDNLQJ WKLV ILQGLQJ WKH -XGJH IRXQG LQ IDYRU RI WKH SODLQWLII DV WR WKRVH PDWWHUV RI IDFW
ZKLFK ZHUH LQ GLVSXWH 7KH LVVXH EHIRUH XV DFFRUGLQJO\ LV ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH IDFWV VR IRXQG MXVWLI\ WKH
XOWLPDWH ILQGLQJ RI LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ DV GHILQHG LQ WKH VWDWXWH :H KDYH H[DPLQHG WKH HQWLUH UHFRUG DQG ILQG
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VXIILFLHQW HYLGHQFH WR VXSSRUW WKH WULDO &RXUW
V ILQGLQJV DQG FRQFOXVLRQ
7KH SDUWLHV ZHUH PDUULHG LQ  DQG VHSDUDWHG LQ )HEUXDU\  7KH\ KDYH IRXU FKLOGUHQ DJHG WZHQW\
VL[ WZHQW\WZR VHYHQWHHQ DQG WKLUWHHQ $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH KXVEDQG GLVDJUHHPHQWV UHVXOWLQJ LQ WHQVLRQV
FRPPHQFHG DERXW WHQ \HDUV EHIRUH WKH VHSDUDWLRQ JUDGXDOO\ LQFUHDVHG LQ IUHTXHQF\ DQG VHYHULW\ DQG DW
OHDVW WZR RU WKUHH \HDUV EHIRUH WKH VHSDUDWLRQ UHDFKHG D VWDJH ZKHUH DUJXPHQWV ZHQW RQ DOPRVW
FRQVWDQWO\ 7KH\ FRQVXOWHG WKH IDPLO\ SK\VLFLDQ ZKR UHIHUUHG WKHP WR D SV\FKLDWULVW LQ  7KH\
FRQWLQXHG WR VHH WKH SV\FKLDWULVW XQWLO DERXW  ZKHQ WKH\ GLVFRQWLQXHG WKHLU YLVLWV WR KLP EHFDXVH KLV
DGYLFH SURYHG LQHIIHFWXDO; WKH WHQVLRQ EHFDPH ZRUVH LQVWHDG RI EHWWHU /DWHU WKH\ FRQVXOWHG WKHLU
PLQLVWHU ZKR WULHG WR DVVLVW WKHP IRU D SHULRG RI D \HDU RU PRUH +LV DVVLVWDQFH OLNHZLVH ZDV LQHIIHFWLYH
DQG ZKLOH KH GLG QRW VD\ WKDW WKH\ RXJKW WR VHSDUDWH KH PDGH D UHPDUN ZKLFK LQGLFDWHG D EHOLHI WKDW WKH
FKLOGUHQ ZRXOG EH EHWWHU RII LI WKH SDUHQWV ZHUH VHSDUDWHG
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH KXVEDQG GXULQJ WKH ODVW WZR RU WKUHH \HDUV RI WKHLU FRKDELWDWLRQ WKHUH ZDV FRQVWDQW
WHQVLRQ LQ WKH IDPLO\ 7KH FRXSOH DUJXHG DQG TXDUUHOHG RYHU VXFK PDWWHUV DV VXSHUYLVLRQ RI WKH FKLOGUHQ
SROLWLFV FKXUFKHV ILQDQFHV DQG KRXVHNHHSLQJ 'XULQJ DUJXPHQWV DW PHDOWLPH IRRG ZRXOG EH WKURZQ ,I
LQ RUGHU WR HVFDSH IURP D TXDUUHO RQH RI WKHP ZRXOG JR LQWR D URRP DQG ORFN WKH GRRU WKH RWKHU ZRXOG
EUHDN WKH GRRU 6H[XDO UHODWLRQV GHWHULRUDWHG DQG FHDVHG HQWLUHO\ DERXW VL[ PRQWKV EHIRUH WKH
VHSDUDWLRQ 7KH KXVEDQG GLG QRW DWWHPSW WR SXW DOO WKH EODPH XSRQ WKH ZLIH EXW DJUHHG WKDW ERWK ZHUH DW
IDXOW +H VWDWHG WKDW WKHUH ZDV D ODFN RI WUXVW DQG FRQVWDQW WHQVLRQ ZKLFK ZDV KDYLQJ D EDG HIIHFW XSRQ
WKH \RXQJHU FKLOGUHQ DQG WKDW ODUJHO\ EHFDXVH RI KLV GHVLUH WR UHOLHYH WKH SUHVVXUH XSRQ WKH FKLOGUHQ KH
OHIW WKH KRPH 7KHUH KDV EHHQ QR UHVXPSWLRQ RI FRKDELWDWLRQ VLQFH WKDW WLPH
7KH KXVEDQG
V WHVWLPRQ\ IRXQG FRQVLGHUDEOH VXSSRUW LQ WKDW RI WKH VHYHQWHHQ\HDUROG VRQ ZKR ZDV WKH
RQO\ FKLOG WR WHVWLI\ ,W ZDV DOVR VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH WHVWLPRQ\ RI WKH SV\FKLDWULVW ZKR VWDWHG WKDW GXULQJ WKH
SHULRG KH DWWHQGHG WKHP WKHUH ZDV FRQWLQXDO ILJKWLQJ HDFK EODPLQJ WKH RWKHU; WKDW WKH\ ZHUH DJJUHVVLYH
DQG KRVWLOH HDFK WRZDUG WKH RWKHU; WKDW VKH FRPSODLQHG WKDW WKH KXVEDQG ZDV DXWRFUDWLF DQG GLFWDWRULDO;
DQG WKDW LQ KLV RSLQLRQ WKHLU GLIIHUHQFHV ZHUH VHULRXV DQG GHHSURRWHG 7KH PLQLVWHU DJUHHG WKDW WKHLU
GLIIHUHQFHV ZHUH QRW WULYLDO DQG WKDW KH KDG EHHQ XQDEOH WR HIIHFW DQ\ LPSURYHPHQW LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ $
)DPLO\ &RXUW ZRUNHU WHVWLILHG WKDW WKH ZLIH VDLG WR KLP VRPHWLPH DIWHU WKH VHSDUDWLRQ WKDW WKHUH KDG EHHQ
LQFHVVDQW ILJKWLQJ LQ WKH KRPH SULRU WR WKH VHSDUDWLRQ
7KH ZLIH DGPLWWHG WKDW D JUHDW QXPEHU RI DUJXPHQWV WRRN SODFH DW WKH GLQQHU WDEOH 6KH IHOW WKDW WKHLU
GLIIHUHQFHV FRXOG EH UHFRQFLOHG DQG VWDWHG WKDW VKH VWLOO ORYHV KHU KXVEDQG 6KH FRQVLGHUHG WKHLU ELJJHVW
SUREOHP WR EH D IDLOXUH WR FRPPXQLFDWH +HU WHVWLPRQ\ WHQGHG WR PLQLPL]H VRPH RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO
HSLVRGHV ZKLFK WKH KXVEDQG FRQVLGHUHG VHULRXV DQG VKH FRQWHQGV WKDW WKH TXDUUHOLQJ GLG QRW H[WHQG
EH\RQG WKH GHJUHH ZKLFK H[LVWV LQ WKH DYHUDJH KRXVHKROG 7ZR RI KHU IULHQGV WHVWLILHG WKDW WKH\ GLG QRW
NQRZ WKDW WKHUH ZDV DQ\ VHULRXV WURXEOH EHWZHHQ WKH FRXSOH XQWLO WKH KXVEDQG OHIW $SSHOODQW
V VLVWHU
ZKR OLYHV LQ 5LFKPRQG 9LUJLQLD LQGLFDWHG KHU EHOLHI WKDW WKH GLIILFXOWLHV ZHUH FDXVHG SULQFLSDOO\ E\ WKH
KXVEDQG EXW GLG QRW EHOLHYH WKDW WKH GLIIHUHQFHV ZHUH LUUHFRQFLODEOH
)URP WKLV EULHI VXPPDU\ RI WKH WHVWLPRQ\ LW ZLOO EH VHHQ WKDW WKHUH ZDV DPSOH HYLGHQFH LI EHOLHYHG WR
VDWLVI\ DOO WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKH VWDWXWH 3UDFWLFDOO\ DOO RI WKH WHVWLPRQ\ ZDV RUDO DQG WKH WULDO -XGJH KDG
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WKH EHQHILW RI REVHUYLQJ WKH ZLWQHVVHV DV WKH\ WHVWLILHG :H DFFHSW KLV ILQGLQJ RI IDFW DQG DJUHH ZLWK KLV
FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW D GHFUHH ZDV MXVWLILHG
7KH MXGJPHQW EHORZ ZLOO EH DIILUPHG
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&RS\ULJKW  E\ 7KH 6WDWH RI *HRUJLD
$OO ULJKWV UHVHUYHG
 &XUUHQW 7KURXJK WKH  5HJXODU 6HVVLRQ 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
   (IIHFWLYH GDWH RI OHJLVODWLYH $FWV 
   D 8QOHVV D GLIIHUHQW HIIHFWLYH GDWH LV VSHFLILHG LQ DQ $FW
    $Q\ $FW ZKLFK LV DSSURYHG E\ WKH *RYHUQRU RU ZKLFK EHFRPHV ODZ ZLWKRXW KLV DSSURYDO RQ RU
DIWHU WKH ILUVW GD\ RI -DQXDU\ DQG SULRU WR WKH ILUVW GD\ RI -XO\ RI D FDOHQGDU \HDU VKDOO EHFRPH
HIIHFWLYH RQ WKH ILUVW GD\ RI -XO\; DQG
    $Q\ $FW ZKLFK LV DSSURYHG E\ WKH *RYHUQRU RU ZKLFK EHFRPHV ODZ ZLWKRXW KLV DSSURYDO RQ RU
DIWHU WKH ILUVW GD\ RI -XO\ DQG SULRU WR WKH ILUVW GD\ RI -DQXDU\ RI WKH LPPHGLDWHO\ VXFFHHGLQJ
FDOHQGDU \HDU VKDOO EHFRPH HIIHFWLYH RQ WKH ILUVW GD\ RI -DQXDU\
E 6XEVHFWLRQ D RI WKLV &RGH VHFWLRQ VKDOO QRW DSSO\ WR ORFDO OHJLVODWLRQ RU WR UHVROXWLRQV LQWHQGHG
WR KDYH WKH HIIHFW RI ODZ 6XFK ORFDO OHJLVODWLRQ DQG UHVROXWLRQV LQWHQGHG WR KDYH WKH HIIHFW RI ODZ
EHFRPH HIIHFWLYH LPPHGLDWHO\ XSRQ DSSURYDO E\ WKH *RYHUQRU RU XSRQ WKHLU EHFRPLQJ ODZ ZLWKRXW
KLV DSSURYDO XQOHVV D GLIIHUHQW HIIHFWLYH GDWH LV VSHFLILHG LQ WKH $FW RU UHVROXWLRQ
+,6725< *D /  S   ; *D /  S   ; *D /  S   ; *D / 
S   
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